In re General Electrodynamics Corp. 368 B.R. 543

MEMORANDUM OPINION

D. MICHAEL LYNN, United States Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the court is the “First Amended Plan of Reorganization, Proposed by General Electrodynamics Corporation" as modified by the “Second Amendment and Supplement to Debtor’s First Amended Plan of Reorganization” (the “Plan”)1 filed by the above named Debtor (sometimes “GEC’). The court held a confirmation hearing respecting the Plan (the “Hearing”) over 4 days on October 17, November 8, November 13, and November 14, 2006. During the Hearing, the court heard testimony from Debtor’s president, Dick E. Davis (“Davis”); Debtor’s chief operating officer, James Emmons (“Em-mons”); Bryant Needham (“Needham”) an economist who testified as to interest rates on behalf of Debtor and who was called by Esequiel Sanchez (“Sanchez”) to rebut valuation testimony of Christopher J. Kelly (“Kelly”) who was called by Debt- or as a valuation expert; and (by video deposition) Harold Thomas. The court also received into evidence exhibits identified as necessary below.2

Following the Hearing, Debtor and Compass Bank (“Compass”) filed briefs in support of confirmation. Sanchez filed a brief in opposition to confirmation.

This matter is subject to this court’s core jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(L). This memorandum opinion constitutes the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7052 and 9014. Much of the transcript of the Hearing was placed under seal at Debtor’s request in order to protect against disclosure of information respecting a business opportunity being pursued by Davis; in part in recognition of that request, the court directs below that this memorandum opinion be placed under seal pending further order of the court. Parties receiving copies of this memorandum opinion (as set forth below) are directed and cautioned to act accordingly.

I. BACKGROUND

GEC is in the business of producing and marketing devices for weighing aircraft and trucks. Compass is GEC’s principal secured lender and is owed approximately $800,000. Although possessed of a checkered history,3 GEC appears currently to be profitable.

*547On December 30, 2005, Sanchez obtained a judgment against GEC in the amount of $1,439,4904 (the “Judgment”) 5 GEC appealed the Judgment, but the appeal is stayed pursuant to Code § 362(a)(1),6 and the parties estimate that substantial costs will be incurred and substantial time will pass before all proceedings respecting the Judgment are concluded.

Rather than posting a bond to avoid execution against it on the Judgment, GEC commenced this chapter 11 case. The Plan proposes to pay Sanchez 100% of his claim, if any, once appeals of the Judgment are exhausted. Pending conclusion of appeals, however, Sanchez is to receive no distributions on his claim.7 Following confirmation Debtor proposes no immediate escrow of funds from its operations against the Judgment and candidly admits its cash flow would not allow for such an escrow. The projections testified to by Kelly (Debtor’s Exhibit 18) do not allow for distributions to (or escrow of funds for the benefit of)8 Sanchez until September 2008.

Under the Plan, Sanchez is classified separately from other unsecured creditors.9 All classes other than that of Sanchez have accepted the Plan. Sanchez has rejected the Plan.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Alternatives to the Plan

Debtor and Compass argue that the only alternative to the Plan is Debtor’s liquidation. In such a liquidation, unsecured creditors, including Sanchez, would, at best, they assert, receive a tiny dividend. Sanchez, on the other hand, insists Debtor could be sold as a going concern, either pursuant to a chapter 11 plan or by a chapter 7 trustee, who, Sanchez posits, *548would be able to operate Debtor’s business under Code § 721.

The court is of the opinion that, in the absence of a plan satisfactory to Debtor, liquidation under chapter 7 is the only realistic alternative in this case.10 In attacking the treatment of his claim under the Plan, Sanchez makes much of the fact that (1) Davis is of an age such that he may not live long enough for Debtor to complete the payments to Sanchez called for by the Plan; (2) Neither Davis nor Emmons nor any of Debtor’s other employees have entered into (or, pursuant to the Plan, will be required to enter into) employment agreements or agreements not to compete with Debtor; and (3) Davis and other of Debtor’s employees could elect at any time to abandon Debtor, thus mooting the Plan, and operate a business identical to Debtor’s elsewhere.

