*447OPINION
By the Court,
The Nevada equal rights commission commenced this action to compel the City of North Las Vegas to obey a commission order regarding an unlawful employment practice. The district court found the action to be barred by limitations and dismissed it. For reasons hereafter stated we reverse and remand for the limited court review contemplated by statute.1
Sarah Lee Johnson, a black woman, was not promoted to an available senior legal secretary position on January 15, 1973, although in first place on the existing eligibility list for that position. She timely filed a complaint with the Nevada equal rights commission alleging that she was denied promotion because she is black.
The hearing officer found that the City of North Las Vegas had engaged in an unlawful employment practice contrary to the mandate of NRS 613.330(1) (a) which bars discrimination on account of race. He recommended that complainant be promoted to senior legal secretary as of January 15, 1973, and be paid the difference between what she would have earned in that position and what she did earn in her lesser capacity.
The Commission upheld the recommendation of the hearing officer. The City received the Commission’s decision and order *448on October 30, 1975, but refused to comply therewith. The Commission commenced this action on December 31, 1975.
Although the plea of limitations is not an unconscionable defense, neither is it such a meritorious defense that either the law or the fact should be strained in aid of it, nor should a court indulge in any presumption in its favor. Howard v. Waale-C. & Tiberti, 67 Nev. 304, 312, 217 P.2d 872, 876 (1950). We mention this simply because NRS 613.430 upon which the court dismissed this action, when read in conjunction with NRS 613.410 and 613.430, is confusing at best.2
The district court apparently believed that an application for an injunction by the commission was limited by the 60-day provision of NRS 613.430. This is a possible construction of the statutes involved, but one which we deem unreasonable and a strain in aid of limitations. The 60-day limitation therein *449runs from the date “of the act complained of.” In this case that date would be January 15, 1973, when the City failed to promote Sarah Lee Johnson to the position of senior legal secretary. To apply that limitation to an enforcement action by the commission following its administrative hearings could lead to absurd consequences. For example, if the complainant had filed with the commission on the sixtieth day after the act, the commission could investigate the matter, but could never bring an action against the recalcitrant employer to enforce its order because the 60-day limitation would necessarily pass before suit could be filed, notwithstanding the tolling provision of the statute. We are unwilling to attribute such an intention to the legislature.
In our opinion the limitation of NRS 613.430 should not be read to apply to judicial review and enforcement sought by the commission of its administrative determination under NRS 613.410. Indeed, NRS 613.410, empowering the commission to enforce its orders, does not itself contain a limitation period within which court action must be commenced.
The limitation period of NRS 613.430 should be confined to actions filed in the first instance in the district court pursuant to the authorization of NRS 613.420.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the limited judicial review contemplated by statute.
Batjer, C. J., and Mowbray, Gunderson, and Manoukian, JJ., concur.