Appellants, Robert Stanley Woolard and Louis Edward Christakos, prosecute this joint appeal in forma pauperis from a final order of the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama overruling their motions to vacate and set aside various sentences imposed upon them by said court on April 20, 1945. Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.
The sentences here complained of were separately imposed under several indictments variously charging petitioners with violations of; (1) Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 415 [now § 2314] (National Stolen Property Act) ; (2) Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 87 [now § 641] (embezzling and transporting military arms and stores) ; (3) Title 18 U.S. C.A. § 408 [now §§ 2311-2313] (National Motor Vehicle Theft Act) ; (4) Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 76 [now § 912] (impersonating United States Army Officer) ; and (5) Title 10 U.S.C.A. § 1393 (unlawful wearing of military uniform). Upon conviction of all the above listed offenses,1 appellant Chrisatkos was awarded an aggregate sentence of seventeen years and two days in the penitentiary. Woolard, who was neither indicted nor convicted under Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 415,2 received a sentence of one year and a day less than Christakos, or approximately sixteen years in the penitentiary.
We have carefully and painstakingly reviewed every phase of the voluminous record testimony, as well as the lengthy motions filed by petitioners pro se and the exhaustive briefs of learned and able counsel appointed by the court to represent them. Almost without exception the numerous specifications of error assigned are totally lacking in substance and wholly without merit. In the main, we are in accord with the view of the trial court and counsel for petitioners that the question presented is whether the district court lost jurisdiction over appellants for its alleged failure to appoint counsel to represent them upon their arraignment and plea of guilty, or whether they intelligently waived their constitutional right to counsel before their sentences were imposed.
No good or useful purpose would be served by reviewing the evidence at length. We consider it sufficient to observe that appellants, after escaping from a military stockade at Camp Bowie, Texas, where they were serving heavy sentences of an Army general court martial for desertion during the recent war, embarked upon a tour of crime and violence through the states of Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama, while masquerading as officers of the United States Army in stolen uniforms. In the course of their wild escapade they committed several offenses which measured to grand larceny, stole and transported at least two automobiles, committed two armed robberies and other lesser offenses. In separate written confessions given prior to their arraignment and sentence, as well as in their own testimony upon the hearing below, appellants reveal undeniably their guilt of the various crimes charged.3
*87It is settled law that the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not require that counsel be forced upon a competent defendant by a court, and that a defendant charged with a federal offense who is aware of his constitutional privilege to have counsel appointed to represent him, may nevertheless waive such right. Adams v. U. S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268, 143 A.L.R. 435; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357; Ossenfort v. Pulaski, 5 Cir., 171 F.2d 246.
Our Court of Last Resort, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, first laid down the general rule as to the test to be applied in determining whether or not an accused has intelligently waived his constitutional right to counsel wherein it held:
“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” See also, Adams v. U. S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268, 143 A.L.R. 435.
The record reveals that appellants were fully aware prior to their sentence and conviction of the nature and substaace of the charges against them, for it appears they were arraigned before a U. S. Commissioner on a charge of violation of the Dyer Act on January 31, 1945, and again arraigned before another Commissioner on the remainder of the charges, for which they were later indicted, on March 15, 1945. Moreover, during the period of their confinement while awaiting trial they were afforded opportunity to consult and employ counsel, and in fact did consult an attorney regarding representation in their cases, even though they were refused. Cf. Ossenfort v. Pulaski, 5 Cir., 171 F.2d 246. It further appears that these appellants, at the time they committed their offenses, were not naive, innocent, and inexperienced youths, but men of unusual intelligence, shrewdness, and cunning, as evidenced by their frequent escapes from both the Army military authorities and Federal apprehension,4 as well as by the petitions they have prepared largely through their own efforts while incarcerated in the penitentiary.
The record further shows that the presiding judge of the federal district court at Birmingham, Alabama, who arraigned *88and sentenced these petitioners testified at the hearing on these motions. His testimony is forthright, clear, and convincing to the effect that he informed each defendant of the charges pending against him in each indictment, and even required the United States Attorney to read the indictments aloud to them; that he explained to each appellant separately his right to have counsel appointed to represent him, and offered to have counsel appointed for them if they so desired.5 Each appellant thereupon stated to the court that he did not desire counsel appointed for him, but that he desired to waive his rights in this regard, whereupon the appropriate entry was recorded in the court docket 6 and sentence was imposed.
The cases of Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309, and Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 69 S.Ct. 184, relied upon by appellants, are clearly distinguishable under their own facts, and are in nowise applicable or com trolling in favor of appellants here. Ossenfort v. Pulaski, 5 Cir., 171 F.2d 246; U. S. v. Christakos, D.C., 83 F.Supp. 521.
In the case of Christakos v. Hunter, 161 F.2d 692, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, on petition for habeas corpus, passed upon the precise issue here raised as to the intelligent waiver of counsel adverse to the appellant Christakos. Moreover, upon application for certiorari being duly filed, our Court of Last Resort declined to review that decision, 332 U.S. 801, 68 S.Ct. 92, 92 L.Ed. 381, certiorari denied. While, of course, we are not bound to follow that decision, or attach any legal significance or presumption to the denial of its review, we nevertheless advert to it as a pertinent factor to be considered in ruling on these motions.
Viewing the record fully and fairly in its entirety, we find no legal basis or support for the contention that appellants were deprived of their right to counsel, or that in ' waiving their right they were not fully informed of the import of their election and of the nature and substance of the charges against them. Adams v. U. S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268, 143 A.L.R. 435; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357; Ossenfort v. Pulaski, 5 Cir., 171 F.2d 246; U. S. v. Christakos, D.C., 83 F.Supp. 521; Christakos v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 161 F.2d 692, certiorari denied 332 U.S. 801, 68 S.Ct. 92, 92 L.Ed. 381; Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 69 S.Ct. 184.
*89It follows that the judgment should be, and the same is accordingly
Affirmed.