*1302OPINION OF THE COURT
This appeal arises from an order dismissing a personal injury suit without prejudice after the plaintiff failed to serve a summons upon the defendant within 120 days of filing the complaint as required by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue of whether, subsequent to a recent rule change, Rule 4(m) permits a district court to extend time for service even absent a showing of good cause is one of first impression at the federal appellate level. We conclude that, under the former rule, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to extend time beyond the 120 days within which service was to be effected after finding-no good cause present. Nevertheless, because we conclude that the new rule affords a district judge greater discretion, we remand to the district court for reconsideration on this issue only. Additionally, we will affirm the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants. Finally, it was not error to deny plaintiffs motions for a default judgment and to compel discovery.
I.
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff David Petrucelli (“Petrucelli”)1 was employed by American Fuel Harvester in East Bangor, Pennsylvania, where he was involved in recycling demolition materials. The recycling process consisted of obtaining materials from demolished buildings, and dumping the material into an impact rotor crusher machine (“rotor crusher”). The rotor crusher chopped and pulverized the material into smaller pieces which were then discharged from the bottom of the rotor crusher. The material was discharged through a transition chute to a vibrating feeder, and then to a hopper on the discharge conveyor. All of the component parts of the recycling machine, including the rotor crusher, were ordered by American Fuel Harvester from defendant Jake Diel Construction Machinery, Inc. (“Jake Diel”).
Jake Diel designed and manufactured the recycling machine and later assembled it on the premises of American Fuel Harvester. Many of the component parts of the recycling machine, including the transition chute, the vibrating screen, the machine chassis, the control booth, and the discharge conveyor, were made by Jake Diel. Jake Diel bought for incorporation into the recycling machine other components, such as the rotor crusher made by defendant Bohringer & Ratzinger (“Bohringer”). Although the rotor crusher and the discharge conveyor were all part of the same recycling machine, there were three independent components between the rotor crusher and the discharge conveyor. From the recycling machine’s control booth, most of the various conveyor belts could be individually turned on and off, but from that vantage point, most or all of the discharge conveyor could not be seen. Bohringer did not participate in the decisions regarding the design or the location of the control booth and its operating controls.
On August 8,1989, while working with the recycling machine, Petrucelli noticed that the conveyor was not functioning properly. One of his co-workers went to the control booth to turn off the machine. After the machine was turned off, Petrucelli attempted to dislodge some wire caught in the roller of the discharge conveyor of the recycling machine. While performing this task, one of his coworkers turned on the recycling machine. Petrucelli’s left arm was torn off after being pulled into the conveyor mechanism.
B. Procedural History
Petrucelli filed a complaint on April 1, 1991, and thereafter an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In the amended complaint, Petrucelli asserts claims for negligence, strict products liability, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, and punitive damages. Petrucelli enlisted the aid of Attorney Process Service (“APS”) to assist in serving process upon the defendants. He informed APS that the nameplate on the *1303machinery indicated that Jake Diel was located in both Texas and Oklahoma. APS advised Petrucelli that “Jake Diehl (sic) Construction” could be served through the Secretary of State of Oklahoma, but that “Jake Diehl (sic) Construction and Machinery Co.” was not subject to service in Texas (March 26, 1991 letter from APS; App. at 66.) because its corporate charter was revoked by the Secretary of State of Texas on November 1. 1988. Inexplicably, prior to sending the summons and complaint, Petrucelli never confirmed or otherwise verified with the Secretary of State of Oklahoma that Jake Diel was a corporation in good standing with the State of Oklahoma, capable of being served through the Secretary of State of that jurisdiction.
On July 25, 1991, Petrucelli sent a copy of the summons and complaint and a copy of a Notice of Acknowledgment of Receipt of Summons and Complaint to the Secretary of State of Oklahoma, who received these documents on July 29, 1991. On March 19, 1992, the Secretary of State of Oklahoma issued a certificate of proof of service which stated that it had been served as the agent for “Jake Diehl (sic) Construction and Machinery Co.” on August 5, 1991. The certificate of service also indicated that on August 7, 1991, the Secretary of State of Oklahoma sent the summons and complaint to an address in Hereford, Texas, via certified mail, return receipt requested, but that the letter had been returned undelivered on August 14, 1991. However, Petrucelli contends that in August of 1991, he communicated with the offices of the Secretary of State of Oklahoma by telephone, and was verbally assured by someone in that office that Jake Diel had been served via certified mail.
