466 F.2d 1393

Matthew WINTERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Thomas D. COOK, Superintendent of The Mississippi State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 71-3323.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 20, 1972.

On Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Jan. 2, 1973.

*1394Roy S. Haber, George Peach Taylor, Jackson, Miss., for petitioner-appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., Guy N. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for respondent-appellee.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and RIVES and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge:

In April of 1963 Winters, a Negro male, was indicted in Holmes County, Mississippi, for the murder of E. T. Branch, a male Caucasian. At his arraignment, Winters pleaded not guilty. Six months later, on the date for which trial had been set and with the advice of counsel, Winters changed his plea to guilty. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

On October 6, 1969, Winters filed a motion in State court to vacate his sentence, alleging inter alia that “[a]t the time of the indictment and plea, and for a long time prior thereto, there was and continues to be a system and practice in the organization and selection of jurors in Holmes County which is deliberately designed to exclude members of the Negro race from service on the grand and petit juries in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” (App. at 46.) At a hearing on the motion, it became clear that at the time Winters entered his plea of guilty he was unaware of his right to challenge the composition of the jury. Though Winters’ counsel had cognizance of the right, he did not inform Winters. Nor did the trial court instruct Winters as to that right. On December 11, 1969, the State court dismissed Winters’ motion, stating that “The petitioner knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty upon the advice of competent counsel. The petitioner’s voluntary guilty plea waived all nonjurisdictional defects.” (App. at 108.) That decision was affirmed, February 8, 1971, by the Mississippi Supreme Court. 244 So.2d 1.

Thereafter, Winters instituted this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, seeking habeas corpus relief. Again he asserted his constitutional right to indictment and trial by a grand and petit jury from which Negroes are not excluded. He contended that his guilty plea was not a bar to relief, first because he was denied effective assistance of counsel, and second because his plea was not a waiver of his right to challenge the array of jurors in that he was unaware of such right when he entered his plea. The district court denied relief. We reverse.

We start with the rubric that a voluntary plea of guilty waives all *1395known nonjurisdictional defects, including the constitutional right to challenge the composition of the grand and petit juries. Colson v. Smith, 5 Cir. 1971, 438 F.2d 1075, 1078;1 Williams v. Smith, 5 Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d 592; Throgmartin v. United States, 5 Cir. 1970, 424 F.2d 630. Both the State courts and the district court in this case held that Winters’ plea of guilty waived his right to complain of the array of jurors in Holmes County. The rationale for such view is that Winters’ lawyer knew of the right and that •by failing to raise the objection counsel effectively waived the right for Winters. But it is axiomatic that Winters is the one who must make the waiver, not his attorney.2 *****8 Winters had no idea that he could object to the jury composition. Before a waiver can be effective it must be *1396knowingly given. Since Winters had not been informed of the right, his waiver did not encompass its relinquishment.

We need not consider Winters’ contention that counsel was ineffective, for his claim for relief is amply supported by the more basic and fundamental proposition that he did not knowingly waive a right of which he was unaware. As we said in Cobb v. Balkcom, 5 Cir. 1964, 339 F.2d 95, 98, 102:

“We * * * pretermit the question of denial of the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed to a state prisoner by the Sixth Amendment * -X- -X-
* -X- * * * -x-
“Trial counsel did not discuss the right with Cobb or his mother or anyone acting for Cobb. There was no express waiver by Cobb either of his right to challenge the grand jury indictment or the trial jury. His lawyer was satisfied with the grand and trial juries, but this is insufficient. * * * * In sum, there was no intentional relinquishment of a known right within the purview of the majority opinion in Fay v. Noia [1963, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837], and for the state to subject a defendant to this situation amounts to a denial of due process and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. What constitutes a valid waiver in this instance is a federal question, and with all deference to the Supreme Court of Georgia, we hold that Cobb’s federal rights were not abandoned.”

In this case Winters’ attorney was satisfied with the grand and petit juries. But the question is whether Winters would have been similarly content had he been fully aware of his rights.

The underpinnings of Cobb are found in United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 5 Cir., 263 F.2d 71, cert. denied, 1959, 361 U.S. 838, and 850, 80 S.Ct. 58, and 109, 4 L.Ed.2d 78, and 89, and its rationale was followed in Labat v. Bennett, 5 Cir. 1966, 365 F.2d 698, cert. denied, 1967, 386 U.S. 991, 87 S.Ct. 1303, 18 L.Ed.2d 334. Although neither Goldsby nor Labat involved waiver by a guilty plea, but rather concerned waiver by failure to raise a timely objection to the array of jurors, they are indistinguishable from a guilty plea context. The fundamentals of the doctrine of waiver are the same no matter what form the waiver takes, be it waiver by inadvertent delay in asserting a right or waiver by a plea of guilty. The party giving the waiver must know of his rights before we can hold that he has relinquished them. E. g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 1938, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; Labat, supra.

