*231OPINION
Among the errors assigned by petitioners is the following:
(b) The Commissioner erroneously determined, that none of the assets acquired in 1963 in connection with repossession of the Redwood Lodge qualified for an investment credit under section 38, et seq., of the Internal Revenue Code;
Section 38,1.R.C. 1954, is in the margin.1 Subpart B of chapter 1, subch. A, part IV, I.R.C. 1954, comprises three sections, namely, 46, 47, and 48, the applicable provisions of which are in the margin.2 *232Under tbe applicable provisions quoted in footnote 2, petitioners would compute the credit here contended for to be $2,164.01 which is 7 percent of two-thirds of $46,371.71. Eespondent, however, contends that no investment credit is allowable on the reacquired Redwood Lodge property for the reason that under the definition of “Used Section 38 Property” contained in section 48(c) (1) “Property shall not be treated as ‘used section 38 property’ if, after its acquisition by the taxpayer, it is used by a person who used such property before such acquisition.” Paragraph 14 of the stipulation of facts is as follows :
14. After reacquisition of the property on April 4, 1963, it was used by petitioners and not by Redwood Gay Nineties Lodge, a corporation. However, the said property was the property which had been owned and used by petitioners-prior to the aforementioned sale of the property on April 2, 1962.
It would seem from the statute and the stipulated facts in paragraph 14 of the stipulation that the property here in question could not be treated as “used section 38 property” for the very reason that after its reacquisition by petitioners on April 4, 1963, it was used by petitioners who used such property before such reacquisition.
At the outset, it should be noted that our only problem here is to determine the intent of Congress in enacting the second sentence of section 48 (c) (1), supra, and in doing so we are relieved of any discussion of the phrase “(or by a person who bears a relationship described in section 179 (d) (2) (A) ) ” for the reason that the parties have stipulated that neither the corporation nor its stockholders were related to petitioner within the meaning of either section 267 or 707 (b), which sections are the sections mentioned in section 179(d) (2) (A).
Petitioners contend that the applicable part of the second sentence of section 48(c) (1) is ambiguous and that it should be interpreted *233as if Congress bad inserted tbe word “immediately” twice in tbe said sentence, tbns making it read as follows:
Property shall not be treated as “used section 38 property” if, immediately after its acquisition by the taxpayer, it is used by a person who used such property immediately before such acquisitions * * *
Under tbe wording of tbe statute, the second sentence of section 48(c)(1) would not apply for petitioners were using the property immediately after its acquisition on April 4,1963, and the corporation was tbe person using tbe property immediately before such acquisition.
We do not agree with petitioners’ contention.
Under section 2 of tbe Kevenue Act of 1962,3 Congress enacted new sections 38, 46, 47, and 48 of tbe Internal Kevenue Code of 1954, in order to encourage investment and stimulate business activity;4 Section 38(b) provided that regulations be prescribed to carry out tbe purposes of these sections. Tbe applicable section of tbe regulations is section 1.48-3, the material provisions of which are in tbe margin.5 While the facts in this case do not fall within any of tbe three examples of tbe regulations just referred to, we do not think tbe regulations in any way can be said to support petitioners’ contention. It repeats tbe exact words of tbe statute with perhaps tbe qualification that property shall not be considered as used by a person before its acquisition if such property was used only on a “casual” basis by such person. Tbe latter qualification could hardly apply to petitioners for they used tbe property reacquired on April 4, 1963, from about December 4, 1957, to April 2, 1962, which would be more than a casual use.
*234Furthermore, we do not think this is the type of case that Congress had in mind when it enacted the investment credit provisions. In the first place, it only applied to property acquired by purchase after December 31,1961. Petitioners first acquired this property in or about 1957. Had it not sold the property to the corporation in 1962, it is obvious it would have had no basis for an investment credit claim. We do not think petitioners are in any better position for having sold the property in 1962 and having reacquired it in 1963. It was still property “used by a person who used such property before such acquisition.” Sec. 48(c) (1), supra. Moreover, the facts as stipulated do not indicate that any part of the purchase price of $46,371.71 was for property originally purchased after December 31,1961, and before or after April 2, 1962, or that any additional capital was invested in the reacquisition of the property in question over and above the sum originally invested by petitioner.
We express no opinion on facts different from those presented in the instant case.
We sustain the respondent’s determination. Because of certain conceded issues by both parties,
Decision will be entered v/nder Bule 50.