Just as these factors make the Plan unattractive for Sanchez, they make successful marketing of Debtor as a going concern during further chapter 11 proceedings unlikely. As to the alternative of sale by a chapter 7 trustee authorized to operate Debtor’s business under section 721, even assuming the court would authorize such operations,11 it is even less likely that Davis and Debtor’s other employees would serve a chapter 7 trustee in such circumstances than that they would cooperate in a sale under a chapter 11 plan. Moreover, the court finds persuasive the testimony of Emmons, Davis and Kelly12 that there are no likely buyers who would be prepared to pay a price for Debt- or sufficient to provide a meaningful return to unsecured creditors.

Because liquidation of Debtor would provide much worse treatment to Sanchez (and other creditors) than does the Plan, because sale of the Debtor as a going concern is not practicable and because Debtor provides a benefit to the community through the payroll it supports, Debtor and Compass argue that the Plan should be confirmed. The alternative of lost jobs and destruction of a profitable company, they insist, must be avoided; ergo, the court must rule in favor of confirmation.

Unfortunately, the Code does not provide the court with the authority to confirm a plan simply because it is better for an objecting creditor than is the alternative. Similarly, the Code makes no provision for the court to override the requirements of confirmation in favor of the public interest or on the basis that support for the Plan by creditors other than Sanchez is overwhelming. On the contrary, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPC-PA”), in which Congress undertook a thorough revamping of the Code, evidences no legislative concern for the public interest or the interests of employees or creditors *549generally.13 Instead, Congress enacted provisions favoring special classes of creditors to the exclusion of all other considerations. Thus, in amending, for example, sections 365, 366 and 1121 of the Code, Congress has, presumably intentionally, made chapter 11 much less suitable as a remedy than it was before BAPCPA became effective. Companies such as Kmart, Mirant Corp. and United Airlines, all of which have survived through use of chapter 11, very likely could not restructure effectively under the Code since the passage of BAPCPA.

It would be singularly inappropriate, therefore, for the court to import into chapter 11 an overriding test for confirmation based on the court’s views of Sanchez’s best interest (as opposed to that creditor’s) or based on the public interest or the needs of a debtor’s employees. Certainly if Congress is prepared to see companies like Kmart (which at the time of its chapter 11 filing employed 250,000 workers) collapse at the whim of their landlords, there is no reason to think Congress would care if the strict requirements it has enacted for confirmation of chapter 11 plans should lead to the demise of GEC. Put another way, if the Plan does not meet the requirements of section 1129 of the Code, then the court may not confirm it, however disastrous the consequences for Sanchez, other creditors and the community at large.

The court must administer the Code according to its terms. The role the public interest or the needs of creditors or a debtor’s employees should play in plan confirmation must be left to Congress. As Congress has structured the Code, the court, in its decision whether to confirm the Plan, has no authority to substitute its views of what is best for Sanchez for his own; he has an absolute right under the law to shoot himself in the foot.

B. Requirements for Confirmation

1. Requirements other than Feasibility a. Section 1129(a)

Section 1129(a) of the Code establishes 16 tests for confirmation of a plan of reorganization. In the case at bar, the Plan does not meet the test established by section 1129(a)(8) which requires either that each class of claims or interest must be unimpaired or that the holders of the claims or interests in the classes have, by the requisite majorities, accepted the Plan. Sanchez, whose claim is classified by itself, voted to reject the Plan. There is no dispute that his claim is impaired.

As to the remaining tests of section 1129(a) (other than the feasibility requirement of section 1129(a)(11)), the court finds that each such test is either inapplicable or is met by the Plan, with the possible exception of the requirement of section 1129(a)(1) that the Plan comply with the applicable provisions of the Code. As to this requirement, certain provisions of the Plan such as the injunction protecting Nordic and Davis (really a channeling order) may not comply with the Code in the specific context of the Plan. The injunction (or channeling order), as proposed in this Plan, can only be consistent with section 524(e) of the Code if its effect is no more than to defer pursuit by Sanchez of Nordic or, more importantly, Davis pend*550ing full satisfaction of Sanchez’s claim by Debtor. See In re Artra Group, Inc., 300 B.R. 699, 704 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2003). Given its concerns regarding the likelihood of Sanchez’s claim being so satisfied, which are set out below, the court is not now prepared to find the injunction to be permissible under section 524(e). On the other hand, because of its conclusion that the Plan is, in any event, not confirmable, neither will the court at this juncture hold that the Plan does not satisfy section 1129(a)(1) of the Code.

b. Section 1129(b)

Pursuant to Code § 1129(b)(1), the court may confirm a plan which meets all the requirements of section 1129(a) other than that of section 1129(a)(8) (i.e., that each class of claims and interests is unimpaired or has accepted the plan) if the court determines that the plan is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly as to dissenting classes. A plan is deemed to be fair and equitable if it satisfies, as to any dissenting class, the applicable requirements established by section 1129(b)(2).