That white lawyers representing black clients often fail to raise an objection to jury composition has been recognized as a problem in this Circuit. Whitus v. Balkcom, 5 Cir. 1964, 333 F.2d 496, 506-507; Goldsby, supra, 263 F.2d at 82. The problem has surfaced in this case. Winters’ attorney testified that although he has represented many Negro defendants he has never objected to an array of jurors. In recognition of this difficulty we have said that “the conduct of * * * counsel without consultation with his client did not bind [the client] to a waiver of his constitutional right to object to the systematic exclusion of members of his race from” the jury. United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 5 Cir. 1962, 304 F.2d 53, 68. See words to similar effect in Goldsby, supra, 263 F.2d at 82-83. We will not, in this ease, retreat from that view.

The district court implied that recent decisions of the Supreme Court have somehow undermined the validity of Goldsby, Seals, Cobb, Whitus and Labat. See Brady v. United States, 1970, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747; McMann v. Richardson, 1970, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763; Parker v. North Carolina, 1970, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785. We cannot accept that view. Granted, the Supreme Court has given its approval to the plea bargaining process, but in doing so it in no way derogated the notion *1397that to be effective as a waiver a guilty plea must be knowingly given. Put shortly, without having been informed of his right to object to the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand and petit juries of Holmes County, Winters cannot be held to a waiver of that right even though he pleaded guilty.3

Of course there has been no fact finding in this case that Negroes were systematically excluded from the grand and petit juries in Holmes County, Mississippi, at the time of Winters’ indictment and conviction. Accordingly we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Negroes were in fact systematically excluded.

Reversed and remanded.

CLARK, Circuit Judge, dissents.

CLARK, Circuit Judge

(dissenting):

The majority opinion adopts the premise that the result in this case is required by the prior decisions of the court and disavows any “retreat from that view.” With all deference, I view that disavowal as wholly unnecessary, since I see the result reached by the majority as nothing less than a headlong charge into an area which has heretofore been only occasionally entered, and then with discretion and circumspection. Both precedent and reason forbid my concurrence.

The facts and procedural background of this litigation are well documented in a lucid opinion by the district court, 333 P.Supp. 1033 (N.D.Miss.1971), and need not be published again.

If it was less than crystal clear before, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), wiped away all doubt that every waiver of a constitutionally protected right had to be intelligent and understanding to effectively foreclose federal habeas corpus relief, 372 U.S. at 439, 83 S.Ct. at 849. However, Fay went on to say that “[a] choice made by counsel not participated in by the petitioner does not automatically bar relief.” Id. The implication of this last statement — that some strategic decisions which entail the waiver of a constitutional right may be made by counsel without consultation with the accused' — was made express in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965) in these words:

Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an accused will not, where the circumstances are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims, see Whitus v. Balk-corn, 333 F.2d 496 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1964), we think that the deliberate bypassing by counsel of the contemporaneous-objection rule as a part of trial strategy would have that effect in this case. (Emphasis supplied.) 379 U.S. at 451-452, 85 S.Ct. at 569.

Prior to today’s holding, it is fair to say that the rule of Henry required the courts of this circuit to determine whether the circumstances of the partic*1398ular case before them would be sufficiently exceptional to lift the bar of waiver of constitutional claims which had been created by the good faith actions of a personally retained attorney. The majority opinion now creates a per se rule that even an intentional, strategic waiver by such a lawyer of his client’s constitutional rights cannot be binding. Specifically, the opinion states:

Both the State courts and the district court in this case held that Winters’ plea of guilty waived his right to complain of the array of jurors in Holmes County. The rationale for such view is that Winters’ lawyer knew of the right and that by failing to raise the objection counsel effectively waived the right for Winters. But it is axiomatic that Winters is the one who must make the waiver, not his attorney. Winters had no idea that he could object to the jury composition. Before a waiver can be effective it must be knowingly given. Since Winters had not been informed of the right, his waiver did not encompass its relinquishment. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under this reasoning, the exception which Henry explicated has swallowed the basic rule on which it was engrafted. “Axiomatic” or not, on the authority of Henry and on the basis of common sense practicalities I would reject the syllogism that since the rights are those of the defendant, only he may waive them. Rather than relying on axioms, I submit that this court should have made an examination of the circumstances of this case to determine whether they were so “exceptional” as to justify departing from the general rule.

