This matter is before the court for consideration of a petition for review by Ohio Power Company and a cross-petition for enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board dated November 27, 1974, reported at 215 NLRB No. 13. The issues presented arise from discharge of two employees during the course of an economic strike by the members of Local 696, International Brotherhood of Electrical *576Workers, at the company’s Steubenville Division between July 1, 1973 and December 4, 1973. The Board ordered reinstatement of Joseph F. Campbell and Larry J. Greene upon a finding that the company had unlawfully discharged them in violation of § 8(a)(3) and (1)1 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and (1).
The company asserts that in each instance the employee was discharged because of misconduct. In the case of Campbell, the company asserts that the misconduct complained of did not occur during the course of protected activities under the Act, but was unrelated in time or place to picketing or other strike activities. The discharges involve separate incidents and are treated separately.
JOSEPH CAMPBELL
In the early morning hours of October 21, 1973, a truck collided with a power pole adjacent to a two-lane asphalt highway outside the corporate limits of Bellaire, Ohio. The collision severed the pole in half, severely damaged the truck, and shut off electrical power in the vicinity. Alvin E. Mayer, a working foreman, and Kenneth Dawson, an area foreman, were reached at their home and together they traveled in one of the company’s 35 ft. elbow trucks to the scene to restore electric service and to remove the pole butt which was then blocking the road. ' Dawson and Mayer arrived upon the scene at approximately 1:30 a. m. and brought their truck to a halt in the eastbound lane of the road just west of the accident scene. In the meanwhile word of the power failure had reached a striking employee, Joseph Campbell, who lived nearby. Campbell and two other striking employees, Larry Campbell and Gabriel Gas-barre, drove to the scene, arriving there in advance of the company truck bringing Mayer and Dawson. Shortly before Joseph Campbell had an unsatisfactory telephone conversation with the dispatcher on duty in the company offices in an effort to find out what had happened and what was being done to correct the power shutoff. The three strikers brought picket signs with them, but upon arrival, decided to leave them in the car. The testimony concerning what happened thereafter was characterized by the Board as being “in sharp conflict”.
According to Mayer, following a conversation between himself and Joseph Campbell in the middle of the road, Mayer turned toward the accident scene only to have Campbell grab him from behind and throw him to the ground, Mayer falling on his left side but sustaining only a scraped elbow and small finger.
In contrast, Joseph Campbell claimed that the two men were talking when Campbell slipped down off the truck and collided “chest-to-chest” with Mayer, causing him to slip and fall on gravel which had accumulated on the pavement.
Mayer and Dawson reported the incident to the company that night, and thereafter a letter was sent to Joseph Campbell notifying him that he was discharged for an “act of unprovoked aggression against a supervisor”. Campbell was discharged by Clayton Wright, Division Manager of the Steuben-ville Division, whose investigation included personal discussions with both Mayer and Dawson, but not with Campbell, or any other witnesses.
In his decision following the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge made several alternative findings. Specifically, he held that the investigation by Wright was neither reasonable nor in good faith and that Wright’s reasons for discharging Campbell were pretextual. He further found that even if, arguendo, Dawson’s and Mayer’s version of the encounter was accepted, Campbell’s conduct fell “within that catego*577ry of trivial and inconsequential scuffles which do not deprive an employee of the protective mantle of the act”. Finally, the Administrative Law Judge found that as a matter of fact Joseph Campbell did not engage in the conduct attributed to him and that therefore the discharge was in violation of § 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, citing N.L.R.B. v. Burnup and Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 85 S.Ct. 171, 13 L.Ed.2d 1 (1964).2
The Board, on review, declined to adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the assigned reason for the discharge of Campbell was pretextual. It did, however, support the Administrative Law Judge in his finding that Mayer had collided with Campbell, stumbled backwards and then lost his footing. The Board held that the misconduct which was alleged as the basis for the discharge did not in fact occur, and that under the principles of Burnup & Sims, supra, Campbell’s discharge violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board further went on to observe that since Campbell had not in fact engaged in the misconduct attributed to him by Respondents’ witnesses, “we deem it unnecessary to pass upon his alternative finding that the misconduct, even if it occurred, was not sufficiently serious to justify discharge”.
