MEMORANDUM **
Judith Marovich appeals the district court’s judgment, which affirmed the Com*592missioner of Social Security’s denial of disability insurance benefits. We affirm.
(1) Marovich asserts that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred when he did not give specific and legitimate reasons for failing to consider the opinions of Dr. Morgenthaler and Dr. Larsen. Before the district court, Marovich did not question the ALJ’s failure to expressly consider Dr. Morgenthaler’s opinion. Thus, the argument is waived as to him. See Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.2006); see also Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 389 n. 6 (9th Cir.1996). As to Dr. Larsen, the ALJ did not, in fact, reject his opinion regarding Marovich’s medical and mental condition. On the contrary, he accepted that opinion. However, the ALJ did not, and was not required to, accept Dr. Larsen’s ultimate determination that Marovich was disabled (lacked the ability to work) for purposes of awarding Social Security disability insurance benefits. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir.2011); Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir.1982). The ALJ did not err in that respect.1
(2) Marovich also asserts that the ALJ erred at step 22 when he decided that her mental impairment (at least from depression) was not severe. However, the ALJ did specifically consider that impairment3 and determined that, based on the evidence before him, any impairment was too mild to be considered severe. Moreover, the ALJ did determine that other impairments were severe and, therefore, he did not dispose of her benefit claim as groundless,4 but moved on to the further steps at which he was required to consider all impairments — severe or not.5 Those other impairments were of a physical nature; however, it should be noted that her mental problem, beyond depression, was a so-matoform disorder, which manifests itself in physical symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.07. We are unable to say that the ALJ erred at this step of the process. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n. 1 (9th Cir.2005).
(3)Marovich finally asserts that the ALJ erred when he determined her Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) for purposes, of steps.4 and 5. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (v). She does not claim that the ALJ failed to consider her physical impairments. She focuses on mental impairments. However, as the ALJ determined at step 2, those that are encompassed by the depression category were so mild as to be minimal at best, and even she and the doctors failed to point to anything that would actually affect her ability to work. As previously noted, her somatoform disorder manifests itself in physical limitations and symptoms which were fully considered. In fact, the ALJ specifically noted her somatic disorder and its connection to depression. It would *593have been preferable for the ALJ to refer to those disorders in more detail when he was determining her RFC, but in light of his prior determinations, the medical opinions, her description of her own activities, and what he did say, that failure to be more specific was, at most, harmless error. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir.2008); Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir.2006).
AFFIRMED.