This appeal and cross-appeal involve the constitutionality of two statutes. One is OCGA § 9-2-60, which provides that if no written order is taken in an action for five years, the action “shall automatically stand dismissed” (the “automatic dismissal statute”).1 The other is OCGA § 9-10-2, which provides that certain judicial actions taken in cases in which the state is a party are void unless, among other things, the Attorney General was given five days written notice of the hearing or trial that resulted in the judicial action (the “state notice *639statute”).2 The trial court held that the automatic dismissal statute violated due process because it does not require a hearing before dismissal to determine whether an action is actually dormant. The court held, however, that the state notice statute did not violate equal protection guarantees. We granted an application to appeal filed by the Georgia Department of Medical Assistance (the “DMA”) to consider whether the trial court erred by ruling that the automatic dismissal statute was unconstitutional. The Columbia Convalescent Center (“Columbia”) has cross-appealed the trial court’s ruling that the state notice statute is constitutional.3 Because we conclude that the automatic dismissal statute is a reasonable procedural rule that gives litigants a fair opportunity to litigate their claims before dismissal, we hold that it is constitutional and reverse the trial court’s decision. Moreover, because we conclude that the state notice statute is rationally related to several legitimate state interests, we hold that it is constitutional and affirm the trial court’s ruling.
1. The automatic dismissal statute does not violate due process. A litigant does have a property interest in her cause of action that she may not be deprived of without due process.4 A state may, however, consistent with due process, terminate a litigant’s claim or appeal for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural or evidentiary rule,5 such as a statute of limitation.6
*640We conclude that the automatic dismissal statute is a reasonable procedural rule. It is reasonable, in part, because it “furthers the dual purpose of . . . preventing] ‘court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and inactive litigation and [of] protecting] litigants from dilatory counsel.’ ”7 The statute also affords litigants, who have constructive knowledge of its provisions, “ ‘an opportunity ... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’ ”8 to litigate their claims. To this end the statute grants a litigant five years to produce only the most minimal of activity to avoid dismissal9 and thereby to obtain a hearing on her claims. Moreover, in the event of dismissal, it permits the litigant to obtain a hearing on her claims by giving her the right to renew the action within six months of dismissal.10 Further, the rule is not made unreasonable because it might lead to the dismissal of some cases that are not truly inactive. In this same vein, a statute of limitation that is rationally related to the goal of eliminating stale claims11 would not be unreasonable or unconstitutional because on occasion it might eliminate a claim that is not in fact stale.
2. Further, we hold that the state notice statute does not violate equal protection merely because it grants a benefit to state litigants that is not provided to other litigants.
Regarding the standard to apply in deciding equal protection claims, “ ‘[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’ ” Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 264 Ga. 701, 704 (449 SE2d 602) (1994) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U. S. 432, 439 (105 SC 3249, 87 LE2d 313) (1985)). Moreover, “ ‘[i]t is not necessary that the classification scheme be the perfect or the best one; nor do we focus on the fairness of a state law.’ ” Love, 264 Ga. at 704 (quoting Bowman v. Knight, 263 Ga. 222 (430 SE2d 582) (1993)).
In the present case, we agree with the DMA’s argument that the state notice statute is rationally related to several legitimate governmental interests. The Attorney General’s office represents numerous state agencies and officials in courts all over the state, many of which are some distance from the Attorney General’s office. The state notice statute is a rational provision that ensures that attorneys in the Attorney General’s office will have time to travel to those locations and *641to familiarize themselves with the particular agency or official involved, as well as with any particular local rules and customs.12 Further, the statute helps to ensure that state agencies and officials are properly represented in lawsuits that may affect the lives of citizens across the state. That the foregoing rationales for the statute might apply in some circumstances to private citizens involved in litigation does not render the statute unconstitutional, as the classification need not be perfect so long as it furthers a legitimate legislative goal. Love, 264 Ga. at 704.
Decided June 30, 1995
Reconsideration denied July 28, 1995.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Kathryn L. Allen, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Dallas, Fowler & Willis, Albert H. Dallas, Heard, Leverett, Phelps, Weaver & Campbell, Robert M. Heard, E. Freeman Leverett, for appellees.
Gerald R. Weber, Samuel W. Oates, Jr., Franklin, Taulbee, Rushing & Bunce, Elizabeth F. Bunce, Keith A. McIntyre, Douglas P. Haines, Eric E. Huber, amici curiae.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. S95X0499 and reversed in Case No. S95A0497.
All the Justices concur.