On review, the company raises several issues. As a threshold question, the employer asserts that there is no substantial evidence to support the finding of the Board that Campbell was engaged in protected activity at the time of the incident. Therefore, it contends, the reasonableness of the discharge could not be at issue since an employer may “ ‘discharge [an] employee for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at N.L.R.B. v. Howell Automatic Machine Co., 454 F.2d 1077, 1080 (6th Cir. 1972), so long as that discharge is not motivated by unlawful considerations. The company claims that the record is clear that neither Campbell nor the other fellow strikers were engaged in picketing or other strike related activities. It points out that the accident happened in the middle of the night, far from the scene of normal picketing activity and that, in fact, the three strikers had concluded upon arrival at the scene that they would not even take out their picket signs. all’ ”,
The company further contends that Campbell’s conduct, even as found by the Administrative Law Judge and the Board, was sufficiently serious to warrant discharge.3 The company notes that it is undisputed that at the time when the repair truck arrived on the scene, Campbell left the group of onlookers and began talking to Mayer about how thin his patience was growing, and that the exchange between the two men was heated. Further, the company contends that even under the version of the events credited by the Administrative Law Judge, it is undisputed that Campbell came down from the fender of the repair truck where he was sitting and collided with Mayer, knocking Mayer backwards and onto the ground. Further, Campbell thereafter attempted to interfere with efforts to remove the broken utility pole and reopen the blocked highway to traffic, until directed to refrain by a police officer at the scene.
The Board counters by noting that there is no evidence in the record to support an *578assertion that Campbell’s conduct interfered or hindered the completion of the repair work which was undertaken. It notes that the collision between Mayer and Campbell resulted in only minor injuries to Mayer. Further, the Board contends, while Campbell did attempt momentarily to prevent the removal of the broken utility pole, he abandoned his efforts when directed to do so by a policeman.
As we agree with the Company’s contention that Campbell’s misconduct was sufficiently serious to warrant discharge, we need not decide whether Campbell had been engaged in protected activity at the time the misconduct occurred.
We begin our analysis by noting our standard of review of the decision of the Board on this point:
[N]ot every impropriety committed during [section 7] activity places the employee beyond the protective shield of the act. The employee’s right to engage in concerted activity may permit some leeway for impulsive behavior, which must be balanced against the employer’s right to maintain order and respect. [Citation omitted.] Initially, the responsibility to draw the line between these conflicting rights rests with the Board, and its determination, unless illogical or arbitrary, ought not be disturbed.
N.L.R.B. v. Hartmann Luggage Co., 453 F.2d 178, 183-184 (6th Cir. 1971).
Nevertheless, we have recognized in many cases that an employer is not required to countenance all misconduct by an employee, and we have carefully examined the acts of the employee to determine whether they are beyond the pale of protected activity under Section 7. N.L.R.B. v. Hartmann Luggage Co., supra; Kayser-Roth Hosiery Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 447 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1971); W. J. Ruscoe Co. v. N.L.R.B., 406 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1969).
Given the exceptional circumstances present in this case, we conclude that Campbell’s misconduct was sufficiently serious to justify his dismissal, and we therefore deny enforcement of the Board’s order in his case. We consider several factors important. First, the supervisors were engaged in emergency repair work at approximately 1:30 a. m. When the truck arrived, Campbell left the area where the other strikers and the onlookers were gathered and jumped up on the fender of the company’s truck. The record indicates that at this point the two supervisors had just begun to survey the area where the accident had occurred, and did not as yet know whether there were any downed power lines or live wires.
