Appellants are the owners of two lots facing south on West Second Street, between Summit and Schiller avenues, in the city of Little Rock. They have owned these lots for many years, and there are three dwelling- houses on them, built about the year 1900. *1032At that time the street in front of these lots had never been graded or otherwise improved. There was a downward slope from the south front of these lots to the opposite side of the street, and there was no sidewalk, but there was a pathway along in front of the houses, which was used by any one who had occasion to do so. The lots were situated in Plunkett’s Addition to the city, and when this addition was laid out and platted there was a dedication of that portion of West Second Street to a width of sixty feet. In the year 1902 the city graded the street along there to a width of thirty-two feet, which was paved with brick, and a street-car track was laid thereon. There was a curb at the outer edge of the paving, which was ten or eleven feet south of the north line of the street as originally dedicated. In other words, in grading the street there was left ungraded a space of ten or eleven feet on the north side up to the property line. The north rail of the street-car track was within about three feet of the curb line, leaving an insufficient space for the passing of vehicles between the track and the curb. In grading the street there was left, on the north side, in front of the property of appellants, a precipitous slate bank about ten feet high, and, in order to afford access to the dwelling houses, appellants provided steps set into the bank. Along the bank there was, as before stated, a pathway or trail used by pedestrians going along in front of the houses, but there was still no paved sidewalk.
In the creation of Pulaski Road Improvement District No. 10, authority was conferred upon the district to improve West Second Street, and this was done during the years 1923 and 1924. The city council passed an ordinance, just before the work of improving the street was begun, widening West Second Street in front of appellant’s property to a width of forty feet. The ordinance provided that the road improvement district should do the work of widening the street and should make good any damages sustained by property owners. The work *1033was done by the district, and in doing so it was necessary to excavate the high bank in front of appellants’ property. This was done to a width of eight feet, leaving about three feet of the dedicated street, but the top of the slope extended, in places, slightly beyond the property line. The widening of the street was all .done on the north side, and there was a new curb line established within about three feet of the property line. As the bank sloped towards the south, the new excavation of eight feet left the slate bluff slightly higher. Appellants contended that the blasting away of the slate in excavating for the extension of the width of the street loosened the earth and rock to some extent back beyond the property line, thus invading their property, and that this caused the bank to cave or slough off from time to time, and that a retaining wall should be built in order to afford protection from that injury. They demanded that the district construct the retaining wall at its own expense, which was refused by the district, and they allege that the wall would cost about $3,500. They also allege that there was a loss of rental value of the property in the sum of $3,000, and this action was instituted by appellants against the district to recover the above sums, aggregating $6,500. There was a trial of the cause before a jury, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the district.
It is undisputed that the street in front of appellants’ property was dedicated by the original owners to a width of sixty feet, and that the widening of the street by the district in making the new improvement did not extend to the line of appellants’ property. No part of appellants’ property was taken or used in the widening of the street, the only contention being that there was damage done to the property by loosening the bank and extending the top of the slope as a result of blasting away the face of the bluff. Nor was there any change in the grade of the street in front of appellants’ property. That portion of the street which had been previously graded by the city *1034in the year 1902 was left unchanged, and the same grade was extended to a distance of eight feet in widening the street. That part of the street had not theretofore been graded, hence there could be no liability under the statute for changing the grade. Red v. Little Rode Ry. & Elec. Co., 121 Ark. 71, 180 S. W. 220. Of course, there was no obligation on the part of the city or appellee district to build a sidewalk. The only element of recoverable damage, if any, was the actual injury done to the property of appellants in loosening the soil or slate when blasting off the face of the bluff. The issue as to this element of damage was properly submitted to the jury upon conflicting evidence, and the verdict of the jury against appellants is conclusive. The court’s instructions were as follows:
“1. If you find for the plaintiff, you will find for them for the depreciation in the market value of their' property caused by the invasion of their property line, and by the rendering of their properly line less accessible, if you find from the evidence it has been rendered less accessible by the invasion of their property line.
“2. If you find from the evidence in this case that, on account of the excavations made by directions of the defendant, the property of the plaintiff will in the future slide or crumble into the excavations, you would have a right to take that fact into consideration in determining the depreciation in the market value of the property of the plaintiffs.
“3. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, in widening Second Street, has invaded the plaintiffs ’ property line and has made a portion of said property useless to them by virtue thereof, and, if you find from such evidence that it has thereby deprived said properties of reasonably safe or convenient means of ingress and egress, then the court instructs you that such constitute injuries for which the plaintiffs should recover, and this is true, even though you may find *1035that the defendant did the work of widening* 'the street in a skillful manner. ’ ’
Error of the court is assigned in submitting as the measure of damages the difference in market value of the property, if any, instead of the cost of restoration by the construction of a retaining wall, and also in refusing to submit, as a measure of damages, the depreciation of the rental value. We think the court was correct in its instruction. The injury, if any, was a permanent one, for which all the damages could and must have been recovered in one action. The injury was not recurring so as to permit separate actions from time to time as each separate injury occurred, and the difference in market value was therefore the correct measure of damages. Davis v. Dunn, 157 Ark. 125, 247 S. W. 793.
We conclude upon the whole that there was no error in the proceeding — that the issues were correctly submitted to the jury, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict in favor of appellee.
Affirmed.