ORDER, OPINION, INJUNCTION AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
These are actions in which the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that certain rules and regulations of the Civil Service Board of the City of Jacksonville, Florida,1 relating to the suspension and dismissal of nonprobationary civil service employees for cause, are violative of the Due Process Clause of the *1169Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, including classwide back pay. For the reasons set forth below, the relief requested will be granted.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
(a) Harvey Young, Case No. 7 3-281-Civ-J-S
The plaintiff in Case No. 73-281-Civ-J-S, Harvey Young, had been in the employment of the Department of Public Safety, Motor Vehicle Inspection Division, City of Jacksonville, Florida, since August 7, 1968, and had achieved permanent civil service status after being duly qualified by examination and otherwise. On February 10, 1973, he reported to work and was directed by his supervisor to return home for allegedly having been “under the influence of intoxicants while on duty.” On or about February 13, 1973, he received a letter 3 from the defendant D. L. Hutchins, Chief of the Motor Vehicle Inspection Division of the Department of Public Safety, stating that he was suspended for a period of 30 days without pay after which time he would be permanently discharged as an employee of that division. At no time prior to his suspension was he given notice of said suspension, an opportunity for a prior hearing, or other due process safeguards to determine the merits of the suspension. By the terms of the aforesaid letter from the defendant Hutchins, the plaintiff was automatically suspended for 30 days effective February 10, 1973, at the end of which period he was to be automatically permanently discharged.
Young’s hearing before the Civil Service Board was set for April 24, 1973, 56 days after he received notice of his suspension and impending discharge. Plaintiff filed his complaint alleging denial of due process based upon his suspension and dismissal without pay from his public employment without first being afforded a prior hearing and other elementary due process procedures to determine the merits of defendant’s grounds for suspension and dismissal. In the meantime, at his hearing before *1170the Civil Service Board, his discharge was upheld.4
On April 19, 1973, this Court entered an injunction and order and held as follows: (1) that Young was not entitled to a hearing before he was temporarily suspended from employment for 30 days “because, in the interest of public safety, there was an overwhelming necessity for immediate action by defendants;” (2) that he was “entitled to a hearing within a reasonable time after suspension and was entitled to other elementary due process procedures to determine the merits of defendants’ grounds for dismissal before he was permanently discharged from his civil service job;” (3) that “56 days between the time of the suspension of plaintiff and the hearing before the Civil Service Board [was] unreasonable and excessive;” (4) that he was “entitled to receive his back pay for the time period beginning 30 days after his suspension was effective —that is to say, March 12, 1973, when his invalid discharge became effective— until the time period ending when he [was to be] given a proper due process hearing before the Civil Service Board . . . ;” (5) that he was “not entitled to receive his back pay. for the 30 day period of suspension beginning February 10, 1973, and ending March 11, 1973, unless the Civil Service Board, at the hearing on the merits so [ruled] ;” (6) that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction did not issue; (7) that “[b]efore a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded an opportunity for some kind of hearing except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event;” and (8) that “[in] the interest of public safety it was necessary in this case to temporarily suspend plaintiff from his duties as auto safety inspector pending the outcome of the hearing on the merits” and that “[this] need supplied the requisite governmental interest and extraordinary situation to justify postponing the hearing until after the suspension.”
On this basis, this Court: (1) required the defendants to provide Young with back pay for the period beginning March 12, 1973, until his permanent dismissal; and (2) enjoined the defendants “from permanently discharging plaintiff until a hearing [was] held and other elementary due process procedures were afforded him, in order to determine the merits of defendant’s dismissal.”
(b) George R. Thurston, Case No. 73—767—Civ—J—S
The named plaintiff 5 in Case No. 73-767-Civ-J-S, George R. Thurston, began employment with the Department of *1171Housing and Urban Development of the City of Jacksonville on March 1, 1971, and achieved permanent civil service status with the City of Jacksonville on or about September 1, 1971. On August 13, 1973, Thurston reported to work and was handed a letter dated August 10, 1973, which informed him that he was suspended effective Monday, August 13, 1973, for a period of 30 days, without pay, after which time he would be permanently discharged as an employee of the City of Jacksonville. Thurston was charged with violating Civil Service Board Rule 12.4(b)(9) in that he was alleged to be “incompetent or inefficient in the performance of the duties of his position.” At no time prior to Thurston’s suspension was he given notice of said suspension, an opportunity for a prior hearing, or other due process safeguards to determine the merits of his suspension. Thurston appealed his dismissal before the Civil Service Board on Monday, September 10, 1973. However, his appeal was denied and his dismissal was upheld.
