The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether this Court should continue to adhere to the common law rule rendering spouses incompetent to testify against each other in a criminal proceeding. We believe that the common law rule no longer com*594plies with the purposes for which it was created, therefore, we alter the rule in the manner set forth below to more closely achieve its purpose without unduly hindering the administration of criminal justice.
[1] Defendant contends that because the common law rule preventing spouses from testifying against each other in a criminal action is codified at G.S. 8-57, this Court is without power to judicially modify the rule. G.S. 8-57 provides in pertinent part that “[n]othing herein shall render any spouse competent or compellable to give evidence against the other spouse in any criminal action or proceeding,” with such exceptions as are thereinafter set forth. This Court has previously held that this provision of G.S. 8-57, and similar provisions of the previous versions of this statute, are not affirmative statements by the legislature that spouses are not competent as witnesses against each other in a criminal proceeding. G.S. 8-57 and its predecessors merely state that, aside from the exceptions listed therein, the common law rule pertaining to the competency of spouses to testify against each other remains unchanged and in full effect. State v. Alford, 274 N.C. 125, 161 S.E. 2d 575 (1968); Rice v. Keith, 63 N.C. 319 (1869). See also State v. Suits, 296 N.C. 553, 251 S.E. 2d 607 (1979). Absent a legislative declaration, this Court possesses the authority to alter judicially created common law when it deems it necessary in light of experience and reason. State v. Alford, supra; State v. Wiseman, 130 N.C. 726, 41 S.E. 884 (1902). See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1980); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 S.Ct. 136, 3 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1958). Consequently, we hold that this Court is empowered to change the common law rule at issue in this case, and defendant’s allegations to the contrary are without merit.
At common law, the spouse of a defendant was incompetent to testify either for or against the defendant in a criminal proceeding. Trammel v. United States, supra; State v. Suits, supra; State v. Alford, supra; 1 Stansbury’s North Carolina Evidence §59 (Brandis Rev. 1973). This rule disqualifying the testimony of a spouse arose from two long-abandoned medieval doctrines; first, that an accused was prohibited from testifying in his own behalf due to his interest in the action, and second, that husband and wife were considered to be one under the law, with the wife possessing no separate legal existence. Trammel v. United States, supra; Funk v. United States, *595290 U.S. 371, 54 S.Ct. 212, 78 L. Ed. 369 (1933); State v. Alford, supra; 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2227 (McNaughton Rev. 1961 & Supp. 1980). The portion of the common law rule preventing one spouse from testifying on behalf of the other in a criminal proceeding has long been abandoned by statute in this jurisdiction. G.S. 8-57; 1 Stansbury’s North Carolina Evidence § 59 (Brandis Rev. 1973). See also State v. Rice, 222 N.C. 634, 24 S.E. 2d 483 (1943). The portion of the doctrine which prohibits one spouse,from testifying against the other in a criminal proceeding remains in effect under the modern justification that the peace and harmony of the marriage relationship will be preserved and fostered when each spouse may rely on the other’s disability to testify. It is thought that the spousal disqualification will encourage free and open communication between marriage partners. Trammel v. United States, supra; Hawkins v. United States, supra; State v. Alford, supra; State v. Brittain, 117 N.C. 783, 23 S.E. 433 (1895); State v. Jolly, 20 N.C. 108 (1838); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2228 (McNaughton Rev. 1961 & Supp. 1980).
When we consider the common law rule preventing spouses from testifying against each other as to any matter at issue in a criminal proceeding in light of its purpose to promote marital harmony, we find that the rule sweeps more broadly than its justification. In the case subjudice, defendant invoked the rule of spousal disqualification not to protect confidential marital communications, but to exclude evidence of criminal acts committed in a public place and in the presence of a third person. Under these circumstances, the rule is employed more to thwart the system of justice than to promote family peace. It is difficult to discern how defendant’s marriage could be bolstered by excluding Mrs. Freeman’s testimony indicating that defendant shot and killed her brother in her presence. In such a situation, the public interest in ascertaining the truth outweighs any policy to promote marital harmony. Trammel v. United States, supra; State v. Alford, supra. See also State v. Clark, 296 N.W. 2d 372 (Minn. 1980); 8 J. Wigmre, Evidence § 2332 (McNaughton Rev. 1961 & Supp. 1980). In the event that an application of a common law rule cannot achieve its aim, as in the case before us, then adherence to precedent is the only justification in support of the rule, and the courts are compelled to re-examine the common law doctrine. Trammel v. United States, supra; Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445, 68 S.Ct. 611 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting); Funk v. United States, supra; State v. Alford, supra.
*596[2] We hold that the common law rule at issue in this case must be modified to comply with its purpose. Henceforth, spouses shall be incompetent to testify against one another in a criminal proceeding only if the substance of the testimony concerns a “confidential communication” between the marriage partners made during the duration of their marriage.1 This holding allows marriage partners to speak freely to each other in confidence without fear of being thereafter confronted with the confession in litigation. However, by confining the spousal disqualification to testimony involving “confidential communications” within the marriage, we prohibit the accused spouse from employing the common law rule solely to inhibit the administration of justice. In the words of Jeremy Bentham more than a century and a half ago, our holding prevents the accused in a criminal action from converting his home into “a den of thieves.” Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 51-52, 100 S. Ct. at 913, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 195, quoting from 5 Rationale of Judicial Evidence 340 (1827).
*597[3,4] Whether a particular segment of testimony includes a “con*598fidential communication” within the meaning of the rule we adopt in this case is to be determined by the guidelines set forth in our previous decisions interpreting the term under G.S. 8-56, the statute preserving a privilege in civil actions not to testify as to “confidential communications” with one’s spouse. In making such a determination, the question is whether the communication, whatever it contains, was induced by the marital relationship and prompted by the affection, confidence, and loyalty engendered by such relationship. Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E. 2d 317(1972); Hicks v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E. 2d 799 (1967); Hagedorn v. Hagedorn, 211 N.C. 175, 189 S.E. 507 (1937); McCoy v. Justice, 199 N.C. 602, 155 S.E. 452 (1930); State v. Freeman, 197 N.C. 376, 148 S.E. 450 (1929); Whitford v. North State Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 223, 79 S.E. 501 (1913). When this definition is applied to the facts of the case sub judice, it is apparent that Mrs. Freeman’s proposed testimony included no confidential communication which would render it incompetent under the rule established in this case. Mrs. Freeman stipulated that had she been allowed to testify, she would have stated that defendant parked his car in a public parking lot, approached her and her brother carrying a shotgun, asked if they wished to speak with him, and immediately discharged the shotgun, killing Mrs. Freeman’s brother. Such actions in a public place and in the presence of a third person could not have been a communication made in the confidence of the marital relationship or one which was induced by affection and loyalty in the marriage. See, e.g., Hicks v. Hicks, supra; State v. Freeman, supra. Consequently, Mrs. Freeman’s testimony is competent and admissible under the rule adopted in this case.2
*599For the reasons stated above, we find that although the trial court correctly followed the previous decisions of this Court in granting defendant’s motion in limine to suppress the testimony of his wife, the suppression of Mrs. Freeman’s testimony was error under the rule established in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is
Reversed.
Justice MEYER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.