Surely a lawyer should not be required to explain to his client every possible constitutional claim that might conceivably be made at the many stages of indictment, plea, trial and appeal. See Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1110-11 (1970). To require an explanation of even the most important rights afforded by the Constitution, with the advantages and disadvantages of raising each issue, in terms such that the defendant could make an intelligent and knowing waiver creates a heavy burden for both clients and lawyers. To extend the attorney’s duty to include the responsibility to inform the defendant of every possible constitutional claim would make the burden unbearable. Particularly is this true where, as in this case, the defendant is illiterate.1

Our Constitution has been held to afford all criminal defendants the right to counsel. The cardinal precept upon which the reasoning of this right is predicated is that most defendants are untutored in the law. Unqualified to present his own defense and having privately employed counsel of his choice so he would have the benefit of legal representation, it seems most incongruous to reflexively allow this defendant to void his conviction when his lawyer did what he was retained to do — use his skill and knowledge of the law to further the best interests of his client — because the lawyer did not reason out his actions with his client. Moreover, I conjure up no unreasonable spectres when I predict that the sure consequences of the reasoning of the majority will be a veritable deluge of claims for post-conviction relief alleging that the petitioner’s attorney took this or that action without fully consulting the petitioner and obtaining his knowing agreement.

Case law demonstrates that circumstances justifying such a departure may be grouped in two broad categories: first, where there is evidence of fraud, *1399or gross negligence or incompetence on the part of the defendant’s attorney; and, second, where an inherently personal right of fundamental importance is involved.

As to the first category, there is absolutely no evidence in this record that the attorney for the defendant did anything other than to conscientiously represent the defendant to the best of his ability. The evidence produced in the District Court clearly shows that counsel for the defendant carefully considered the possibility of raising the constitutional objections to the composition of the jury, but rejected that course of action in favor of a plea of guilty. By such a plea his client was assured of receiving a recommendation from the prosecution of a life sentence (with a possibility of a parole after serving ten years), thus avoiding what counsel considered (and I agree) was the distinct possibility of the death sentence. Counsel testified that these constitutional objections were the “pry pole” that he used in getting the state to allow the defendant to enter a guilty plea. In his opinion as an experienced criminal attorney, he was utilizing this unlawful condition in the most effective way. Even the most skillful trial tactician should be hard pressed to fault counsel’s considered and conscientious strategy to waive this option in return for practical assurance that his client’s life would not be lost. Where, as here, a privately retained lawyer who is well-versed in the defense of murder charges deliberately refrains from making a known constitutional objection to the composition of the jury in exchange for important and material concessions from the prosecution, there has been a deliberate by-pass and waiver under Fay and Henry. If the jury exclusion claim had been successfully asserted, it would only have gone to the procedure of trial. At most this would have merely postponed the day of the final judgment. These being the circumstances, I simply cannot say that because the attorney did not inform the defendant of this possible constitutional claim, the deliberate waiver is vitiated.2

On the facts of this case, I cannot say any able defense lawyer would have *1400made or allowed an illiterate client to make a different decision. Even conceding, arguendo, that the attorney was mistaken in his decision not to attack the jury composition, surely that judgment was well “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). Thus, it is clear this case does not fall within this first branch of exceptions to what should be the general rule.

It does not fall within the second branch of the exception either. It is not such an inherently personal fundamental right that it can be waived only by the defendant and not by his attorney. Such personal fundamental rights include the right to plead guilty (which of course encompasses the waiver of numerous rights), the right to waive trial by jury, the right to waive appellate review and the right to testify personally. See Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1011 n. 102 (1970). Without intimating any opinion as to whether these fundamental rights can never be waived by an attorney for his client, it is sufficient for the purposes of this case to point out that the right to be tried by a constitutionally composed jury is not one of the rights traditionally considered so inherently personal that only the defendant may waive it. The decisions cited by the majority, rather than supporting the proposition that only the defendant may waive this right, are foursquare against it. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, supra n. 2, stated:

The evidence in this case fairly considered shows no waiver by the appellant himself but at most by his counsel without his express authority. In ordinary procedural matters, the defendant in a criminal case is bound by the acts or nonaction of his counsel. That might extend to the waiver of the objection that Negroes were systematically excluded from the grand jury. In noncapital cases, it might extend to a like waiver as to the petit jury. It might extend to such a waiver even in capital cases, where the record affirmatively shows that the particular jury was desired by defendant’s counsel after conscientious consideration of that course of action which would be best for the client’s cause. 263 F.2d at 83. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

In Whitus v. Balkeom, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 379 U.S. 931, 85 S.Ct. 329, 13 L.Ed.2d 343 (1964), noted with approval in Henry v. Mississippi, supra, 379 U.S. at 451-452, 85 S.Ct. 564, we quoted the language of Goldsby and stated that in the circumstances described there could be a “true waiver based on a free option.” 333 F.2d at 502.