(c) The Board’s Uniform, Policy
The parties have stipulated that it is the policy of the Civil Service Board of the City of Jacksonville that all permanent city employees who are to be permanently dismissed from their employment are automatically suspended for a period of 30 days without pay, after which time they are automatically dismissed.6 Furthermore, during the period in which city employees are suspended from employment, the benefits of salary, seniority, vacation and sick leave are frozen and do not accrue.
The plaintiffs contend that their suspension for 30 days without pay from employment pursuant to Civil Service Board Rules7 without first affording *1173them notice of said suspension, an opportunity for a prior hearing, and other due process safeguards, to determine the merits of the suspension in the absence of valid criteria promulgated by the Civil Service Board to determine whether an extraordinary situation exists where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the suspension is a denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment in that it operates to deprive the plaintiffs of a “property” interest in continued governmental employment without proper due process safeguards.
The defendants, on the other hand, contend that they are complying with procedural due process in that: (1) the Civil Service Board Rules provide that where an employee is to be dismissed he is given written notice of a 30 days suspension without pay with dismissal to follow at the end of 30 days; (2) the rules further provide that an employee may appeal to the Civil Service Board within ten days after suspension; (3) if an appeal is taken, he must, under the *1174rules be given a hearing before the board within 20 days after the appeal, thus affording a hearing prior to the effective date of discharge.
II. APPLICABILITY OF ARNETT v. KENNEDY
To determine the appropriate legal standard to apply in these cases, the Court must ascertain to what extent the most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court regarding procedural due process and public employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974), is applicable. Unfortunately, no clear majority opinion emerged from this case and the five separate opinions served merely to obfuscate what had been until that time a relatively settled area of the law. However, a close reading of the various opinions rendered in the case provide some guidance in deciding the instant cases.
In Arnett, a nonprobationary federal employee of the Office of Economic Opportunity was discharged by his supervisor after the supervisor had given him notice of written charges against him. One of the charges was that the plaintiff employee, “without any proof” and “in reckless disregard of the actual facts” known to him or reasonably discoverable by him, had publicly stated that the supervisor and his assistant had attempted to bribe a third party. The affected employee had chosen not to exercise his rights under the administrative regulations to reply orally or in writing to the charges, but had instead asserted that he had a right to a trial-type evidentiary hearing before an impartial hearing officer before he could be dismissed from his federal employment, and that his statements were protected by the First Amendment.
The employee’s discharge was effected pursuant to the provisions of the LloydLaFollette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501, authorizing removal or suspension without pay of a nonprobationary government employee “only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service”, and requiring that the employee be given written notice of the charges against him, but not requiring a pretermination evidentiary hearing. In addition, the implementing civil service regulations afforded a post-dismissal evidentiary hearing on an administrative appeal by the employee, with full back pay benefits if the employee prevailed.
The employee contended, on behalf of himself and all those similarly situated, that the removal standards and procedures established by the Lloyd-LaFollette Act unconstitutionally interfered with governmental employees’ freedom of expression and denied them procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment.
Although unable to agree on an opinion, six members of the Court held, in pertinent part, that the discharge procedures established by the Act did not violate procedural due process by failing to require a trial-type evidentiary hearing before, rather than after, the employee’s removal.
In a plurality opinion which expressed the views of only three members of the Court, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Stewart, stated, inter alia,8 that the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, in failing to require a preremoval hearing, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because the Act did not *1175create a “property” interest, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), that is, an expectancy of job retention requiring procedural due process protection beyond that afforded under the statute and the applicable regulations.
In a concurring opinion, Justices Powell and Blackmun enunciated the view that the Act, in guaranteeing a nonprobationary employee continued employment absent “cause” for discharge, conferred a “property” interest protected under the Due Process Clause as to notice and a hearing, and the procedural provisions of the Act could not limit the extent of procedural protection to which an employee was constitutionally entitled.