In the instant case, for the Plan to be fair and equitable it must, as to Sanchez’s dissenting class, provide on account of his claim “property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i). For purposes of confirmation of the Plan the parties have stipulated that the allowed amount of Sanchez’s claim is $1,100,000 and that accrual of interest on the claim at 9% will provide full present value of the claim.14 The Plan, however, provides that Sanchez’s claim will amortize negatively (except to the extent the $100,000 cash bond may be escrowed against interest) for approximately two years. Although not favored (see In re McCombs Properties VIII, Ltd., 91 B.R. 907 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1988); In re Sunflower Racing, Inc., 226 B.R. 673, 688 (D.Kan.1998); In re M & S Assocs., Ltd., 138 B.R. 845, 850 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1992); In re Apple Tree Partners, 131 B.R. 380, 395 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1991); In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385, 398 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1989), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1065 (11th Cir.1992)),15 courts have approved plans under section 1129(b)(2) that provide for negative amortization. See, e.g., In re Club Assoc., 107 B.R. 385, 398 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1989) (confirming a plan under § 1129(b) despite negative amortization of secured claim; terms of original contract provided for negative amortization); In re Consolidated Properties Ltd. P’ship, 170 B.R. 93, 99 (Bankr.D.Md.1994); In re Bouy, Hall and Howard and Assoc., 141 B.R. 784, 790 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1992).16 But confirmed plans that so provide typically involve a dissenting class of secured claims. Indeed, the court has found (and has been cited to) no case in which a plan that provided for negative amortization of a dissenting class of unsecured claims was *551confirmed pursuant to section 1129(b)(2)(B)(i). Thus, while the court would find, based on the testimony of Kelly and Needham, that the value as of the Plan’s effective date of the payments proposed for Sanchez’s claim is $1,100,000, the court is not now prepared to hold that the proposed treatment of Sanchez’s claim is fair and equitable and not unfairly discriminatory. Because of the court’s finding respecting feasibility, there is no need to resolve at this time whether the Plan, because it negatively amortizes a dissenting class of unsecured claims, fails to satisfy section 1129(b).

2. Feasibility

Code § 1129(a)(ll) requires that, in order for a plan to be confirmed, the court must find that:

(11) Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.

Generally referred to as a requirement that a plan be feasible, section 1129(a)(11) mandates that a debtor satisfy the court that carrying out the terms of the plan, in the context of future operations, is not likely to force the debtor into liquidation or further reorganization proceedings. That a plan meets this test must (like all other requirements for confirmation) be proven by the plan’s proponent by a preponderance of the evidence. In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship, 116 F.3d 790, 801 (5th Cir.1997); In re Danny Thomas Properties II Ltd. P’ship, 241 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir.2001); In re Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 120 (D.Del.2006); Corestates Bank, N.A. v. United Chemical Technologies, Inc., 202 B.R. 33, 45 (E.D.Pa.1996).

In the case at bar, Debtor has failed to meet this requirement. As Debt- or argues, it was not required to show certainty that the Plan is feasible. Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship, 116 F.3d 790, 801 (5th Cir.1997). That certainty is not required does not equate, though, to giving the Debtor the benefit of every doubt nor does it shift to Sanchez the burden to show that the Plan is not feasible.