In Cobb v. Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1964) there was no evidence of any deliberate bypass by counsel for the defendant. The court properly held that the lawyer’s statement that he was satisfied with the jury was “insufficient” to show an intent to waive a right to achieve a strategic advantage. There was no showing, as there is in the instant case, that the defense counsel had made positive use of the constitutional right in any manner. The court specifically pointed out that “[w]e are not presented here with a waiver case where a ‘particular jury was desired by defendant’s counsel after conscientious consideration of that course of action which would be best for his client’s cause,’ see United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, supra.” 339 F.2d at 101 n. 2.3

*1401From this discussion it can be seen that, prior to today, the rule that a constitutional objection to the composition of the jury might be waived by an attorney without consultation with his client where there is “conscientious consideration of that course of action which would be best for his client’s cause” was well established as the law of this circuit. So undeviating precedent commands that I dissent from the “axiomatic” rule that an attorney may never waive an objection to the composition of a jury without consultation with his client.

Even were the precedents not so uniform, I would nevertheless feel compelled to file this dissent. The original pronouncement of the rule in Goldsby is correct as a statement of what the law should be. Neither fairness, justice, nor common sense can condone voiding the conviction of this petitioner merely because the attorney who represented him did not explain every possible constitutional claim. Where, as here, there is no showing whatsoever of prejudice to the petitioner as a result of the attorney’s failure to inform him of the right, I believe the majority is distorting the limited privilege to reexamine claims waived in the trial court into a license to seize upon a pragmatically meaningless circumstance to void a solemn and final judgment.

There is yet another reason why the result announced by the majority should not prevail. Despite the protestations of the majority that, considering “fundamentals”, a waiver is a waiver is a waiver, the law recognizes a world of difference between a waiver resulting from a failure to object to the composition of a jury which actually convicts a defendant and one created by a plea of guilty where no jury is ever involved.4

The Supreme Court has taught us that a liberal measure of finality is to be accorded to a plea of guilty by a criminal defendant. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). If the plea is intelligent and voluntarily made, it is binding. As the decision in McMann points out:

In our view a defendant’s plea of guilty based on reasonably competent *1402advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession. Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when motivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends as an initial matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. 397 U.S. at 770-771, 90 S.Ct. at 1449 (footnote omitted)

If McMann stands for the proposition that habeas corpus is not available where counsel has given erroneous advice to his client who pleads guilty as a result thereof, surely we should not intervene where the attorney merely failed to inform his client of a single possible constitutional claim which he thought best to use as coin for barter with the prosecution. Where the attorney reached a more than arguably correct decision involving many complicated and uncertain variables, we should not impose a rule requiring that he inform his client as to the precise nature of each variable. A lawyer ought not have to conduct a course in constitutional law for his client to validly discharge his position of trust.

The possibility of prejudice in this case is less than a gossamer one. I have no doubt but that petitioner would have pleaded guilty even if he had known of his constitutional claim. If the rule proscribing more severe penalties on retrial had not existed, thus allowing him to seek a new trial without, sacrificing the advantage he secured by his guilty plea, this petition would never have been exposed to the clerk’s file stamp. Lawyers worth their salt, as the one condemned today most certainly is, acutely feel the oppressive weight of professional responsibility when it must carry the stake of human life. I say counsel here fully merited the confidence bestowed on him. This decision not only misjudges the man, it does violence to our system of justice. I respectfully dissent.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and WISDOM, GEWIN, BELL, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN, CLARK, INGRAHAM and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

A member of the Court in active service having requested a poll on the application for rehearing en banc and a majority of the judges in active service having voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc.

It is ordered that the cause shall be reheard by the Court en bane on briefs without oral argument. The Clerk shall set a briefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.

Winters v. Cook
466 F.2d 1393

Case Details

Name
Winters v. Cook
Decision Date
Sep 20, 1972
Citations

466 F.2d 1393

Jurisdiction
United States

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