ORDER
I.
This matter is before the court on the motion of the defendant, Charles McLemore, for arrest of judgment under Fed.R.Crim.P. 34. The defendant was convicted by jury verdict of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(h) by knowingly transferring a firearm knowing that such firearm would be used to commit a crime of violence, the murder of a former business associate. The defendant’s motion contends that the indictment fails to state a federal offense.1 The defendant now raises the same issue as his previous motions to dismiss, that an indictment under § 924(h) must allege a féderal nexus, either interstate travel or commerce or an underlying federal offense. Although the court has already ruled on this issue, it is important enough to revisit.2
In the instant case, no interstate nexus was alleged in the indictment nor proven at trial;3 the underlying crime of violence is not a federal offense. The issue before the court concerning the scope of activity prohibited by § 924(h) is apparently one of first impression.4
II.
Section 924(h) of Title 18 provides:
Whoever knowingly transfers a firearm, knowing that such firearm will be used to commit a crime of violence (as defined in subsection (c)(3)) or drug trafficking crime (as defined in subsection (c)(2)) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both.
Subsection (c)(3) of section 924 provides:
For purposes of this subsection the term “crime of violence” means an offense that is a felony and — (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
Subsection (c)(3) refers to crimes that are already codified as felonies' and meet the above definition. It does not create substantive liability for those acts. Subsection (c)(2) specifically refers to federal drug trafficking offenses.
Subsection 924(h), if read in isolation, could prohibit the transfer of a firearm to commit a crime of violence regardless of whether the firearm or perpetrator travels interstate or whether the crime of violence is prohibited by state or federal law.5 At the outset, the court would reject a challenge to the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate intrastate transfers of firearms that are used to commit state crimes of violence. Even the intrastate transfer of firearms has a direct effect on interstate commerce. Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (outlining the effect of local drug offenses on interstate commerce); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 *434L.Ed.2d 686 (1971). Further, Congress already regulates the interstate sale and transfer of firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 922.
Under the government’s reading of the statute, the underlying crime of violence can be a state offense. However, the statute does not explicitly state that it applies to state crimes of violence, nor does it give a commerce clause based justification for why it would apply to a state crime of violence. Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3). The term “crime of violence” is ambiguous because it could reasonably be read to include both state and federal crimes of violence or just federal crimes of violence. By reference to subsection (c)(2), subsection (h) applies to only federal drug offenses. Thus, the government’s reading of the statute is that it applies to state and federal crimes of violence, but only federal drug offenses. The defendant’s reading is presumably that it applies to only federal offenses. Neither interpretation would be contrary to the language of the statute.6
Because of the ambiguity, subsection 924(h) must be read in pan materia with the rest of the statute. Subsection 924(h) was enacted in 1988 with what is now subsection 924(g) as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.7 Subsection -924(g) provides:
Whoever, with the intent to engage in conduct which — (1) constitutes an offense listed in section 1961(1), (2) is punishable under the Controlled' Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C.App. 1901 et seq.), (3) violates any State law relating to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6))), or (4) constitutes a crime of violence (as defined in subsection (c)(3)), travels from any State or foreign country into any other State and acquires, transfers, or attempts to transfer, a firearm in such other State in furtherance of such purpose, shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both.
Because these subsections were passed together, the term “crime of violence” presumably has the same meaning in both subsections. In subsection 924(g), Congress specifically applied the law to both state and federal drug offenses, but included crimes of violence without reference to state or federal law.8 Because Congress was able to differentiate between state and federal drug- offenses in other parts of section 924 — and between state and federal offenses elsewhere in title 18, the failure to make- a similar specific distinction with respect to crimes of violence in subsection 924(h) means that the court cannot tell whether such underlying crimes must be federal. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2) (specifically stating that federally licensed firearms dealers may not sell or deliver a firearm to' someone who the dealer knows is prohibited by state law from possessing -or receiving a firearm); 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (creating a federal felony for use of interstate commerce facilities to commit murder in violation of state or federal law); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (specifically stating that this provision of the Bail Reform Act applies *435to both state and federal offenses that meet the requirements of subsection (f)(1)).
Reading subsection 924(h) in conjunction with the rest of section 924 does not support the government’s position that a crime of violence includes state offenses. Section 924 is entitled “penalties.” Whether this section creates liability or simply lists the penalties for violations of other statutes is an open question. See United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461, 1463-64 (10th Cir.1992). The legislative history of subsection (c) suggests that it was a congressional effort to enhance the penalty for federal crimes for the use of a firearm. See id at 1486-87 (Moore, J., dissenting). Furthermore, subsection (h) is the only subsection in section 924 that does not explicitly include either interstate commerce or travel or an underlying federal offense as an element.9 Subsection 924(b), for example, applies to shipping, transporting, or receiving a firearm in interstate commerce with the intent or knowledge that it would be used to commit an offense punishable by more than a year in prison. It would be an anomaly for Congress to have intended for subsection 924(h) to have a much greater scope than the other subsections of section 924 — and perhaps change the federal-state balance by criminalizing intrastate activity — without explicitly stating so.
The scant legislative history of subsection 924(h)10 provides only little insight. Referring to both subsections 924(h) and (g), Senator Biden said, “This section [§ 6211 of P.L. 100-690] creates a new offense, punishable by imprisonment for 10 years, of traveling in interstate commerce and acquiring or transferring a firearm with the intent to commit a crime of violence or other serious federal offense including any drug offense.” 134 Cong.Rec.S. 17360, 17363 (emphasis added). Senator Biden’s remarks imply that the crime of violence described in subsections 924(g) and (h) must be a federal offense.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690, which created subsection (h), amended subsection (c) to increase the penalties. When Congress enacted subsection (c) as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968, P.L. 90-618, it considered whether to apply the enhanced penalties to state crimes of violence. See Hill, 971 F.2d at 1475-76 (Moore, J., dissenting, citing H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1956, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4428). After deliberation, Congress decided to apply the law only to federal offenses. No such discussion is apparent in the genesis of subsection (h). Howéver, when contrasted with Congress’s previous consideration of a similar issue with respect to subsection (c), the failure of Congress even to consider whether subsection (h) applied to state crimes of violence implies that Congress did not intend to cover state crimes of violence. At the least, the legislative history does not evince, an intent to cover state crimes of violence. Because there is no evident statutory purpose, the statute remains ambiguous. See United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 1631, 95 L.Ed.2d 204 (1987).
Because the statute is unclear about whether it applies to state crimes of violence, the rule of lenity dictates that the court must construe it narrowly. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971).11 In this case, because Congress has not “‘plainly and unmistakably”’, id at 348, 92 S.Ct. at 523 (citing United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485, 37 S.Ct. 407, 411, 61 L.Ed. 857 (1917)), made *436it a federal crime to knowingly transfer a firearm knowing that it will be used to commit a state crime of violence, the indictment is fatally deficient.12 Although defendant’s conduct was morally reprehensible, the court cannot tailor an ambiguous federal statute to fit that conduct.13
III.
Because the indictment does not charge an offense punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 924(h),14 the motion to arrest judgment is GRANTED. It is so. ORDERED.