In an ancient case, now rounding out a near decade, we have to determine who picks up the pieces under Florida contract law1 between two parties who never knew each other or, for all that appears, ever wanted to have anything to do with each other. That prologue introduces, of course, another of the familiar 2 intramural disputes between two insurers, one of whom puts on the appealing garb of an animate assured, cf. Float-Away Door Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 5 Cir., 1966, 372 F.2d 701, and see opinion denying petition for rehearing, at page 709 [No. 22879, December 1, 1966], to force on its brother underwriter a liberal construction of a kind it would normally repel. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 5 Cir., 1957, 248 F.2d 509, 510; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 679. About the only odd twist in the routine is that the Insurer seeking “liberal” construction does so to avoid pursuit, not, as would its vicarious animate counterpart, to effect recovery.
The District Court, construing the policies, held that each in effect contained an “excess” other insurance clause thus requiring proration. We affirm.
The setting, nearly always uncomplicated and all but forgotten as the controversy makes a hydramatic shift from tort to contract, is certainly simple here. Ronan, vacationing in the sunshine of Florida, rented a ear from No. 1, Hertz, who tried, there being no real question whether hard enough, to obtain coverage for itself and its client drivers from Atlantic.3 Ronan had an accident. He and Hertz were sued and a judgment slightly in excess of the policy limits was entered on a jury verdict against both. Atlantic, insuring Hertz and by definition its client users, under a policy having the unlikely title of “Driverless Car Liability Policy” paid off. Now, in effect, No. 1 looks for a No. 2, or for that matter any *603lesser number or fraction thereof as it seeks to pass off half of this loss onto Motor Casualty,4 the insurer of the client-driver Ronan.
The share the wealth, or more accurately, share the burden, theory was also simple. It rested on the assumption that each of the policies contained an “excess” other insurance clause which, indeed, Motor Casualty 5 did as to rented vehicles, and Atlantic6 had at one time. With two excess clauses, the law steps in, apparently abhoring a stalemate as much as nature abhors a vacuum, to pronounce the dubious fiat that, of all things, the parties intended by such exculpatory language to pick up a liability verbally excluded so that what was “excess” becomes pro rata.7 But simple as it is, the theory collapses if in one policy there is neither an “excess” clause or any like “other insurance” clause to match against a second policy having an “excess” clause.8
And here is where the controversy centers. For the Atlantic policy with its six printed pages and another fourteen of endorsements, riders, and assorted attachments reminiscent of Ocean Accident,9 the lamentations of Judge *604Hand,10 and the sighs of Justice Frankfurter 11 has an endorsement which amends the “Other Insurance” clause (note 6, supra). The question is whether the endorsement amends former Clause 17 generally to be a complete substitute for it as it literally states or whether it amends it solely as to operations in Maryland.12
Whatever else might be said, two things do seem clear in this unclear endorsement. The first is that as to some circumstances a pro rata insurance clause is substituted for an excess clause. Second, some special provision is made with respect to Hertz’ operations conducted in the State of Maryland. From that point on, however, what we said in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Holman is certainly appropriate here: “Divining the underwriter’s intent from these contradictory agglutinations is, of course, no easy matter. If errors occur, Judges perhaps may indulge a little comfort from the fact that, not really of their own making, they come from what loosely may be called loose draftsmanship.” 5 Cir., 1964, 330 F.2d 142, 147. See also Nardelli v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 1959, 269 F.2d 592, 594.
For natural reasons, Motor Casualty urges strict literalness here. Liberality of construction sought by it holds the Insurer to the letter of the bond. This approach is structured on the proposition that the prefatory statement “is amended to read” substitutes the clause for all purposes and to all situations in lieu of that in the original printed form. Motor Casualty draws its strongest analogy from cases involving legislative enactments in which the usual rule seems to be that the effect of this prefatory phrase is to substitute the new *605énactment for the original act or section. Only those provisions of the original act or section repeated in the amendment are retained.13
If this were all, there would be much difficulty in rejecting Motor Casualty’s appeal to literalism. But when it is borne in mind that under basic principles of contract construction, the meaning and application of plain words used is to be judged in the situation in which the parties were placed at the time of making the agreement,14 it is clearly evident that literalism would here produce a result that makes no or little sense. And a Court ought always, we suppose, to hesitate a little bit at least before making a pronouncement that the parties intended a senseless result.
The uncontradicted record shows here that the particular policy covering the period from January 1, 1958, to January 1, 1959, was simply a replacement policy for the one initially procured in July 1956 and successively renewed or replaced each year. Presumably required by virtue of Maryland laws respecting automobile financial responsibility insurance laws, Hertz as a renter of automobiles to the public had to secure approval of its liability insurance program by the State Insurance Department of Maryland. On the submission of the initial policies in 1956 15 the Insurance Department refused to “approve these policies * * * [since] they do not meet the requirements of the financial responsibility law of this state” because of the presence in the policy of the “excess” Other Insurance clause, Condition No. 17 (note 6, supra). Subsequently the Insurance Department approved the proposed endorsement in the exact language now used (note 12, supra), and the policies with this endorsement were thereafter formally approved.
Two things serve to narrow this endorsement’s effectiveness to Maryland operations. First is the fact that by policy definition, the coverage was extended nationwide. Second, by numerous endorsements specifying by name various cities in various states with the specific scheduled premium rate per mile covering not less than 16 states and expected to generate an annual premium of $253,045.75, it is clear that as between Atlantic and Hertz — the only parties to this contract — the policy was intended to cover actual operations scattered throughout the nation. There is nothing to indicate that, in order to meet the specific localized objection of the insuring authorities of Maryland, there was either any occasion for, or desirability in, modifying the contract as to non-Maryland activity. Third, and equally important, if it were intended that the new “substituted” clause was to apply nationwide, no meaning or purpose whatsoever can be found for the tag line “But only as respects the assured’s operations in the State of Maryland” which with poor syntax and bad grammar is found verbless at the tail end of the endorsement (note 12, supra).
*606When the Court puts itself in the position of the parties faced with the need for nationwide coverage, but which is acceptable to Maryland only upon a specific modification, this series of words in this incomplete sentence is obviously a limiting part of the clause either in the prefatory phrase or within the amended condition 17 itself.16 At this point several things must be kept sharply in mind. Motor Casualty does have standing, as one in the shoes of its Assured Ronan, to assert whatever rights he (Ronan) has. These include his rights as an additional assured under the Atlantic policy. And granting that as such an additional assured Ronan can invoke the plea of “liberality” in policy construction, the fact remains that at the time the contract was made there were but two parties — (1) Hertz and (2) Atlantic. The yet unknown, undeterminable additional assureds played no part. Their “intention” was unknown, unimportant and unexpressed. The intention, so far as it can be ascertained, of the parties is confined to the two alone. It was their needs, their setting, their words in that setting from which the law draws meaning. And Ronan’s or Motor Casualty’s right to invoke liberal construction can never alter that. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 5 Cir., 1957, 248 F.2d 509, 515; cf. Float-Away Door Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 5 Cir., 1966, 372 F.2d 701, nn. 3-7 and related text [No. 22879, Dec. 1, 1966].
Whether fictionalized in the notion of what the parties to the contract really intended — on a matter on which, of course, they had probably not the slightest awareness at the time — or, perhaps more realistically, in terms of what the law concludes they must have expected, this construction enables the parties to meet the problem at hand in Maryland without disturbing the arrangement for the other operations across the country. Sense and common sense, law and common sense, sense and the needs of the parties coincide. In keeping with all of the other canons of contract construction, this surely should be a desirable goal.
Affirmed.