Meanwhile, Bohringer impleaded Excel Recycling & Manufacturing, Inc. (“Excel”) as a third-party defendant, believing that Jake Diel had legally changed its corporate name to Excel.2 After Jake Diel failed to respond, Petrucelli, in May of 1992, moved for a default' judgment against Jake Diel or alternatively to extend time for service. Both of these motions were denied, resulting in the dismissal of Jake Diel from these proceedings as a direct defendant.3
Defendant Bohringer subsequently moved for summary judgment.4 Petrucelli opposed Bohringer’s motion and filed a motion seeking to compel Bohringer: (1) to answer the interrogatories that Excel had served on Bohringer; and (2) to produce the documents that Excel had previously demanded of Boh-ringer. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bohringer and denied Petrucelli’s motion.
Petrucelli appeals the orders of the district court: (1) denying his motions for default judgment against Jake Diel or, alternatively, to extend the time for service on Jake Diel; (2) granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Bohringer; and (3) denying Petru-celli’s motion to compel discovery from Boh-ringer. We will affirm the orders of the district court.
II.
A. Denial of Motion for Default Judgment
Petrucelli argues that the district court erred by not granting his motion for a default judgment against Jake Diel. Assuming that proper service of process was effected on Jake Diel, we can reverse the district court only if we find that it abused its discretion in denying the motion for a default judgment. See Farzetta v. Turner & Newall, Ltd., 797 F.2d 151, 153 (3d Cir.1986). Insofar as this issue pertains to whether Jake Diel was properly served, our standard of review is plenary. Stranahan Gear Co. v. *1304 NL Industries, Inc., 800 F.2d 53, 56 (3d Cir.1986). See also Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 481 (3d Cir.1993) (“We exercise plenary review over issues concerning the propriety of service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.”)- We note that if a default judgment had been entered when there had not been proper service, the judgment is, a fortiori, void, and should be vacated. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir.1985).
Petrucelli filed the complaint on April 1, 1991. Pursuant to former Rule 4(j), the predecessor to Rule 4(m), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he had 120 days (until July 30, 1991) to serve the summons and complaint upon Jake Diel.5 The return receipt from the mailing indicates that the Secretary of State of Oklahoma received the summons and complaint on July 29, 1991, just within the 120-day limit. Petrucelli contends that since he served Jake Diel’s authorized agent, service was effective. However, as of November 1, 1988, Jake Diel was no longer a foreign corporation authorized to conduct business in Oklahoma. Because the Secretary of State of Oklahoma was no longer the authorized agent to accept service of process on behalf of Jake Diel, we conclude that serving the Secretary of State was ineffective as service on Jake Diel. Thus, Jake Diel was not served within the 120-day period required by the rule. Indeed, it would have been error as a matter of law for the district court to enter a default judgment against Jake Diel when it was never served.
B. Denial of Motion to Extend Time for Service
Petrucelli next argues that the district court should have granted his alterna-five motion for an extension of the 120-day limit to serve Jake Diel, pursuant to Rule 4(j). When Petrucelli argued his motion to extend time for service before the district court in May of 1992 and when the district court entered its memorandum order in August of 1992 denying Petrueelli’s motion, former Rule 4(j) had not yet been amended. In 1992, Rule 4(j) read in pertinent part:
Summons: Time Limit for Service. If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court’s own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j) (1991) (emphasis added). Under this rule, a district court was required to dismiss a case if service of process was not effected within the 120 day period, unless the plaintiff showed good cause for the delinquency.6
As of December 1, 1993, Rule 4(j) was amended and redesignated as Rule 4(m). While the change in designation from (j) to (m) is of no import, the language in this subdivision was substantially modified. Although counsel for Petrucelli failed to bring this substantive change to our attention, our own research has revealed this critical change in the rule.