Debtor admits in its post-hearing brief that its projections are “tight.” The court would go further. Debtor’s projections reflect that payments on Sanchez’s claim will result in a number of years in which the Debtor will have a negative cash flow (Debtor’s Exhibit 18; testimony of Kelly, Transcript of Hearing, Nov. 13, 2006, p. 92, ll. 6 ff). Kelly testified (id. p. 94, ll. 2 ff) that there were a number of ways Debtor could handle these shortfalls—e.g., additional borrowing or deferring trade payables. If the court had sufficient confidence in Kelly’s projections, it might be prepared to put Sanchez to the risk that Debtor would be unable to overcome these projected cash deficiencies. But Kelly did not instill such confidence. Both Kelly’s testimony and the testimony of Needham elicited by Sanchez on rebuttal left the court with grave concern about the depth of Kelly’s investigation and his methodology in projecting the results of Debtor’s operations.17 When uncertainties *552such as Davis’s probable lifespan, the attraction for Davis of other opportunities, the possibility of Debtor’s management defecting to a prospective competitor and the possible fluctuations always inherent in the economy are taken into account,18 the court cannot find that Debtor has carried its burden; confirmation of the Plan will, as likely as not, be followed by a need for further restructuring or Debtor’s liquidation. Because the court cannot find that the Plan meets the requirements of Code § 1129(a)(11), the Plan cannot be confirmed.

III. CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding its determination that the Plan is not confirmable, the court is convinced that it is in the best interest of all parties, including Sanchez, that GEC survive. The court is thus reluctant to enter an order denying confirmation — an event that would likely be followed promptly by Debtor’s conversion to chapter 7 and all the unfortunate consequences predicted by Debtor and Compass. Accordingly, the court will temporarily defer entry of an order consistent with this opinion. Rather, pursuant to Code § 105(d), Davis, Sanchez, their attorneys and counsel for Debtor are directed to attend a conference with the court to be held in chambers at 9:00 a.m. on December 27, 2006. In addition to those parties, Compass, Nordic and the United States trustee may, but are not required to attend such conference.

The clerk of the court is directed to transmit a copy of this memorandum opinion to counsel for each of the parties named in the preceding paragraph and J. Douglas Cortes, court-appointed examiner in this case. Except as here specified, this memorandum opinion shall be held under seal by the clerk pending further order of the court.

Entered: December 19, 2006

On Motion for Rehearing; Motion to Estimate Claim; Objections to Claim; and Application for Allowance of Administration Expense

Following entry of the foregoing memorandum opinion, Debtor filed its “Fourth Amendment and Supplement to Debtor’s First Amended Plan of Reorganization” (the “Fourth Modification”) and sought reconsideration based upon such modification of the court’s determination that the Plan was not confirmable pursuant to

*553Code § 1129(a)(ll). The central feature of the Fourth Modification is a capital infusion from Davis into Debtor19 of $400,000.20 Based (in part, at least) on indications from the court that the proposed capital infusion would resolve the court’s concerns respecting feasibility of the Plan,21 Sanchez withdrew his objection to confirmation of the Plan; Sanchez also filed his “Motion for Estimation and Allowance of Unsecured Claim of Mr. Esequiel Juan Sanchez, III, for Distribution Purposes” (the “Estimation Motion”), as a result of which Debtor and Sanchez agreed to a procedural order (the “Estimation Order*’) which the court entered on February 6, 2007. In addition to procedures established by the Estimation Order, pursuant to which the court was to determine the amount of Sanchez’s claim based on appeal (and, potentially, remand) of the Judgment, Debtor filed its “Debtor’s Objection to Amended Proof of Claim of Esequiel Sanchez III” (the “Claim Objection”), by which Debtor urged objections to Sanchez’s claim on various bases independent of its appeal of the Judgment. Finally, Sanchez filed “Esequiel Sanchez, Ill’s Application for Allowance and Payment of Administrative Expenses” (the “§ 503(b) Application”), pursuant to which Sanchez, under Code § 503(b), seeks payment of a part of his attorneys’ fees incurred in this case.

The court heard argument respecting the Estimation Motion and received evidence on the Claim Objection and the § 503(b) Application on April 17, 2007. Having determined that the Plan, as modified, should be confirmed, the court, by letter ruling, resolved the Estimation Motion and Claim Objection22 by allowing Sanchez’s claim in the amount of $811,070 (including $22,000 in prepetition attorneys’ fees).23 As directed in the Judgment, interest shall be calculated on that amount *554from January 20, 2006 to the date of the commencement of Debtor’s chapter 11 case.24

Turning next to the § 503(b) Application, Debtor presents numerous arguments why that application should be denied or substantially reduced. Several of these arguments turn on the necessity that Sanchez show he has made in “substantial contribution” in the case25: Debtor denies that the “contributions” by Sanchez were substantial or benefited anyone but Sanchez.

