The defendant, Maxwell Dragon, appeals from a sentence entered by the Superior Court (Somerset County) after he pleaded guilty to arson, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 802(1)(B) (1983 & Supp.1986) (Class B). As his sole issue on appeal, Dragon contends that the court’s restitution order is illegal because the sentencing justice failed properly to consider his ability to pay. We affirm the judgment.
I.
On March 10, 1986, Dragon entered a plea of guilty to arson pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and was sentenced to six years in the Maine State Prison with all but four years of the sentence suspended. He was ordered to make restitution of $5,000 to the Skowhegan Savings Bank (mortgagee for the house burned by Dragon) “in the event he is able to generate income pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1330.” Dragon appeals the legality of that order.1
II.
A defendant may directly appeal the legality of his sentence to the Law Court only if there is a jurisdictional infirmity in the sentencing process “on the face of the appeal record so plainly that its existence is shown as a matter of law.” State v. Rich, 395 A.2d 1123, 1133 (Me.1978).
Dragon argues that the restitution order is defective because the Superior Court failed to undertake a sufficient inquiry to determine his financial circumstances as required by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1325 (1983).2
Dragon is required to pay the sum of $5,000 as restitution in the event he is able to generate income by working while in prison pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1330.3 Subsection 2 of section 1330 al*706lows restitution payments to be deducted from monies earned by prisoners who are “able to generate income, from whatever source” if the sentencing court has ordered that restitution be made. That subsection effectively diminishes the extent of the inquiry that is necessary to support the sentencing justice’s determination under section 1325(2) that an order of restitution will not create a. financial hardship on the offender or his family. If the sentencing justice can reasonably conclude that a particular criminal defendant has the potential capacity to generate income while in prison, a restitution order pursuant to section 1325 is then authorized and the defendant is required by that order and section 1330 to make restitution.
It is significant that the amount of restitution in this case was ordered in accordance with the parties’ plea agreement. In fact, at the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed to lower the amount of proposed restitution from $10,000 to $5,000. Thus, Dragon clearly consented to the amount of restitution ordered. In these circumstances, it was unnecessary for the court to make further inquiry to determine whether the amount of restitution ordered was excessive. Cf. State v. Stinson, 424 A.2d 327, 334 (Me.1981) (given defendant’s seeming satisfaction that restitution order was within reasonable tolerance of his financial ability to pay, determination without conducting in-depth probe of such ability not error).
Since the sentencing justice expressly conditioned the restitution upon Dragon’s ability to earn income while in prison and established the amount of restitution in accordance with the parties’, fully negotiated plea agreement, we conclude that the Superior Court sufficiently considered Dragon’s financial circumstances when it ordered him to make conditional restitution payments while in prison. As a result, we find no infirmity in the sentence.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
All concurring.