Initially, we question whether Rule 4(m) applies to these proceedings in light of the fact that service of process was attempt*1305ed in 1991, two years prior to the rule change. If former Rule 4(j) still applies to this ease and we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was no good cause shown for failing to timely serve Jake Diel, we would have no choice but to affirm the order of the district court dismissing this ease. However, we are guided by the order of the Supreme Court which stated, “the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 1993, and shall govern ... insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in civil cases then pending.” See The Order of the United States Supreme Court Adopting and Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (April 22,1993). Because we believe it to be “just and practicable,” we conclude that Rule 4(m) applies retroactively to these proceedings.
Determining that Rule 4(m) applies to the case before us does not, however, end our inquiry. In this ease of first impression before a federal Court of Appeals, we must decide the manner in which a district court should now proceed when employing a Rule 4(m) analysis. Rule 4(m) states in relevant part:
Time Limit for Service. If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) (1993) (emphasis added). As mentioned previously, the former rule required the court to dismiss the case absent a showing of good cause. We read the new rule to require a court to extend time if good cause is shown and to allow a court discretion to dismiss or extend time absent a showing of good cause. We reach this conclusion for several reasons.
Initially, we find that the plain language of the rule itself explains that in all eases, the court has the option of dismissing the action or extending time for service. The fact that the word “shall” is used along with the disjunctive “or” in the first clause indicates that the court has discretion to choose one of these options. As an exception to this general provision, the second clause notes that if good cause exists, the district court has no choice but to extend time for service. Thus, the logical inference that can be drawn from these two clauses is that the district court may, in its discretion, extend time even absent a finding of good cause.
Next, we find that the Advisory Committee note on the Rule 4(m) amendment to be instructive. The Committee explained:
The new subdivision explicitly provides that the court shall allow additional time if there is good cause for the plaintiffs failure to effect service in the prescribed 120 days, and authorizes the court to relieve a plaintiff of the consequences of an application of this subdivision even if there is no good cause shown.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) advisory committee’s note (1993) (emphasis added). Thus, the “even if’ language of the note indicates that the district court may extend time for service where there is no good cause shown.
We hold that as a result of the rule change which led to Rule 4(m), when entertaining a motion to extend time for service, the district court must proceed in the following manner. First, the district court should determine whether good cause exists for an extension of time. If good cause is present, the district court must extend time for service and the inquiry is ended. If, however, good cause does not exist, the court may in its discretion decide whether to dismiss the case without prejudice or extend time for service.
The Advisory Committee note provides some guidance as to what factors the district court should consider when deciding to exercise its discretion to extend time for service in the absence of a finding of good cause. Although the list is not exhaustive, the Committee explained that, “[rjelief may be justified, for example, if the applicable statute of limitations would bar the refiled action, or if *1306the defendant is evading service or conceals a defect in attempted service.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).7
We hold that a district court may not consider the fact that the statute of limitations has run until after it has conducted an examination of good cause. If the district court determines that good cause does not exist, only then may it consider whether the running of the statute of limitations would warrant granting an extension of time. We emphasize that the running of the statute of limitations does not require the district court to extend time for service of process. Rather, absent a finding of good cause, a district court may in its discretion still dismiss the case, even after considering that the statute of limitations has run and the refiling of an action is barred.8
We begin our inquiry into the proper resolution of this case by determining whether the district judge was correct in concluding that Petrucelli failed to establish good cause for not serving Jake Diel in a timely manner. Petrucelli contends that he has shown good cause for his failure to serve Jake Diel within the required time. We review the district court’s determination that good cause has not been shown for abuse of discretion. Lovelace v. Acme Markets, Inc., 820 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965, 108 S.Ct. 455, 98 L.Ed.2d 395 (1987); Braxton v. United States, 817 F.2d 238, 242 (3d Cir.1987).9
Petrucelli argues that the following circumstances constitute good cause: (1) he was under the mistaken belief that the defendant had been served since he spoke to someone in the Office of the Secretary of State of Oklahoma via telephone and was verbally assured that proper service was effected; and (2) he was told by APS that Jake Diel could not be served in Texas, but could only be served in Oklahoma. Petrucelli maintains that his and APS’ errors in serving Jake Diel are attributable to the confusion caused by the change in the corporate name from Jake Diel to Excel.
