Hussey appeals from convictions and sentences for battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting the officer without violence as a lesser included offense of resisting with violence, in an incident during a purported Terry stop. We reverse.
That the defendant was “crouching” next to a wall on a public street near closed businesses — where he was clearly seen in broad daylight at 7:40 p.m. on a June afternoon — and that he then walked away from the officer’s first attempt to accost him,1 fell far short of giving the officer the founded suspicion of unlawful activity necessary to justify a Terry stop. See S.P. v. State, 833 So.2d 267, 268 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Lee v. State, 868 So.2d 577, 582-83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); D.G. v. State, 831 So.2d 256, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Chamson v. State, 529 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review denied, 539 So.2d 476 (Fla.1988); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (acknowledging that absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause an “individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business [and that] any ‘refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure’ ” (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted))); D.G., 831 So.2d at 257 (same); Slydell v. State, 792 So.2d 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (same). Compare the state’s “main case” of Mitchell v. State, 955 So.2d 640, 641-42 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that there was reasonable suspicion that the defendant was loitering and prowling based on the officer’s observation of the defendant “in a high crime area, at night, lurking in the shadows of a wooded lot bordered by *938two homes” and the defendant’s acts of fleeing from the uniformed officer and attempting to conceal an object on his person).
Since this is true, the officer was, as a matter of law, not engaged in the lawful “performance” or “execution” of a legal duty as required under sections 784.07(2)(b) and 843.02, Florida Statutes (2002), respectively, to sustain the convictions below.2 See Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1266, 1273 (Fla.2006) (requirement that “in order to convict a defendant ... of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, the State must prove that the officer was ‘engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties’ or ‘in the lawful execution of any legal duty’ ” not satisfied if Terry stop not supported by reasonable suspicion).
Accordingly, the convictions under review are reversed with directions to discharge the defendant.
Reversed and remanded.