The appellee Ramirez-Limon lived with his wife and children in Houston, Texas until he was imprisoned in a jail in Mexico, where he still remains. After his incarceration, his family moved to a home in Dade County, but Ramirez-Limon has never resided there. Because the appellee can hardly be said to have been “actually living [there] at the time of service,” Panter v. Werbel-Roth Securities, Inc., 406 So.2d 1267, 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), we agree with the trial court that the Dade County residence is not his “usual place of abode,” under section 48.031(1), Florida Statutes (1983).1 See State v. Heffeman, 142 Fla. 496, 195 So. 145 (1940); Hauser v. Schiff, 341 So.2d 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); cf. Bull v. Kistner, 257 Iowa 968, 135 N.W.2d 545 (1965) (home where prisoner resided before imprisonment and where wife and children still live is his “usual place of abode”). Accordingly, the order quashing the substr-*1050tuted service of process attempted at that address through the appellee’s wife is
Affirmed.