*31OPINION
By the Court,
This appeal is from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which the appellant alleges that he was denied his constitutional right to appointed counsel at the hearing for the revocation of his probation previously granted.
We have heretofore established that an indigent person convicted of a felony who had been previously sentenced and then placed on probation, but the execution thereof had been suspended during good behavior, is not entitled to appointment of counsel. Shum v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 156, 413 P.2d 495 (1966); In re DuBois, 84 Nev. 562, 445 P.2d 354 (1968); Smith v. Warden, 85 Nev. 83, 450 P.2d 356 (1969). In seeking to have this court overrule those cases, the appellant relies upon Hewett v. State of North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th CA 1969), which was decided since In re DuBois and Smith, supra.
This case may be distinguished from Hewett on the facts. Here the appellant readily admitted, at his revocation hearing, that he had possessed marijuana during the term of his probation and furthermore he did not ask for the assistance of counsel. In Hewett, the defendant questioned the nature of his alleged violation and requested the assistance of counsel. We do not, however, decide this case on its factual difference from Hewett because we do not find the announced holding of that case to be persuasive.
We are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court (Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Sec. 2).1 We are not *32bound by the decisions of the other federal courts. In some instances we might follow the decisions of the other federal courts. Here we have carefully considered Hewett v. State of North Carolina, supra. We find the holdings in that case opposite to our holdings in In re DuBois, supra, and Smith v. Warden, supra. Those cases were decided by this court in the light of Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), which is the latest holding by the High Court on the question of the right to counsel at a hearing for the revocation of probation. We believe that In re DuBois and Smith were correctly decided. We reaffirm those holdings and apply them to this case.
A point of law, once determined, will not be unsettled except for very weighty and conclusive reasons. Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69 (1876); Maitia v. Allied L. & L. S. Co., 49 Nev. 451 (1926). The reasoning in Hewett v. State of North Carolina, supra, does not persuade us to alter our position on this matter. We therefore reject the holding in that case.
The order of the district court denying the appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
Zenoff, C. J., Mowbray, Thompson, and Gunderson, JJ., concur.