To begin with, Debtor argues that Sanchez acted as he did not for the benefit of creditors but merely in furtherance of his own claims. The trouble here is that Debt- or fails to distinguish between the case where the “benefit” conferred redounds only, or overwhelmingly, to the applying creditor (and only incidentally benefits other creditors or constituencies)26 and a more general benefit that is in the interests, to a greater or lesser degree, of all stakeholders in a debtor’s reorganization.

In the case at bar, Sanchez relies on, in broad terms, three types of contribution. First, there is, of course, Davis’s $400,000 commitment of capital to Debtor post-confirmation. Second, Sanchez points to other changes to the Plan (since its initial iteration) which either provide limitations on GEC’s post-confirmation conduct or require GEC to take affirmative action to protect the stream of payments to creditors. Finally, Sanchez argues he has contributed by providing the monitoring and investigative functions normally performed by a committee appointed under section 1102 of the Code.27

The court holds that any of these accomplishments, attributable to the efforts of a *555party in interest, will, absent other factors, amount to a “substantial contribution in a case.” See Code § 503(b)(3) (the prerequisite of which is adopted by Code § 503(b)(4)). It is self-evident that a significant increase in Debtor’s available capital (here $400,000 in letters of credit) is a substantial improvement (and, hence, contribution) in the Plan which, through enhancing feasibility, makes return to all creditors more certain.

Likewise, if the protections added to the Plan benefit Sanchez, they also serve the interests of creditors generally. Because the limitations placed on GEC, Davis and others make it more likely that the Plan will be carried out, the benefit from the limitations will be realized by all who look to the Plan for satisfaction of their claims.

As to Sanchez’s contribution as a surrogate creditors’ committee, Debtor argues that Sanchez was not a statutory fiduciary, the oversight performed should have been left to the United States trustee (the “UST’) or the examiner and none of the irregularities cited by Sanchez led to any recovery for the benefit of creditors. In the absence of a creditors’ committee, a chapter 11 case lacks the congressionally intended governor that would police a debtor’s performance of its fiduciary obligations — yet the importance to the court and the system of monitoring and ensuring the performance by the debtor in possession of its fiduciary duties is no less in a case in which creditors do not organize a formal committee. Looking to the UST to fulfill that role is unreasonable. With limited resources and a great many cases to monitor, the UST is in no position to substitute for a creditors’ committee. As in the case at bar, the UST at most can respond to concerns identified in the first instance by interested parties like Sanchez.

As to the examiner, first, there would have been no examiner but for Sanchez. Second, the examiner’s duties and authority were severely constricted by court order. Finally, the examiner’s two reports gave substantial support to the fears expressed by Sanchez.

As for Debtor’s contention that no recoveries resulted from Sanchez’s policing efforts,28 section 503(b)(4), when incorporating section 503(b)(3)(D), unlike section 503(b)(3)(B), does not require a recovery “for the benefit of the estate [of] any property” (§ 503(b)(3)(B)) to justify compensation. Rather, section 503(b)(4), turning on section 503(b)(3)(D), requires a showing of “a substantial contribution in a case” (§ 503(b)(3)(D)). In the case at bar, identification of potentially voidable transfers to insiders may well have played a role in Debtor’s decision to propose a plan providing for 100% satisfaction of all claims- — and the possibility that failure to confirm a plan would result in pursuit of recovery of such transfers may have helped persuade Davis to enhance GEC’s post-confirmation capital and so make the Plan feasible and confirmable. Moreover, because the Plan provides 100% recovery to creditors, pursuit of voidable transfers is, at best, likely to be uneconomic; at worst, complaints to recover voidable transfers in such a case might be subject to dismissal.29 In any *556event, the benefit of any recoveries would inure to Debtor, not (directly at least) its creditors. Finally, potential causes of action based on voidable transfers will be preserved pending Debtor’s performance of the Plan thanks to Sanchez.

In sum, for all these reasons Sanchez’s policing of Debtor qualifies as a substantial contribution.