Mr. Justice Powell then set forth what he considered to be the controlling test as to whether an evidentiary hearing, including the right to present favorable witnesses and to confront and examine adverse witnesses, must be accorded before removal:
The resolution of this issue depends on a balancing process in which the Government’s interest in expeditious removal of an unsatisfactory employee is weighed against the interest of the affected employee in continued public employment.
416 U.S. at 167, 94 S.Ct. at 1651, 40 L.Ed.2d at 41.
Mr. Justice Powell then concluded, on this basis, that the employee’s procedural due process rights were not violated in that case since the removal procedure afforded under the Act and the related regulations provided “a reasonable accommodation of the competing interests” so as to minimize the risk of error in the initial removal decision and to “provide for compensation for the affected employee should that decision eventually prove wrongful.” 416 U.S. at 165, 94 S.Ct. at 1650, 1652, 40 L.Ed.2d at 42-43.9
Mr. Justice White, in a separate opinion in which he concurred in part and dissented in part, agreed with the Court’s plurality opinion only as to the holding that the Act and its attendant regulations were not void for over-breadth. However, he agreed with Justices Powell and Blaekmum and the dissenters that the Act created a “property” interest in continued public employment. In addition, he stated that although procedural due process required a hearing at some time before a nonprobationary employee was finally terminated for misconduct, the pretermination hearing provided by the federal statute satisfied minimum procedural due process requirements and that it was not necessary that the employee be afforded a plenary trial-type hearing before rather than after removal from active status.10
Justices Marshall, Brennan and Douglas11 dissented, stating, in pertinent part, that: (1) the Act created a “property” interest in continued government employment for purposes of due process, so that the statutory procedures were required to meet minimum constitutional standards; (2) in determining whether due process required a full evidentiary *1176hearing prior to termination, the government’s interests must be balanced against those of the discharged employee; (3) upon balancing those interests, due process required a plenary evidentiary hearing before an impartial decision maker, prior to the employee’s removal.12
Although these various opinions badly fragmented whatever precedential value Arnett may have as a basis for a decision in the instant cases, several threads emerge which provide some direction. First of all, six justices agreed that the Lloyd-LaFollete Act which guaranteed the affected employee continued employment absent “cause” for discharge clearly conferred on him a legitimate claim of entitlement which constituted a “property” interest under the Fifth Amendment. 416 U.S. at 165, 94 S.Ct. at 1650, 40 L.Ed.2d at 40. (Powell and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part); 416 U.S. at 165, 94 S.Ct. at 1650, 40 L.Ed.2d at 40. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 416 U.S. at 203, 212, 94 S.Ct. at 1669, 1673; 40 L.Ed.2d at 63-66 (Marshall, Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
Secondly, at least six justices held that the resolution of the issue whether an evidentiary hearing including the right to present favorable witnesses and to confront and examine adverse witnesses, must be accorded before removal seems to depend on a balancing type of analysis in which the government’s collective interest in expeditious removal of an unsatisfactory employee is weighed against the individual interest of the affected employee in continued public employment. 416 U.S. at 167, 94 S.Ct. at 1651, 40 L.Ed.2d at 41 (concurring opinion of Justices Powell and Blackmun), 416 U.S. at 198-203, 94 S.Ct. at 1666-1668; 40 L.Ed.2d at 59-61 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 416 U.S. at 210, 213, 94 S.Ct. at 1672, 1673; 40 L.Ed.2d at 66-67 (Marshall, Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
Third, the three “swing” justices held that a plenary hearing seems to be constitutionally required at some stage in the proceedings and it must occur before a “final taking” of the “property” interest (that is, final termination) even though it may occur after the initial removal from active duty status. 416 U.S. at 167-173, 94 S.Ct. at 1651-1653; 40 L.Ed.2d at 42-43. (Powell and Blackmun, JJ., concurring) 416 U.S. at 184, 94 S.Ct. at 1659; 40 L.Ed.2d at 51 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see, 416 U.S. at 216-229, 94 S.Ct. at 1675-1681; 40 L.Ed.2d at 69-75. (Marshall, Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
Fourth, the three “swing” justices also seem to hold that the affected employee must be afforded advance written notice of the reasons for his proposed dismissal and the materials on which the notice is based prior to removal. In addition, it would also appear that the employee would be constitutionally entitled to respond to the charges both orally and in writing, including the submission of affidavits, as under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, before the initial removal from the job. Furthermore, he should at least be given the opportunity, as under the Act, to appear personally before the official having the authority to make or recommend the final decision before his initial removal. These procedures, in conjunction with the post-removal but pretermination plenary evidentiary hearing and possible reinstatement with back pay, were deemed to adequately minimize the risk of error attendant to the initial removal decision. 416 U.S. at 167-172, 94 S.Ct. at 1651-1653, 40 L.Ed.2d at 42-43 (Powell and Blackmun, J.J., concurring); 416 U.S. at 192-196, 94 S.Ct. 1663-1665, 40 L.Ed.2d at 56-57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Of course, the three dissenting justices *1177would have gone further and held that a plenary evidentiary hearing was also constitutionally mandated prior to the initial removal.
