MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the court on the motion of defendant Mutual Benefits Corporation, Inc. (Mutual) to dismiss due to the presence of a forum selection clause or, in the alternative, to transfer venue pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).1 The court, considering the memoranda and submissions of the parties, finds that the motion is not well taken and should be denied.
On April 5, 2002, Marion C. Bentley filed suit in Mississippi state court against Mutual and other defendants alleging several causes of action with regard to his contractual investment in a viatical settlement plan.2 Specifically, Bentley alleged fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duties, violations of the Mississippi Securities Act, joint venture to defraud plaintiff and vicarious liability of Mutual. On May 9, 2002, defendant- James B. Gilt-ner, d/b/a Giltner & Associates and d/b/a Jim Giltner Financial Group, and O.B. Giltner removed the action to this court on diversity of citizenship grounds. After removal, defendants answered the complaint and shortly thereafter, Mutual filed the present- motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer venue on the basis of a forum selection clause contained in the contract between Mutual and Bentley. Specifically, Article VI of the contract, in pertinent part, reads:
This Agreement shall be construed under the laws of Florida and the parties stipulate to venue in Broward County.
Mutual argues that the language of the forum selection clause is mandatory and requires the present action to be brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.3 In his response, Bentley argues that the forum selection clause was. not mandatory, but permissive under Fifth Circuit precedent. Therefore, Bentley asserts the clause simply authorizes him to bring the action in any court where venue is proper, including, as agreed, Broward County, Florida.
*701Mutual, not surprisingly at odds with Bentley’s interpretation of the forum selection clause, replies that since the contract contains a choice of law provision deeming Florida law applicable in the event of a dispute, then the forum selection clause is to be interpreted not under federal law, but under Florida law which, according to Mutual, would treat the language of the forum selection clause as mandatory and not permissive. Therefore, to Mutual, the combination of the choice of law provision and forum selection clause requires that the case be transferred to the Broward County venue.
For his part, Bentley argues that Mutual’s assertion that Florida law should be applied to the interpretation of the forum selection clause is incorrect and that instead, the law in the Fifth Circuit is clear that federal law applies to the interpretation of a forum selection clause.
Under Fifth Circuit precedent, when determining whether a forum seleetion clause in a contract will require the parties to litigate in the named forum, i.e., is mandatory and enforceable, a two-step inquiry is undertaken. See Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Willingham, 17 F.3d 123, 127 (5th Cir.1994). First, the court looks to see whether the forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive. Id. If mandatory, then the court must determine whether it is enforceable. Id. at 127.4
In the Fifth Circuit, mandatory forum selection clauses, by their terms, expressly limit the forum(s) to the one(s) listed in the contract. In other words, a mandatory forum selection clause has express language limiting the action to the courts of a specific locale which is clear, unequivocal and mandatory.5 Id. at 128. On the other hand, a permissive forum selection clause authorizes jurisdiction or venue in a selected forum, but does not prohibit litigation elsewhere. Id. at 127-28. Hence, in Caldas, the Fifth Circuit found that a clause which deemed “[t]he *702laws and courts of Zurich are applicable” was permissive due to lack of clear language of limitation. See Caldas, 17 F.3d at 127-28 Similarly, in Keaty, the Fifth Circuit found that a forum selection clause providing “[t]his agreement shall be ... enforceable according to the law of the State of New York and the parties submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of New York,” was permissive. The court reasoned that the clause was ambiguous because it was “subject to opposing, yet reasonable, interpretations,” and determined that this ambiguity was to be construed against the drafter. Keaty v. Freeport Indonesia, Inc., 503 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir.1974).6
In the court’s opinion, the forum selection clause at issue in this case is permissive. The operative language in this clause is the word “stipulate.” Mutual argues that “stipulate” should be read to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of Broward County, Florida. The court, however, is unpersuaded.
A principal rule of contract interpretation is that “[t]he common or normal meaning of language will be given to the words of a contract unless circumstances show that in a particular case a special meaning should be attached.” 4 S. Willi-ston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 618 (W. Jaeger 3d ed.1961). The common meaning of the word “stipulate” with regards to a contract is to “make an express agreement” or “give a promise.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2245 (1981). Black’s Law Dictionary defines a stipulation as “a material condition or requirement in an agreement.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1427 (7th ed.1999).
In the case at hand, by “stipulating” to venue in Broward County, Florida, the parties clearly agreed in advance to consent to venue in Broward County. Thus, neither party could attack as improper venue of an action commenced in Broward County. But by merely having agreed to a Broward County venue, without excluding all other venues, this clause is insufficient to render the Broward County venue mandatory. Nothing in the clause indicates that Broward County courts have exclusive jurisdiction. No words of limitation are used, as Caldas and Keaty indicate is required in order to effect a mandatory venue selection.7 Accordingly, as the *703court concludes that the forum selection clause at issue is permissive, and that venue over this action is thus not improper in this forum, Mutual’s motion to dismiss will be denied.8
Inasmuch as the venue plaintiff has chosen is not improper under the forum selection clause contained in the Bentley-Mutual contract, it is ordered that Mutual’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer venue is denied.9