*196OPINION
By the Court,
Appellant Arthur E. Pease was one of three comakers of a 90-day, $16,500 promissory note dated September 15, 1966. Respondent Wesley S. Taylor was the named beneficiary of the note. The note was not paid. Taylor sued Pease for the $16,500 plus interest and attorney fees. Pease’s only defense was that the transaction was usurious.1 Pease contends (1) that an amount less than the $16,500 was advance by Taylor and (2) that from that amount Taylor further withheld “brokers’ fees” that constituted prepaid interest in excess of the legal rate.2 We cannot reach that question, because the findings of the district judge make no reference, express or implied, to the usury question.3
NRCP 52 provides in part:
“(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a *197jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment . . . .”
It is true that this court has repeatedly held that even in the absence of express findings, if the record is clear and will support the judgment, findings may be implied. State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Olsen, 76 Nev. 176, 351 P.2d 186 (1960); Chisholm v. Redfield, 75 Nev. 502, 347 P.2d 523 (1959).
Not so, when the record is not clear, as in this case. Richfield Oil Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 85 Nev. 185, 452 P.2d 462 (1969); Lagrange Constr., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Corp., 83 Nev. 524, 435 P.2d 515 (1967); Robison v. Bate, 78 Nev. 501, 376 P.2d 763 (1962); Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1962).
We therefore remand the case to the district court, so that adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law may be made by the district judge to the end that this court may appropriately review the issues presented on this appeal.
Collins, C. J., Zenoff, Batjer, and Thompson, JJ., concur.