III. STATE OF THE LAW pre-ARNETT
As a backdrop to these somewhat amorphous guidelines, this Court must also consider the Vast body of settled law relating to procedural due process which requires adequate notice and a hearing before a person can be deprived of an important interest in life, liberty or property, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969) (pre-judgment garnishment of wages); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) (revocation of a driver’s license); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) (repossession of consumer goods); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (revocation of parole); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1973) (termination of college instructors by public educational institutions); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (revocation of probation), “except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake which justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971).
With this framework in mind, it is now appropriate to apply the law to the facts at hand.
IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND BACK PAY FOR THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS
As pointed out previously, the announced policy of the Civil Service Board of the City of Jacksonville is that all city employees who are to be permanently dismissed from their employment are automatically suspended for a period of 30 days without pay after which time they are automatically permanently discharged. During the period in which city employees are suspended from employment, the benefits of salary, seniority, vacation and sick leave are automatically frozen and do not accrue. The employee receives no advance written notice of his impending suspension or of the charges on which said suspension is based. The suspended employee is afforded no opportunity to refute the charges, either orally or in writing, prior to the suspension. The employee may appeal the dismissal within ten days after he has been suspended and the board is required, under the rules, to provide a hearing within 20 days thereafter.
By comparison, the plaintiff in Arnett was afforded, by statute and regulations, numerous safeguards to minimize the risk of error in the initial removal decision which were not available to the plaintiffs herein. A nonprobationary federal employee must be provided with written notice of the reasons for his proposed discharge and the materials on which the notice is based at least 30 days prior to removal. He is also accorded the right to respond to the charges both orally and in writing, including the submission of affidavits. Upon request, he is also entitled to an opportunity to appear before the official having the authority to make or recommend the final decision.13 See 5 C.F.R. *1178§§ 752.262, 771.208 and 772.305; 5 U.S.C. § 5596.
It seems clear from the concurring opinions in Arnett that, were it not for the existence of these critical procedural safeguards to minimize the risk of error attendant to initial removal,14 the three “swing” justices would not have sustained the federal statute and regulations under attack therein. It is also clear that these important safeguards are noticeably absent from the rules and regulations at issue herein. The absence of these safeguards in the instant cases becomes especially crucial when one considers that, effectively, a city employee is dismissed once the period of his “suspension” commences by virtue of the board’s uniform policy of automatic suspension for 30 days prior to final discharge, during which time substantially all the suspended employee’s benefits are terminated. Thus, in reality, “suspension” under the present state of facts in these cases is the functional equivalent of permanent discharge subject to the condition subsequent that the employee may be reinstated with back pay upon a successful appeal.
Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, this Court must conclude that, because of the absence of the procedural safeguards which were deemed to be so critical in Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, in serving to minimize the risk of error in the initial removal of a nonprobationary federal employee, the Civil Service Board Regulations at issue herein are violative of procedural due process. Therefore, the defendants will be required, by injunction, either: (1) to provide adequate notice and a plenary evidentiary hearing prior to the suspension without pay of any nonprobationary city employee; or (2) to promulgate sufficient procedural safeguards which are specifically designed to minimize the risk of error attendant to the initial removal and suspension of any city employee. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969).15
An exception to the foregoing requirements will be permitted where it is determined, by objective criteria, that retention of the employee would result in damage to municipal property or would be detrimental to the interests of the city government, or would be injurious to the employee himself, to a fellow employee or to the general public.16 In such circumstances, the affected em*1179ployee may be immediately suspended without pay. However, this Court holds that procedural due process requires that, in such a situation, the employee must be provided a detailed written notice of charges within 24 hours after the commencement of the suspension period and that he must be afforded the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing before an impartial decisionmaker17, within 20 days thereafter. These time limitations do not apply, however, in these circumstances, where the suspension is with pay. In that event, the notice and the opportunity for a hearing need not be provided until prior to the time the affected employee is to be finally dismissed.18 As part of this Court’s injunction, the defendants will be required to promulgate sufficiently detailed criteria for determining when immediate suspension without pay would be appropriate under the legal standards set forth above.