Debtor, however, argues that Sanchez’s contributions are not compensable because they fail to meet the standards set by the Court of Appeals in In re DP Partners, Ltd., 106 F.3d 667 (5th Cir.1997). Debtor argues that Sanchez has not shown a causal connection between his counsel’s work and any benefit. But as set out above, the court finds that Sanchez’s efforts at least contributed to (1) Debtors’ proposal of a 100% plan; (2) various protections and a capital infusion that make the Plan feasible; and (3) Debtor’s attendance to its fiduciary duties. Debtor seems to be of the view that the causal connection of counsel’s work to any benefit must be facially apparent, proximate and exclusive. The court does not find section 503(b) to be so restrictive, but even by that standard, many changes in the Plan can be traced to specific objections made by Sanchez.30

It is also unlikely the court would have identified the Plan’s infeasibility without the adversarial conduct of the confirmation hearing; thus, it was Sanchez’s efforts that proximately caused Davis to put up additional capital, making Debtor’s successful performance of the Plan much more likely. Finally, the court has been concerned throughout this case that Debtor lacked any great enthusiasm for the strictures imposed on its operations by chapter 11. For the court to insist on evidence directly proving that Sanchez caused Debtor to abide more carefully by the rules would essentially require Sanchez to prove a negative. Rather, the court is prepared to infer from the record before it that Debt- or’s conduct was better for Sanchez’s monitoring.

Debtor’s contention that Sanchez’s efforts did not provide general benefit is similarly without merit. In this regard Debtor’s argument that the court should consider acceptance of the Plan by all other creditors as proof that Sanchez acted only for himself is particularly misguided. That other creditors were apparently will*557ing to run a significant risk that the Plan would prove infeasible does not mean those creditors were not benefited by changes to the Plan that greatly reduced that risk.

Debtor next argues that Sanchez has failed to show that the benefits he has brought to the case are worth the charges he now seeks to impose on Debtor’s estate. See In re DP Partners, Ltd., 106 F.3d 667 (5th Cir.1997). The court does not agree. The product of this case is a feasible plan that will provide a 100% recovery to all creditors over a realistic time period. Sanchez played an important role in bringing about this result.31 The amount sought by Sanchez — $194,644—is reasonable,32 especially in light of the costs of Debtor’s counsel (in excess of $500,000). Further, total debt in this case exceeds $2,000,000; $194,644 is not an unreasonable charge for the role Sanchez played in ensuring that debt’s full satisfaction.

Debtor further argues that much of the time of Sanchez’s attorneys was spent on “routine” tasks. Routine work, Debtor maintains, citing In re American Plumbing & Mechanical, Inc., 327 B.R. 273 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.2005), should not be compensated under section 503(b)(4). However, what is “routine” legal work varies depending on the representation: “routine” work for a lawyer representing an unsecured creditor like Sanchez would include filing a proof of claim and resisting any objection to that claim. The services for which Sanchez seeks payment might have been “routine” if performed by counsel to a committee, trustee or indenture trustee. Undertaken by attorneys representing a single unsecured creditor, counsel’s work was not routine.

For all the foregoing reasons, the § 503(b) Application should be granted. However, a review of the time records attached to the application persuades the court that the amount awarded Sanchez (or, as he has not paid them, more aptly his counsel; see Mirant, 354 B.R. at 140; In re Western Asbestos Co., 318 B.R. 527, 580 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2004)) should be reduced.

First, some categories of charges do not represent work done in aid of any of Sanchez’s substantial contributions.33 Time spent on Sanchez’s proof of claim and the claim estimation process benefited only Sanchez. Likewise, correspondence between counsel and Sanchez was not helpful to creditors generally and brought to the estate — and the case — no value or advantage. Finally, review of other claims and analysis of the Plan’s classification scheme was work that benefited only Sanchez.

Second, some of the charges included in the § 503(b) Application appear to be incorrectly calculated. For example, 2.3 hours billed by Clay Taylor on September 27, 2006, are charged at $963.50, or a rate of $418.91 per hour. The next day (September 28) 4.1 hours are billed for Mr. *558Taylor at a charge of (again) $963.50 — or $235 per hour.

The court has therefore recalculated the amount to be paid by Debtor by reason of the § 503(b) Application by, first, deducting time spent on noncompensable categories and, second, multiplying the total hours for each attorney by that attorney’s correct hourly rate.34 The § 503(b) Application shall be granted to the extent of the resulting, lodestar amount: $172,900.50.35

The court’s rulings as set out herein will be embodied in a separate order. However, the court understands there is no longer any need to maintain its original memorandum opinion under seal. The clerk of the court is accordingly ORDERED to unseal the court’s original opinion as well as to docket and file that opinion as herein modified.