This appeal presents the validity vel non of an order of the court below, entered at the outset of a Grand Jury investigation, denying the Government the right to use before the Grand Jury information obtained by its agents in their •examination of the books of the appellees, Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Banner Publishing Company, Marshall Publishing Company, and Denison Herald, Inc. The -court entered the order granting appel-lees’ motions upon its finding that, prior to the issuance of the subpoenas duces tecum under which the records were required to be produced before the Grand Jury, appellees had submitted to the Government for examination their books, records and files upon their understanding that they would not be used in connection with any criminal investigation or prosecution.
The.trial court heard the testimony of three witnesses, Bruce Meador, a representative of the four corporations, T. J. McMahon, their attorney, and Ural E. Horton, Jr., Special Agent of the Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice. The testimony was in sharp conflict. Meador and McMahon testified that, when the government agent requested the right to examine the books, records and files of the four newspapers, he was informed that these records would be submitted to him on condition that they be not used in connection with any criminal investigation or prosecution, and he was requested to note this condition in his report to the Government.
Horton testified that no such condition was expressed or discussed, that he advised Meador and McMahon that they had a right to refuse to produce the records if they desired, and advised them further that the records could be used against them by the Government, stating further that he did not know the purpose of the investigation then in progress. He testified that he had no authority to promise any person that he would be “free from any prosecution” concerning any statements made or records furnished. He introduced a long letter addressed to him by Meador which listed the documents furnished and gave certain requested information. This letter, which accompanied Meador’s delivery of the corporate records to Horton, made no mention of the condition testified by Meador and McMahon as having been imposed upon the surrender of the records to the Government. The letter also offered to furnish further information if requested to do so. The court resolved the conflicts between the witnesses in favor of appellees.1
*368We are not able to say that these findings of fact are clearly erroneous and we accept them as the predicate upon which our decision will rest. We recognize, however, as do the appellees, that there was no express agreement between the Government and appellees, and that the “understanding” grew out of the conditional furnishing of the records and was an understanding held by appellees alone, it being “quite immaterial,” in the court’s mind, whether “it was agreed to by the Government.”
The motions set forth the condition upon which the corporate records had been turned over to the Government,2 and prayed solely that “the subpoenas be suppressed and * * * said condition fully respected.” The motions did not allege that any of appellees’ constitutional rights had been violated, but the court, in its memorandum opinion, held that “constitutional provisions” would be violated if use of the records before the Grand Jury should be permitted.3 The order of the court did not quash or suppress the subpoenas, but commanded only that the restriction placed upon the use of the records by appellees be respected.4
What we have before us, therefore, is an order entered by the District Court at the beginning of a Grand Jury investigation which prohibited in advance the use before the Grand Jury of the information obtained by the government agent from appellees’ records. In our opinion the order was without legal justification. Its language showed clearly that the denial of use of the records, and information before the Grand Jury was predicated solely upon its declaration that the restrictions and conditions should be respected and enforced. These restrictions were unilateral only. Appellees knew that Horton was not advised of the purpose of the investigation and that, as a mere field agent, he had no authority to agree to any restrictions. The most appellees contend is that they requested that he advise the Government of the restrictions when he made his report.2 **5, *369Appellees did not follow up their request or withhold the records until they learned whether it would be respected — even if it be assumed that some agent of the Government had the authority to enter into such an agreement. Cf. United States v. Ford (Whiskey Cases), 1878, 99 U.S. 594, 25 L.Ed. 399.
Appellees pitch their argument entirely upon the contention, not raised in their motions, that the evidence ought to be withheld from the Grand Jury on the ground that it was illegally obtained in violation of appellees’ rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment, of course, does not apply to corporations,6 and it is perfectly clear that the records were not obtained by any illegal search or seizure in contravention of the Fourth Amendment.7 Horton entered the premises of appellees with the consent of Meador after having ’phoned for an engagement. Even under appellees’ evidence, he made no threats or misrepresentations, employed no stratagems, practiced no concealment, coercion or fraud. He did not seize any records at all. They were delivered to him voluntarily by Meador two weeks after the request was made. Appellees and their attorney knew all the while that they had no assurance from the Government that any condition which might have been imposed would be honored. We find nothing in appellees’ argument or in their authorities to justify the ruling of the court below.
It is established law that suppression of evidence prior to an indictment should be considered only when there is a clear and definite showing that constitutional rights have been violated. Cf. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., supra, 336 U.S. 793, 796, 69 S.Ct. 824. And under our holding in Eastus v. Bradshaw, 1938, 94 F.2d 788, the validity of his entire proceeding is subject to serious doubt. In White v. United States, 1952, 194 F.2d 215, 217, certiorari denied 343 U.S. 930, 72 S.Ct. 760, 96 L.Ed. 1340, we held that one proceeding, as are appellees here, under Rule 41(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., could not hold the Internal Revenue Bureau, as a matter of contract, to its declared policy of granting immunity to persons making voluntary disclosure.
The office of the Grand Jury under our system is an important one, and its ability to function should not be limited by questions of propriety, Blair v. United States, 1919, 250 U.S. 273, 282, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979, it being vital that it possess the power to conduct *370broad investigations8 fettered only by the requirement that constitutional rights be not infringed.9
The order of the District Court granting the motions is reversed and the cause is remanded for the entry of an order denying them.
Reversed and remanded.