A comparison of the factual situations of the named plaintiffs provides a rough guide to the defendants for promulgation of these criteria. Plaintiff Young’s being intoxicated while on duty is certainly a sufficient basis for immediate suspension because the governmental interest in the alacritous removal of an intoxicated employee from a motor vehicle inspection station outweighs the employee’s individual interest in remaining on active duty status. The highly disruptive effect of his remaining on the job is obvious. On the other hand, as to plaintiff Thurston, the record is entirely devoid of any justification for his immediate suspension without pay without the benefit of advance formal notice and the opportunity for a hearing. Merely being deemed “incompetent or inefficient in the performance of the duties of his position” without further elaboration does not justify the deprivation of a person’s very livelihood without prior notice and a hearing or other procedural safeguards to minimize the risk of error. Since 30 days was a reasonable time period after suspension within which to have a hearing at that time because the defendants did not have the benefit of this Court’s opinion, the back pay order with respect to plaintiff Young will stand as originally entered. However, for the reasons stated above, plaintiff Thurston is entitled to back pay from the date of his suspension, August 13, 1973, to the date of his appeal before the Civil Service Board, September 10, 1973.19
*1180V. REINSTATEMENT AND CLASS-WIDE BACK PAY
This Court also concludes that classwide back pay for nonnamed class members would be an appropriate additional remedy under the facts of these cases. As the plaintiffs correctly point out, back pay has been held to be an integral part of injunctive relief in Section 1983 cases. In Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), the Court stated:
Section 1983 was designed to provide a comprehensive remedy for the deprivation of federal constitutional and statutory rights. The prayer for back pay is not a claim for damages, but is an integral part of the equitable remedy of injunctive reinstatement. Reinstatement involves a return of the plaintiffs to the positions they held before the alleged unconstitutional failure. . .
427 F.2d at 324.
Additional support for classwide back pay may be found in several recent Title VII Civil Rights Act cases. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company, 495 F.2d 398, 421-422 (5th Cir. 1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973). These cases are closely analogous to the instant cases in that back pay in both types of eases serves to vindicate fundamental constitutional rights and also to return the plaintiffs to the position they would have occupied but for the defendants’ illegal actions.
In addition, Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not prohibit back pay to nonnamed class members in a class action under that subdivision of the rule. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company, supra, 495 F.2d at 422; Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., supra; Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed 404 U.S. 1006, 92 S.Ct. 573, 30 L.Ed.2d 655. Therefore, this Court holds that class-wide back pay is an appropriate remedy in the instant cause.
Those plaintiffs who, on or after April 10, 1973, have already been suspended for 30 days and have had their Civil Service Board hearing and whose dismissal was upheld will be entitled to back pay for the period of their suspension. However, the defendants will not be required to reinstate said plaintiffs. Those plaintiffs whose automatic 30 day suspensions have not yet expired and who have not yet had a Civil Service Board hearing will be reinstated with back pay pending their hearing. Those plaintiffs who, on or after April 10, 1973, were given a punitive suspension and whose suspensions were upheld by the Civil Service Board but were not permanently discharged are entitled to back pay for the period of their suspension. Those plaintiffs whose immediate removal from their job was necessary to *1181avoid damage to municipal property or would be detrimental to the interests of the city government, or would be injurious to the employee himself, a fellow employee or to the general public will not, however, be entitled to back pay for the period of their suspension assuming adequate notice and a hearing was provided within 30 days after the suspension period began. If a hearing was not provided within 30 days after the suspension period began, then they will be entitled to back pay for that time period prior to the hearing which exceeds 30 days, as in plaintiff Young’s case. On this basis, Case No. 73-767-Civ-J-S will be remanded to the defendants for a determination of the precise amount of back pay to which each member of the affected class of plaintiffs is entitled under the standards set forth above.