Petrucelli, however, made several inexcusable errors. First, he unreasonably *1307relied on a verbal assurance from some unknown individual in the Office of the Secretary of State of Oklahoma to the effect that Jake Diel had been served. Second, his attempted service included a Notice of Ac-knowledgement Form, which was never completed and returned. Petrucelli did not question why the acknowledgment form was not returned. A prudent attorney exercising reasonable care and diligence would have inquired into the matter further when it was obvious that the acknowledgment form was not forthcoming. Third, Petrucelli claims that sending a mailing to Texas would be pointless in light of the assurances from APS that Jake Diel was no longer doing business in Texas. However, Jake Diel (later renamed Excel) was continuously and without interruption doing business in the state of Texas from April 1, 1969 until the present. Fourth, the record is barren of any written inquiry made by the plaintiff of the Secretary of State of Oklahoma, or any response thereto, which would indicate whether Jake Diel was a corporation in good standing in that state (or that it was previously a corporation in good standing whose charter had been revoked).10
We have previously held that reliance upon a third party or on a process server is an insufficient basis to constitute good cause for failure to timely serve, and is also an insufficient basis for granting an extension of time to effect service. Braxton, 817 F.2d at 242. We have also held that “ ‘[h]alf-hearted’ efforts by counsel to effect service of process prior to the deadline do not necessarily excuse a delay, even when dismissal results in the plaintiffs case being time-barred due to the fact that the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs cause of action has run.” Lovelace, 820 F.2d at 84. Even when delay results from inadvertence of counsel, it need not be excused. Id. Further, we have previously cautioned that, “ ‘[t]he lesson to the federal plaintiffs lawyer is not to take any chances. Treat the 120 days with the respect reserved for a time bomb.’ ” Braxton, 817 F.2d at 241 (citation omitted).11
The facts of this case are quite similar to Lovelace, where we found that it was inappropriate for plaintiffs counsel to rely upon verbal assurances of the process server where counsel was not in possession of any written proof of service. 820 F.2d at 84-85. Here, Petrucelli relied on the verbal assertions of an individual in the Office of the Secretary of State of Oklahoma. He failed to inquire further when the acknowledgment form was not received. Petrucelli cannot rely upon his belief that the defendant had been served when he had in hand no proof or indication of service. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Petrucelli has not shown good cause for failing to timely serve the defendant.
Next, the district court must consider whether any other factors warrant extending time even though good cause was not shown. Because Rule 4(m) had not yet been adopted at the time the district court decided this issue, the district court was forced to dismiss this case after finding that no good cause existed and was prohibited from considering whether an extension of time should be granted despite a lack of a showing of good cause. Now, however, the district court is not faced with having to dismiss Petrucelli’s case and is not prohibited from extending time for service.12 Although the district *1308court did not abuse its discretion, in light of Rule 4(m), we will remand this issue to the district court to exercise its discretion as to whether the case should be dismissed or an extension of time granted within which service of process can be effected.
C. Granting of Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Bohringer & Ratzinger
We exercise plenary review over the district court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the same test employed by the district court. United States v. Capital Blue Cross, 992 F.2d 1270, 1271-72 (3d Cir.1993). Summary judgment shall be granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Moreover, the mere existence of some evidence in support of the non-moving party will not be sufficient to support a denial of a motion for summary judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable a jury to reasonably find for the non-moving party on the issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where, as here, the non-movant bears the burden of proof on the issue which is the subject of the summary judgment motion, and is confronted by the movant’s argument that the facts established through the discovery process do not support the claim, the party must identify evidence of record sufficient to establish every element essential to the claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
It is well established that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state whose law governs the action. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Griggs v. Bic Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1431 (3d Cir.1992). All parties agree that the substantive law of Pennsylvania applies to this litigation.
Petrucelli asserts a claim for: (1) negligence; (2) strict liability for failure to warn and/or design defect; (3) misrepresentation; (4) breach of express and implied warranties of fitness for purpose and merchantability; and (5) punitive damages.13 In order for Petrucelli to prevail on this appeal, he must point to evidence which establishes every element of at least one of the above claims.