According to Campbell’s own testimony, he began a discussion with Mayer stating how his patience was getting thin. Apparently, Campbell’s statements angered Mayer4 because at this point Mayer came at Campbell and as Campbell arose from the truck, the two men bumped “chest-to-chest.” The force of the collision knocked Mayer back and he slipped onto the ground.5 He sustained slight injuries from the fall. Although there was no evidence that either man had to be restrained subsequent to the bumping incident, onlookers apparently considered the situation quite serious. Police Officer Warnock testified that immediately after Mayer fell, he came over to Campbell and told him to back away, so there would not be any trouble. Thereafter the repair work continued until Campbell attempted to stop removal of the sheared pole from the highway, and was directed by a police officer who was present *579to cease interfering with the emergency-repair work.
The critical factor in evaluating whether Campbell’s conduct warranted discharge, we think, is the emergency nature of the repair work being performed by the company supervisors. Had the supervisors been on an ordinary repair call during daylight hours, we might agree with the Board that Campbell’s misconduct was not so serious as to justify his discharge. Here, however, an emergency situation clearly existed and Campbell’s conduct must be evaluated in that context. Campbell had no business entering the area where the emergency repair work was being performed. Accepting the Board’s conclusion that Campbell did not deliberately assault Mayer, it is undisputed that his comments to Mayer provoked the altercation which led to Mayer being knocked backwards, and that a police officer, standing some 35 to 45 feet away, felt the situation was serious enough to ask Campbell to back away so trouble could be avoided. Finally, Campbell continued to disrupt the emergency repair work by attempting to stop the removal of the sheared pole.
Although no serious disruption of the repair work occurred, such disruption might have occurred had Mayer been provoked to retaliate, or had the police not been present to threaten Campbell with arrest if he did not stop interfering with removal of the severed pole. Accordingly, enforcement of the Board’s order with regard to Campbell is denied.
LARRY GREENE
The facts leading to Larry Greene’s discharge are in most respects undisputed. On August 10, 1973, Greene and two other strikers were walking to picket the site of a repair job being performed by the company in Steubenville. As Greene and the others reached the southeast corner of the intersection of North and 4th Streets, a company truck which had just left the worksite stopped for a red light at the intersection. In it were line foreman Ross Lee Cunningham and working foreman Walt Williams. Cunningham was driving. Greene yelled “Don’t you know we’re on strike?” and made some comments that the two non-union men were not observing safety rules. Greene then ran out into the intersection, grabbed Cunningham’s cigar from his mouth and threw it to the ground. Based solely upon this incident, Greene was discharged.
The Board affirmed the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge that the conduct complained of was an isolated expression which did not upon the circumstances create a safety hazard jeopardizing either company equipment or personnel. While such conduct is not to be condoned, we are unwilling to disturb the findings and conclusions reached by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted by the Board. At the time of his discharge Greene was the Recording Secretary for the Union and the evidence suggests that the incident was exaggerated and that Greene’s discharge for the alleged misconduct was pretextual. As we noted earlier, the determination as to whether employee misconduct justifies dismissal lies with the Board, and we will not upset that determination unless arbitrary or illogical. N.L.R.B. v. Hartmann Luggage Co., supra. The Board’s determination that Greene’s admitted misconduct was not so serious as to justify his discharge is not so arbitrary or illogical as to be overturned here.
The company further claims that the Administrative Law Judge’s credibility resolutions “are so tainted by his demonstrated bias and prejudicial conduct as to render erroneous, as a matter of law, the Board’s adoption of such findings based on the credibility resolutions.” The Board’s concern over the charge is evident in its decision.6 *580We have little to add to the Board’s comments except to hold that if the Administrative Law Judge’s conduct was less than a model of judicial objectivity, it was not so lacking therein as to deny enforcement solely on this basis.
Enforcement is denied of that part of the order of the Board which directs reinstatement with back pay of Campbell. In all other respects enforcement is granted.