Therefore, it is
Ordered and adjudged:
That by stipulation, filed herein June 21, 1974, plaintiffs’ motion to certify class, filed in Case No. 73-767-Civ-J-S on June 20, 1974, is hereby granted; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That Case No. 73-767-Civ-J-S is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That the class of plaintiffs in Case No. 73-767-Civ-J-S consists of all those employees of the City of Jacksonville who have achieved permanent civil service status and who, on or after April 10, 1973, have been suspended for 30 days without pay by the defendants without their being afforded prior notice of said suspension, an opportunity for a prior hearing and other procedural due process safeguards to determine the merits of suspension in the absence of valid criteria promulgated by the Civil Service Board to determine whether an extraordinary situation exists where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the suspension; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, filed in Case No. 73-767-Civ-J-S on June 17, 1974, is hereby granted to the extent set forth below; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, filed in Case No. 73-281-Civ-J-S on May 19, 1973, is hereby granted only to the extent set forth below ; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That defendants’ motions for summary judgment, filed herein June 20, 1974, are hereby denied; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That Rules 12.4, 12.8 and 13.4 of the Civil Service Board-, Jacksonville, Florida, are hereby declared to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States for the reasons set forth above in this Court’s opinion; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
The defendants in these cases are hereby enjoined from suspending or dismissing without pay any nonprobationary employee of the City of Jacksonville, Florida, without providing that employee prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing until such time that said defendants promulgate sufficient procedural safeguards which are specifically designed to minimize the risk of error attendant to the initial removal and suspension of any city employee, except- in those extraordinary situations where it is determined, by objective criteria, that retention of the employee would result in damage to municipal property or would be detrimental to the interests of the city government, or would be injurious to the employee himself, to a fellow employee or to the general public; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That, in those extraordinary situations alluded to in the previous paragraph, the defendants are hereby enjoined from suspending and/or dismiss*1182ing a nonprobationary city employee without pay without providing that employee a detailed written notice of charges within 24 hours after commencement of the suspension period and an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing before an impartial decisionmaker within 20 days thereafter; except that, in such an extraordinary situation, where the suspension is with pay the notice and hearing need not be provided until prior to the time the affected employee is to be finally dismissed; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That the defendants are hereby required to promulgate sufficiently detailed criteria for determining when immediate suspension without pay would be appropriate in extraordinary situations under the standards set forth above; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That the plaintiff Harvey Young is not entitled to any back pay in addition to what this Court already awarded in its prior order and injunction of April 19, 1973; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That the defendants are hereby required to provide back pay to those members of the affected class of plaintiffs who have already been suspended for 30 days and have had their post-suspension Civil Service Board hearings for the period of their suspension; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That the defendants are hereby required to reinstate with back pay all those plaintiffs whose automatic 30 days suspensions have not yet expired and who have not yet had a Civil Service Board hearing pending their suspension; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That the defendants are required to provide back pay to those members of the affected class of plaintiffs who were given a punitive suspension and whose suspensions were upheld by the Civil Service Board but were not permanently discharged for the period of their suspension ; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That those members of the affected class of plaintiffs whose immediate removal and suspension were necessary to avoid damage to municipal property or would be detrimental to the interests of the city government, or would be injurious to the employee himself or to the general public are not entitled to back pay assuming adequate notice and a hearing was provided within 30 days after the suspension period began. If a hearing was not provided within 30 days after the suspension period began, then the defendants will be required to provide them with back pay for that time period prior to the hearing which ex-, ceeds 30 days; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That Case No. 73-767-Civ-J-S is hereby remanded to the defendants for a determination of the precise amount of back pay to which each plaintiff is entitled under the standards enunciated in the previous paragraphs; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That this Court retains jurisdiction of Case No. 73-767-Civ-J-S for the purpose of implementation of this order, injunction and declaratory judgment; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
That Case No. 73-281-Civ-J-S is hereby dismissed and final judgment will be entered contemporaneously herewith in accordance with this order, opinion, injunction and declaratory judgment ; and, it is further
Ordered and adjudged:
This order, opinion, injunction and declaratory judgment constitutes this Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.