Adrian Iselin et al. plaintiffs and appellants, vs. Samuel Peck et al. defendants and respondents.
1. A witness, who had known H. for four or five years, and pretty well for a year or two previous to certain transactions in question, had been in the habit of selling him goods on credit; had seen statements of H.’s business, wherein the dividends and profits of him and his partner were some $4000 in six . months; knew what his credit was, at the time of a sale in question; and that it was good; being asked the question, “ Did you learn at that time what *630H. was reputed to be worth V’ Held that the witness was competent to testify as to H.’s responsibility and credit, and that an objection to such question was properly overruled.
2. A witness, who did not know H.; had no knowledge personally of his responsibility; or of his general reputation for pecuniary responsibility “ except from his own books and records of bis agency,” was asked whether a paper produced contained a correct result of his books, as to the standing of H. Held that the answer to this question was properly excluded.
(Before Robertson, Barbour and Garvin, J.J.)
Heard December 10, 1863;
decided February 13, 1864.
This- action was brought to set aside - a sale of a stock of goods, made by the judgment debtor Peck, to the defendant House, and an assignment made for the benefit of creditors to the defendant Mack, which assignment was without preferences.
Peck & Co. in September, 1861, became insolvent. On the 25tli September, they sold their entire stock of goods to George V. House for $1000 in cash, and his nine notes' for $1022 each, payable in from six to fourteen months. On the 28th September, Peck & Co. assigned those notes and other bills receivable to John Mack. The defendants, Peck & Mack, who were witnesses, did not claim but that the sale was made with a view to the assignment. The plaintiffs proved that House had been discharged under the insolvent law two and a half years before the sale in question, and that, the notes he gave-were each protested as they fell due, and were now in suit. The counsel for the defendant Mack then interrogated him : “ Did you learn at that. time what Mr. House was reputed to be worth ?” The plaintiffs’ counsel objected to the question. The objection was overruled, and-the plaintiffs excepted. The defendant answered,. “ I understood he was worth $25,000 to $30,000.” The plaintiffs then called John McKillip, the president of a commercial agency, who testified that it was his, business to receive and communicate intelligence as to the commercial responsibility of men. He was asked to communicate the result of his books, as to the responsibility of House in September, 1861. The question was objected to, and the objection sustained, and the plaintiffs excepted. The court found, as a fact, from the evidence of Mack, that House was *631possessed of means sufficient to carry this purchase into effect. At the close of the plaintiffs’ testimony, the court found, as facts, that the sale and assignment were not fraudulent, and gave judgment for the defendants on the merits. The plaintiff. appealed to the general term.
W. Watson, for the appellants.
A. J. Vanderpoel, for the respondents.
By the Court,
Garvin, J.
The plaintiffs filed their complaint to set aside a sale of a stock of goods made by the judgment debtor Peck to the defendant House, and also an assignment made to the defendant Mack, which assignment was without preferences.
The case was heard before his honor Justice Moncrief, at special term, who passed upon the question of intent both as to the sale of the goods and the assignment, and found that each were made in good faith, without any intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors ; that finding was upon conflicting evidence, and is therefore conclusive. But it is insisted that the court erred ih overruling the objection to the question, “ Did you learn at that time what Mr. House was reported to be worth ?” The witness had known House for four or five years—had known him pretty well- for a year or two previous to these transactions. House had been a customer of the witness, who had been in the habit of selling him goods on credit. The witness further stated that he had seen statements of House’s business, and that the dividends and profits between, and by, House and his partner were some $4000 in six months —drew that much money—“ I knew what his credit was at the time of this sale; it was good.” Then follows^—after a few immaterial questions—the one objected to. The ruling of the court Was unexceptionable.
I think the witness had knowledge of the defendant’s (House) pecuniary circumstances and facts connected with his business, growing out of the witness’ commercial relation and acquaint*632anee, to qualify him to spéak upon the question of House’s responsibility and credit.
The evidence of McKillip was properly excluded. He had .stated he did not know House ; had no knowledge personally of his responsibility ; knew nothing of his general reputation for pecuniary responsibility, either in Troy or New York, “except from - my books and records- of my agency.” After making these statements, this question was put by the plaintiff, (producing a paper,) “ I ask you whether this paper contains a 'correct result of your books, as to the standing of Mr. House?” The answer to this question was properly excluded. The judgment in this case should be affirmed, with costs.