In order to defeat summary judgment on the negligence claim, Petrucelli must prove: (1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) failure to conform to such standard; (3) a causal connection between the failure to conform and an injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. Griggs, 981 F.2d at 1434 (emphasis added). A claim for strict products liability has two elements: (1) that the product is defective; and (2) that the defect was a proximate cause of the injuries. Griggs, 981 F.2d at 1432 (emphasis added). In order to prevail on a claim of misrepresentation, Petrucelli must prove: (1) justifiable or reasonable reliance; and (2) a causal connection between the representations and the alleged harm. Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F.Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D.Pa.1987) (emphasis added).
All three of the above claims require a causal connection between the wrongful act and the alleged harm. As we have noted, Bohringer manufactured the rotor crusher, but Petrucelli’s arm was amputated in the discharge conveyor. Although the rotor crusher and the discharge conveyor were both part of the same recycling machine, there were three independent components between the rotor crusher and the discharge *1309conveyor. It is uncontradicted that the component part (the rotor crusher) manufactured by Bohringer was not involved in Petrucelli’s accident. There being no causal relationship between Bohringer’s product and the accident, Bohringer cannot be held liable on a theory of negligence, strict products liability, or misrepresentation. In short, one of the necessary elements of these claims, causation, is not present.
The district court properly made findings that Petrucelli has offered no evidence of an express warranty. As such, we will only consider the claim of breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose applies “[w]hen the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know: (1) any particular purpose for which goods are required; and (2) that the buyer is relying on the skill or judgment of the seller to select or furnish suitable goods.” 13 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 2315 (1984). The Pennsylvania Commercial Code provides that an implied warranty of merchantability requires that the product be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” 13 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 2314(b)(3) (1984). Moreover, in order to prevail under Pennsylvania law on a claim for breach of either warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff must show that the product was defective. Altronics of Bethlehem, Inc. v. Repco, Inc., 957 F.2d 1102, 1105 (3d Cir.1992).
Petrucelli alleges that the rotor crusher was defective since (1) it lacked adequate warning systems which would alert, by sounding an alarm or a bell, personnel in the proximity of the recycling machine prior to the machine actually starting movement and (2) the design and location of the control booth did not allow adequate visibility of the component parts of the recycling machine.
Under Pennsylvania law, it is recognized that a manufacturer’s duty to warn is limited when it supplies a component of a product that is assembled by another party and the dangers are associated with the use of the finished product. Jacobini v. V. & O. Press Co., 527 Pa. 32, 39, 588 A.2d 476, 478 (Pa.1991) (citing Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 523 Pa. 1, 9, 564 A.2d 1244, 1248 (1989)). The court in Jacobi-ni reasoned that the manufacturer of the component part cannot be expected to foresee every possible risk that might be associated -with the use of the completed product and to warn of dangers in using that completed product. Id. at 40, 588 A.2d at 480.
Nevertheless, it is possible under certain circumstances for a component manufacturer to be held liable for a failure to warn. For example, in one case, a plaintiff was severely injured after diving into a shallow pool. Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir.1992). He contended that the pool and the replacement pool liner were defective because they did not have depth markers or “No Diving” warnings. In holding the pool liner manufacturer liable, we concluded that since the pool liner manufacturer knew that its product would ultimately be incorporated into a pool, the potential risk of failing to affix warning labels was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 118.
Thus, the question before us is whether it is reasonably foreseeable to a component manufacturer that failure to affix warning devices to its product would lead to an injury caused by another component part, manufactured by another company, and assembled into a completed product by someone other than the initial component manufacturer. We conclude that Bohringer could not be expected to foresee that failure to affix alarms or bells on the rotor crusher would lead to someone being injured by the discharge conveyor, another component part of the recycling machine. Thus, we do not accept Petrucelli’s argument that Bohringer had a duty to warn about the dangers of rotor crusher. Therefore, Petrucelli has failed to prove the rotor crusher was defective for failure to warn of possible injury.
Next, Petrucelli argues that there was a design defect because the control booth was placed in a such a manner that a full view of the discharge conveyor was obstructed. We do not agree. Petrucelli has offered no evidence refuting Bohringer’s position that it did not manufacture the control booth and did not provide mechanisms to *1310attach it to the rotor crusher. In addition, Petrucelli faded to contradict evidence that Jake Diel had previously placed control booths for other companies in similar locations even prior to its use of Bohringer rotor crushers, and would place the control booth in any location according to the demands of the customer. We conclude that plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claim of breach of warranty of fitness and merchantability.14
D. Denial of Motion to Compel Discovery
Petrucelli argues that the district court erred by not allowing him to adopt, as his own, the discovery request that Excel as third-party defendant served upon Bohringer.15 Petrucelli contends that he was implicitly given permission to adopt the interrogatories and request for production of documents that Excel served on Bohringer because no objections were filed to his attempted adoption. Furthermore, he speculates that if his motion to compel had been granted, he would have discovered the evidence necessary to preclude the grant of summary judgment in favor of Bohringer.
In order to succeed on a motion to compel discovery, a party must first prove that it sought discovery from its opponent. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(2)(A)16 The district court concluded that Petrucelli was less than diligent in his discovery requests. The district court found that interrogatories and a request for documents were served on Bohringer by Excel in May of 1992. Yet, the record is devoid of any indication of discovery requests served by Petrucelli. In September and October of 1992, representatives of Excel and Bohringer were deposed, during which time Petrucelli deposed a representative of Bohringer for forty-five minutes. Petrucelli’s contention that the grant of his motion to compel would produce evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of Bohringer is suspect in light of the fact that Petrucelli had upwards of two years to conduct discovery during which time his discovery consisted solely of this one deposition. In February of 1993, almost ten months after Excel served discovery requests on Bohringer, Petrucelli sent a letter to Bohringer’s attorney seeking, first, to receive responses to the discovery requests Excel served in May of 1992, and second, purporting to adopt the discovery requests that Excel served on Bohringer. This was Petrucelli’s only attempt to seek discovery; he initiated no independent, direct discovery requests of Bohringer. On June 14, 1993, Bohringer filed its motion for summary judgment and on June 28, 1993, Petrucelli filed his motion to compel discovery.
The district court concluded that Petrucelli failed to comply with Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires a written stipulation when modifying procedures governing discovery. Moreover, in addition to not complying with the rule, Petru-celli was lax in not attempting to adopt the discovery requests until February of 1993, almost ten months after Excel served the request. Furthermore, the district court observed that Petrucelli did not file his motion to compel discovery proactively but instead waited until after Bohringer had first filed its motion for summary judgment (some four months after Petrucelli attempted to adopt the discovery requests previously served by Excel).
We apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing orders regarding the scope and conduct of discovery. Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 447 (3d Cir.1990) (citations omitted). After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying *1311Petrueelli’s discovery requests. First, Petru-celli never forwarded interrogatories, nor a request for production of documents, to Boh-ringer. Thus, pursuant to Rule 37, the prerequisite for compelling discovery was never fulfilled. Second, there was never any written agreement between counsel by which Pe-trucelli could adopt Excel’s discovery requests of Bohringer. We observe, as did the district court, that plaintiff has failed to comport with Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires a written stipulation when modifying procedures governing discovery. Third, this case had been ongoing for over twenty-six months at the time that Bohringer filed its motion for summary judgment. At no time during this period did Petrueelli forward any discovery requests to Bohringer. We will therefore affirm the order of the district court denying the motion to compel discovery.17
III.
A default judgment against Jake Diel could not be entered since the complaint was never served. Thus, we will affirm the order of the district court denying plaintiffs motion seeking a default judgment. We will also affirm the decision of the district court which concluded that Petrueelli has failed to demonstrate good cause in not timely serving Jake Diel. However, in light of Rule 4(m), we will remand Petrucelli’s motion to extend time for service to the district court for further consideration in light of our above analysis. Summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Bohringer on all of plaintiffs claims against it, as there was no genuine issue of fact in dispute. Therefore, we will affirm the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Bohringer. Finally, since the district court did not abuse its discretion in monitoring discovery, we will affirm the order of the district court denying plaintiffs motion to compel discovery.
