Paul Bashkin appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 action challenging a state court decision declaring him a vexatious litigant. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2003) (jurisdictional dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2008) (dismissal for failure to state a claim). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Bashkin’s action to the extent that he challenged the vexatious litigant order and any other state court orders and judgments, because the action is a “forbidden de facto appeal” of state court judgments, and raises constitutional claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with those prior state court judgments. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. Contrary to Bashkin’s argument, “Rooker-Feldman applies where the plaintiff in federal court claims that the state court did not have jurisdiction to render a judgment.” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1043 n. 6 (9th Cir.2005).
The district court properly dismissed the due process claims because the record shows that Bashkin received due process prior to the state court’s entry of the vexatious litigant order. See Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1090 (elements of procedural due process claim).
Bashkin’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.