The State appeals from an order dismissing a charge of second degree arson.1 Mayle filed a (c)(4) motion2 alleging the basic facts of the case are undisputed and they do not establish a prima facie case against him.3 Reaching the merits of the case, we affirm.
Mayle’s (c)(4) motion established that Mayle had an accident while driving his uninsured Dodge van. The van was towed to a garage and left in the adjacent yard. In a fit of anger, Mayle set fire to the van and destroyed it. No damage to any person or other property occurred, nor did Mayle intend to damage anything except his van.4
Mayle maintains these undisputed facts do not constitute a prima facie case of arson. The second degree arson statute provides in part:
Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or another, under any circumstances not referred in subsection
*109(1), is guilty of arson in the second degree
§ 806.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1979). A vehicle is expressly included in the statutory definition of “structure.” § 806.01(3), Fla.Stat. (1979). The legislature eliminated the requirement that the burning be done “maliciously,”5 but the new arson statute requires that the act be done “willfully and unlawfully.” (Emphasis supplied).
The meaning of “unlawfully” has yet to be defined by the Florida courts.6 However, it must mean something more than the mere burning of one’s own property without any danger or damage to others or the property of others,7 nor intent to inflict such damage. Such an act is not contrary to any statute or common law of this State. Therefore we agree the trial court properly granted Mayle’s (c)(4) motion.
AFFIRMED.
COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur.