ORDER DETERMINING APPLICABLE STATE LAW
Before the Court for resolution without oral argument1 is Defendant Rockwell’s Mo*1468tion for Order Determining Applicable State Law, Ct.Rec. 135 in No. CY-91-154-AAM and Ct.Rec. 219 in No. CY-91-155-AAM. Plaintiff Iotech, Inc. (“Iotech”; in No. CY-91-154-AAM only) is represented by Clifford J. Zatz, Luis R. Mejia and Cindy M. Bryton of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., and James S. Berg of Halverson & Applegate, P.S., Yakima, Washington. Plaintiff Radiation Sterilizers, Inc. (“RSI”; in No. CY-91-155-AAM only) is represented by Roy P. Lessy, Jr. and Jeffrey K. Sherwood of Akin, Gump; and Berg. Defendant Rockwell International Corporation (“Rockwell”; in both eases) is represented by David F. Jurca of Helsell, Fetterman, Martin, Todd & Hokanson, Seattle, Washington. Defendant Battelle Memorial Institute (“Bat-telle”; in both cases) is represented by William R. Squires of Davis Wright Tremaine, Seattle, Washington. Defendant Department of Energy of the United States of America (“DOE”; in No. CY-91-155-AAM only) is represented by Assistant United States Attorneys Frank W. Hunger and James Schivley of Spokane, Washington; and Richard R. Stone of the United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.2
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
As a part of its defense waste management program, DOE decided in the 1970s to separate cesium-137 from radioactive military wastes at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington. DOE also decided to encapsulate the cesium in double-walled steel cylinders.
Rockwell and Battelle performed the majority of the design and testing work for this program. ' They also ran the waste separation program and manufactured the cesium capsules.
In the mid-1980s, DOE entered into discussions with Iotech and RSI about using DOE’s cesium capsules as a radiation source in plaintiffs’ commercial irradiators. (Iotech and RSI are separate private corporations in the business of using radiation to sterilize consumer goods.) Shortly thereafter, Iotech and RSI leased the cesium capsules from DOE and took possession of them.
About two years later, one of the capsules in RSI’s Decatur, Georgia plant leaked in the plant’s storage pool. The leak seriously contaminated the facility, caused the complete shutdown of operations, and required several years of cleanup operations.
After determining that the leak might have been caused by capsule defects, DOE recalled all cesium capsules from both plaintiffs’ facilities.
B. LITIGATION BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that defendants designed, tested, manufactured, and leased capsules that were unsafe as designed and as manufactured. Plaintiffs’ claims against Rockwell and Battelle are brought under the Washington Product Liability Act CWPLA”) and the Uniform Commercial Code. RSI’s claims against DOE are brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which incorporates the WPLA. RSI also alleges tortious spoilation of evidence against DOE and Battelle, alleging that they destroyed evidence by conducting destructive testing on the leaking capsule.
Plaintiffs’ original and first amended complaints, filed in mid-1991, addressed only federal law. Plaintiffs’ second amended complaints, addressing Washington law, were filed on January 6, 1992.4 Iotech’s current complaint alleges:
IOTECH is a Colorado corporation.... DOE’s negligence was the proximate cause of injury to IOTECH.... As a direct and proximate result of Rockwell and Battelle’s negligence in failing to provide postmanu-facture warnings.... [and] [a]s a direct and proximate result of this breach [of Rockwell and Battelle’s express warranty to IOTECH that the cesium capsules would be safe for use in IOTECH’s com*1469mercial irradiator].... [and] [a]s a direct and proximate result of this breach [of Rockwell and Battelle’s implied warranty that the WESF capsules they designed and manufactured were safe, merchantable, and fit the intended and foreseeable uses of the capsules], IOTECH sustained damages and losses including loss of its property in that its license was restricted and the cesium capsules were rendered unsafe to use in IOTECH’s [Colorado] facility; loss of profits; loss of customers; loss of goodwill; interruption of business at the Northglenn[, Colorado] facility; loss of access to operating cash and credit; loss of business opportunities; loss of investment; diversion of management time and resources; and future costs of demolishing the Northglenn[, Colorado] facility....
Second Amended Complaint [and] Demand for Jury Trial, Ct.Ree. 47 in No. CS-91-154 [“Ioteeh’s Complaint”], at 2, 41-45.5 RSI’s current complaint alleges:
RSI is a California corporation....
DOE’s negligence was the proximate cause of injury to RSI.... As a direct and proximate result of the above — Rockwell and Battelle’s defective design and manufacture of the capsules; failure to provide adequate warnings; and breach of express and implied warranties — RSI has sustained damages for which Rockwell and Battelle are strictly liable.... As a direct and proximate result of Rockwell and Bat-telle’s negligence in failing to provide post-manufacture warnings_[and] [a]s a direct and proximate result of this breach [of Rockwell and Battelle’s express warranties] .... [and] [a]s a direct and proximate result of this breach [of Rockwell and Bat-telle’s implied warranties].... [and] [a]s a direct and proximate result of [DOE’s] breach and spoliation of evidence.... [and] [a]s a direct and proximate result of [Battelle’s] spoliation, RSI sustained damages and losses including loss of use of the Decatur[, Georgia] facility; loss of use of the Westerville[, Ohio] facility; loss of profits; loss of customers; destruction of irradiation equipment and [Ohio and Georgia] facilities through radioactive contamination; interruption of business at the De-eatur[, Georgia] and Westerville[, Ohio] facilities; costs for cleanup activities related to decontamination of the Deeatur[, Georgia] facility; cost of replacement of radioisotope sources for use at Westerville[, Ohio]; loss of access to operating capital and credit; loss of market share; diminution of value of the company; increased financing costs; loss of business opportunities; diversion of management time and resources; increased operating costs; additional administrative costs; future costs of reopening (if permitted to do so) or permanently closing the Decatur[, Georgia] facility; adverse publicity; loss of customer confidence; increased costs of and potential failure to recover damages in civil litigation as a result of destruction of evidence; harm to RSI’s business reputation; and such other damages as RSI may prove at trial.
Third Amended Complaint [and] Demand for Jury Trial, Ct.Ree. 72 in No. CS-91-155 [“RSI’s Complaint”], at 2, 44, 48-52, 57-62.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss in late 1991. The Court on July 30, 1993 transferred Iotech’s claims against DOE to the Court of Claims. The Court on June 10, 1994 dismissed RSI’s claims against DOE for failure to warn, and for negligent design, manufacture and testing of the capsules. Claims against DOE for negligent lease of defective products remain, as do all claims against Rockwell and Battelle.
Dispositive motions are due by November 22, 1994. Hearing is set for January 17, 1995, at 9:30 a.m., in Yakima, Washington.6
Trial is set for May 16, 1995, at 9:30 a.m., in Yakima, Washington.7
C. DETERMINATION OF APPLICABLE STATE LAW
Party contentions. Rockwell moves for an order determining that the applicable state *1470law is the substantive law of Georgia. It contends that plaintiffs’ claims arise from a “nuclear incident” that occurred in Georgia within the meaning of the Priee-Anderson Act. DOE joins in Rockwell’s motion.
RSI opposes Rockwell’s motion. RSI contends that the doctrines of judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel and waiver preclude reliance on the Price-Anderson Act. It contends that plaintiffs have long known of the Price-Anderson Act but chose to rely on Washington law, and that change of controlling law now would be inequitable. Alternatively, RSI contends that even if the Price-Anderson Act applies, that its choice of law provisions require application of Washington law. It contends that the “nuclear incident” was the manufacture, design, testing and marketing of the cesium capsules, which occurred in Washington.
Iotech also opposes Rockwell’s motion. It contends that the Price-Anderson act is inapplicable to its claims because it is not alleging public liability arising out of a “nuclear incident”. (None of Iotech’s capsules leaked.) Rather, it sues under product liability law, alleging the defective design and manufacture of the capsules it leased. Alternatively, Iotech argues that even if the Price-Anderson Act applies, that its choice of law provisions require application of Washington law. It contends that the tort was more closely related with Washington than with Georgia.
Battelle has not responded to Rockwell's motion.
C(l). APPLICATION OF PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
The Priee-Anderson Act provides in pertinent parts:
(hh) The term “public liability action” ... means any suit asserting public liability- [T]he substantive rules for decision in such action shall be derived from the law of the State in which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is inconsistent with the provisions of such section [42 U.S.C. § 2210, “Indemnification and limitation of liability” of contractors by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission].
(w) The term “public liability” means any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident ... except (i) claims under ... workmen’s compensation acts ...; (ii) claims arising out of an act of war; and [claims under] ... (a), (c), and (k) of section 2210 of this title ... for loss of, or damage to, or loss of use of property which is located at the site of and used in connection with the licensed activity where the nuclear incident occurs. “Public liability” also includes damage to property of persons indemnified: Provided, That such property is covered under the terms of the financial protection required, except property which is located at the site of and used in connection with the licensed activity where the nuclear incident occurs.
(q) The term “nuclear incident” means any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the United States causing, within or outside the United States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material ...
(j) The term “extraordinary nuclear occurrence” means any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, which ... [is] substantial, and which ... has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite ...
42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh), (w), (q) and (j) (emphasis in original).8, 9 The interpretation of the choice-of-law provision of § 2014(hh), espe-*1471daily in deriding where a nuclear incident “occurred”, is a novel issue of law.10
“Nuclear incident.” The leak of the cesium capsule at RSI’s Georgia facility was an occurrence causing loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, resulting from the hazardous properties of byproduct material. It was a nuclear incident. (The Court makes no finding whether it was an “extraordinary nuclear occurrence”.)
The occurrence was the leak, rather than the allegedly defective manufacture or design. That is evident by application of the “but-for” test to plaintiffs’ claims. But for the leak, plaintiffs would have no claims of property damage. RSI’s Georgia plant would not have been contaminated. The Georgia, Colorado and Ohio plants would not have suffered damage from potential other leaks, because the leakage potential of the other capsules was not evident until the Georgia capsule leaked. See the Court’s Order of June 10, 1993, Ct.Rec. 88 in CS-91-0155, at 17 (finding that Iotech cannot recover in tort unless it can “borrow a ‘remote occurrence’ which results in injury to another.”)
It is immaterial that some of the property damage plaintiffs allege is intangible. (The statute describes “property of persons”, but does not define “property”.) A “person” includes a corporation. 42 U.S.C. *1472§ 2014(s). It is long established in contract and tort law that a business’s property includes intangibles such as loss of profits and goodwill. See, e.g., Backus v. Ft. Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 580, 18 S.Ct. 445, 454, 42 L.Ed. 853 (1898).11 Here, subsection (q)’s other provisions provide broad coverage. Therefore, the Court interprets “property” broadly both to effectuate the intent of Congress, and to give the word its everyday meaning in tort and contract law.
“Public liability.” RSI’s action asserts legal liability from a nuclear incident, for loss of property located at the site of and used in connection with the nuclear incident. Specifically, RSI alleges liability for loss of property at its Georgia facility; that is where the nuclear incident occurred.
RSI’s action also asserts liability for loss of property at its Ohio facility, and property at its California situs. (Damages to intangible property of a corporation, such as loss of profits and goodwill, “occur” where the corporation is incorporated.) However, it would be absurd to find that RSI had a public liability action in part (for its allegations of damages in Georgia) and a non-public liability action in part (for its allegations of damages elsewhere). That result would lead to trial chaos, as well as contravening the intent of Congress:
Absent any dispute as to where the nuclear incidents alleged occurred, the court finds § 2014(hh) unambiguous in its call for the application of the “law” of only one state.
In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 780 F.Supp. 1551, 1571 n. 36 (E.D.Wash.1991).
Iotech’s action does not assert legal liability from a nuclear incident, for loss of property located at the site of and used in connection with the nuclear incident. Iotech does not allege any injury to property in Georgia. It alleges injury only to its Colorado facility and its Colorado situs.
“Public liability action.” RSI’s suit is a public liability action, because it asserts public liability. Therefore, the substantive rules for decision in its action shall be derived from the law of Georgia, where the nuclear incident occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). As the Court explained in In re Hanford, § 2014(hh) does not dictate substantive law but rather provides for the applicable law on choice-of-law. In re Hanford, 780 F.Supp. at 1571 (“[the phrase “law of the State” ... mean[s] the whole law of the state, including any choice of law provisions”).12 Thus, the Court still needs to examine Georgia’s choice-of-law provisions to determine which state’s substantive law applies.
Iotech’s suit is not a public liability action, because it does not assert public liability. Therefore, federal statute does not dictate choice of law. As the Court sits in diversity, it must apply the choice of law principles of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Federal Ins. Co. v. Scarsella Bros., Inc., 931 F.2d 599, 603, amended, 91 C.D.O.S. 3391, 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5444 (9th Cir.1991) (citing other authority). Iotech’s case originates in the Eastern District of Washington. Therefore, the governing choice of law principles here are those of the State of Washington.
C(2). JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, WAIVER AND LAW OF THE CASE
RSI contends that application of Price-Anderson’s choice-of-law principles is barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, waiver and law of the case.
*1473 Judicial estoppel. RSI contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Rockwell from making inconsistent legal or factual assertions in the same litigation. Specifically, RSI contends that the Court has expended substantial resources evaluating Rockwell’s claims and defenses under Washington law, so now RSI should be precluded from asserting that other law governs.
“[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel bars a party from taking inconsistent positions in the same litigation.” Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 96, 121 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992) (citing other authority). There are two versions of the doctrine:
The majority of circuits recognizing the doctrine hold that it is inapplicable unless the inconsistent statement was actually adopted by the court in earlier litigation. ... The minority view, in contrast, holds that the doctrine applies even if the litigant was unsuccessful in asserting the inconsistent position, if by his change of position he is playing “fast and loose” with the court.
Id., 966 F.2d at 452-53 (internal citations omitted). While the Ninth Circuit has adopted the principle of judicial estoppel, it has not yet specifically adopted either of the majority or minority positions. Id., 966 F.2d at 453; Yanez v. United States, 989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir.1993).
The conduct at issue in Morris and Yanez was the plaintiffs’ adoption of case positions that were apparently inconsistent with their earlier positions. Morris stated at her criminal trial that she did not use methamphetamine prior to her arrest; she then filed a habeas corpus petition contending that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize the legality of her use of methamphetamine prior to her arrest. The district court found that Morris was judicially estopped from taking her second position. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “the doctrine of judicial estoppel may not be invoked where its use would serve to keep a conviction in effect regardless of the innocence or guilt of the defendant.” Morris, 966 F.2d at 453.
In Yanez, Yanez filed a state court personal injury suit against a private defendant, alleging that she had suffered injuries when an explosion occurred at a munitions factory where she was employed. In her state court complaint, she contended that defective lead azide (the initiating explosive) supplied by the private defendant proximately caused her injuries. While that suit was pending, Yanez filed a federal court suit against the United States. In that complaint, she contended that the United States was negligent in inspecting and enforcing contractual safety regulations, proximately causing her injuries. The district court found that Yanez was judicially estopped from taking her second position. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the two positions were not necessarily inconsistent, that the second position did not mislead anyone to their detriment, and that for jurisdictional reasons Yanez had no choice but to split her claims.
Here, Rockwell has not taken inconsistent positions in its factual allegations; applicable state law is a legal conclusion rather than fact. Rockwell argued (briefly, in its Motion to Dismiss) that Washington law applied. However, Rockwell’s statements were never adopted by the Court; the issue of applicable law was not addressed until now. (RSI and Ioteeh adopted Rockwell’s prior choice-of-law argument, in the Motions to Dismiss.) Further, Rockwell never adopted contrary legal claims, but rather makes contrary legal arguments; that is not unknown in this Court (witness RSI’s and Rockwell’s instant pleadings, which each make arguments in the— inconsistent—alternative). Although Rockwell’s delay in moving for a determination of applicable law is unfortunate, judicial estop-pel does not bar a determination of applicable law.13
*1474The Court notes that even had Rockwell made contrary assertions of fact or law here, the Court would not be required to apply equitable estoppel. As its name suggests, the doctrine is an equitable one subject to equitable policy considerations. Here, there is strong Congressional intent regarding choice-of-law in Price-Anderson:
the substantive rules for decision in [a public liability] action shall be derived from the law of the State in which the nuclear incident occurs ...
42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (emphasis added). Party allegations to the contrary could not negate Congress’s mandate.
Equitable estoppel. RSI contends that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars Rockwell from making assertions contrary to its earlier assertions, and upon which earlier assertions RSI has relied. Specifically, RSI contends that Rockwell knew of Price-Anderson’s choice-of-law provisions, acted in a manner justifying RSI’s belief that Rockwell had agreed to application of Washington law, and finally that RSI did rely on that belief to its detriment (i.e., its incurrence of legal fees in defending the motions to dismiss made under Washington law).
“Estoppel prevents a party from showing the truth contrary to a representation of facts after another has relied upon the representation.” United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir.1992) (citing other authority). More specifically,
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former’s conduct to his injury.
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 709 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 384, 112 L.Ed.2d 395 (1990) (citing other authority). A court “can refuse to apply the doctrine when policy considerations so demand.” Hall, 974 F.2d at 1205.
First, RSI has not demonstrated that Rockwell “knew the facts,” i.e. that Price-Anderson’s choice-of-law provision looked to Georgia law. (Further, that is a legal conclusion, not a fact, regardless of Rockwell’s knowledge.) Second, RSI has not demonstrated that Rockwell acted with intent or so as to justify RSI’s reliance. Rockwell did not make any affirmative act or statement indicating that it believed Washington law applied, or stand silent while Washington law was asserted. Rockwell did not explicitly question RSI’s pleading of Washington law in its complaint, but Rockwell’s answer cannot, in its numerous denials, be construed as admitting to application of Washington law.14 Third, RSI has not demonstrated that it was ignorant of the true facts. It was as knowledgeable about the factual location of the capsule leak as was Rockwell, and its counsel were as knowledgeable about the public Price-Anderson statute as was Rockwell’s counsel. Fourth, RSI has not demonstrated that it relied upon Rockwell’s assertions to its detriment. RSI may have suffered injury, but that is as likely caused by RSI’s own ignorance of the application of Price-Anderson than of Rockwell’s ignorance (or its interpretation of facts known to both parties).15
*1475Rockwell has not made a representation, contrary to a previous representation upon which RSI has relied. Equitable estoppel does not bar a determination of applicable law. Further, as discussed in the preceding section, conflicting party representations could not negate Congress’s mandate in § 2014(hh).
Waiver. RSI contends that the doctrine of waiver bars Rockwell from making assertions which it has waived by delay. Specifically, RSI contends that Rockwell knew of Price-Anderson’s choice-of-law provisions but intentionally delayed in raising the issue, thereby waiving it.
Standard waiver doctrine defines waiver as “ ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), quoted in United States v. Sandoval, 990 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir.1993).
Here, RSI has not demonstrated that Rockwell intentionally delayed. Further, it is questionable whether choice-of-law is a party “right” rather than a procedural rule. The Court finds that Rockwell has not waived the choice-of-law analysis.16 Further, any delay was relatively brief; certainly Rockwell raised the issue before trial or summary judgment.17 Finally, as discussed two sections previous, party (in)action could not negate Congress’s mandate in § 2014(hh).
Law of the case. RSI contends that application of Georgia law is barred by the law of the case. It contends that Washington law has impliedly governed its claims so far.
The law of the ease is another equitable doctrine:
The law of the case doctrine is a judicial invention designed to aid in the efficient operation of court affairs. Under the doctrine, a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical ease. For the doctrine to apply, the issue in question must have been “decided explicitly or by necessary implication in [the] previous disposition. A significant corollary to the doctrine is that dicta have no preclusive effect. Application of the doctrine is discretionary.
Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir.1990) (internal citations omitted).
The most RSI can argue in the way of Court application of Washington law is that RSI sought and was granted leave to amend its complaint to conform to Washington law after Rockwell raised the issue in its Motion to Dismiss; that Judge McNichols preliminarily indicated he would grant Rockwell’s motion to dismiss but changed his preliminary indication once the state supreme court ruled on the outstanding issue; and that the Court rendered detailed analyses of Washington law in denying defendant’s two sets of motions to dismiss.
The Court has never ruled on the applicability of state law to RSI’s or Ioteeh’s claims, although it has analyzed the validity of plaintiffs’ claims under Washington law. See Order Granting Plaintiff Radiation Sterilizers, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to Amend Its Complaint, Ct.Rec. 47 in CS-91-0155 (granting leave to amend upon party stipulation; not addressing application of Washington law); Order of March 17, 1992, Ct.Rec. 51 in CS-91-0155, at 4, 16 (“The tentative ruling remains ... As to lotech, the government’s motion to dismiss the FTCA claim is grant*1476ed”, etc.; interpreting Washington law without ruling that Washington law applied); Order of June 10, 1993, Ct.Rec. 88 in CS-91-0155 (denying motions to dismiss; interpreting Washington law without ruling that Washington law applied); Order re: United States’ Third Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment, Ct.Rec. 216 in CS-91-0155 (granting dismissal of one negligence claim against DOE; denying dismissal of other claims; interpreting Washington law without ruling that Washington law applied). Until now, the Court has only been called upon to interpret the validity of claims as plaintiffs pled them, not as Price-Anderson dictates. Thus, although the Court decided issues under Washington law, it has never decided, implicitly or explicitly, that Washington law applied. The doctrine of law of the case does not apply.
Thus, none of the doctrines of judicial es-toppel, equitable estoppel, waiver or law of the case bar a determination of applicable law under Price-Anderson.
C(3). APPLICABLE STATE LAW ON RSI’S CLAIMS
As discussed in section C(l), the applicable substantive law on RSI’s claims is derived from the choice-of-law provisions of Georgia law. That law provides:
Georgia generally adheres to the traditional choice of law system, under which tort actions are adjudicated according to the law of the place where the wrong occurred.
Karimi v. Crowley, 172 Ga.App. 761, 762, 324 S.E.2d 583 (1984) (internal citations omitted);
[T]ort actions are adjudicated according to the law of the place where the wrong occurred, and contract actions are regulated by the law of the state where the contract was made when matters of execution, interpretation, or validity are at issue, and by the law of the state where it is to be performed when the issue is one concerning performance.
Wallace v. Harrison, 166 Ga.App. 461, 462-63, 304 S.E.2d 487 (1983);
The law of the place where the tort or wrong has been committed is the law by which the liability is to be determined, and the place of wrong is the place where ... there takes place the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort.
Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 133 Ga.App. 378, 380, 210 S.E.2d 854 (1974), citing Brooks v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 253 F.Supp. 119, 121 (N.D.Ga.1966);
The place of a wrong is the jurisdiction where the harm was suffered or where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for the alleged tort takes place.
Velten v. Lippert, 985 F.2d 1515, 1521 (11th Cir.1993).
Under Georgia law, products liability claims are claims in tort. Ga.Code Ann §§ 51-1-1, 51 — 1—11(b)(1), 51-12-5.1(e)(l) (Mi-chie 1994). See also, Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir.1992) (“this products liability suit ... claim[ed] negligence and strict liability in tort”); Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 770 (1976), reh’g denied, 561 F.2d 831 (5th Cir.Ga.1977) (“[Section 51-l-ll(b)(l) ] mak[es] manufacturers strictly liable in tort”).18 RSI’s products liability claims shall be governed by the law of Georgia, because that is where the nuclear incident — the event without which there would be no claim, and so the last event necessary to create liability — occurred, and where the alleged injuries (tangible and intangible) occurred.
Breach of warranty claims are treated in unusual fashion, being tort claims if they appear similar to an injury claim and contract claims otherwise:
In that a breach of warranty involving an injury is analogous to a tort action, it is reasonable to conclude that the orthodox “place of injury” rule should apply to warranties.
Whitaker, 418 F.2d 1010, 1016 n. 9 (5th Cir.1969), reh’g denied, 424 F.2d 549 (5th Cir.1970)19;
*1477It is unclear exactly where [Georgia’s implied warranty of merchantability] fits on the tort v. contract scale.... In Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.1969), reh’g denied, 424 F.2d 549 (1970), the Fifth Circuit confronted this question and ... h[e]ld that a federal court should look not to the place of the sale (lex loci contractus) but to the place of the injury (lex loci delicti)_ In the absence of any Georgia authority ... this court is obligated to follow the Circuit’s interpretation. Further, under the facts of this case, it is appropriate to apply tort-based theories of analysis. There is a colorable argument that no contract ex-ists_ The presidents of both companies [defendant and a third party owning the machine at issue] stated in affidavits that no warranties or representations were made.... Labeling this claim as one based on personal injury not only more closely resembles the facts of the case, but also is in keeping with the deeply ingrained public policy in Georgia of maintaining the privity requirement before a party can bring a warranty claim.
Morgan v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 614 F.Supp. 438, 442 (N.D.Ga.1985) (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original).20
Here, RSI’s breach of warranty claims appear to be claims in contract, because no personal injury is alleged and there exists contracts among the parties (at the very least, the indemnity provisions created by Price-Anderson). Because RSI challenges performance of the contract, RSI’s breach of warranty claims shall be governed by the state where the contract—leasing of the capsules—was to be performed. (The contract was not performed in Washington; the contract would not be performed if the capsules had only been designed and manufactured but not leased to RSI’s Georgia facility.) Even if RSI’s breach of warranty claims were claims in tort, they would again be governed by Georgia law because that is where the nuclear incident occurred, and where the alleged injuries occurred.21
Thus, the applicable state law on RSI’s claims is that of Georgia.
C(4). APPLICABLE STATE LAW ON IOTECH’S CLAIMS
As discussed in section C(l), the applicable substantive law on Ioteeh’s claims is derived from the choice-of-law provisions of Washington law. That law provides:
To determine which state’s law applies to a particular issue, Washington has adopted the “most significant relationship” test as set out in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971). Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 [Wash.]2d 577, 580, 555 P.2d 997 (1976). The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
*1478(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971).
Section 6 states the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable law:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
[ (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,]
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result[, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.]
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971).
Rice v. Dow Chemical Co., 124 Wash.2d 205, 213, 875 P.2d 1213 (1994). “Washington has adopted the significant relationship approach to resolving both tort and contract choice of law issues.” Van Vonno v. Krush, 120 Wash.2d 416, 418, 841 P.2d 1244 (1992) (citing other authority).
Here, both Colorado and Georgia have a significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. The place where the injury occurred is Colorado; that is where both tangible damages (to the Colorado facility) and intangible damages (to the Colorado si-tus of the corporation) occurred. The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred is Georgia; that is where the nuclear incident occurred.22 The places of incorporation and places of business of the parties is a less important factor, given the size of the parties and their resulting ability to incur travel costs, as well as the multiplicity of such places. These places are Colorado, Io-tech’s place of incorporation; California, the principal place of business of Rockwell; and Ohio, the place of incorporation and principal place of business of Battelle.23 The place where the relationship among the parties is centered is a less important and indeterminable factor, because the parties’ relationship presumed that each party would perform acts in separate states.
Which state had the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties? The Court applies the principles of the Restatement § 6, and finds as it did before:
[T]he function of the statutory reference [in § 2014(hh) ] to state law (but for certain clearly delineated federal exceptions) ... [is] to place the invoking plaintiff in the same position as one asserting similar or parallel state court provisions.
.... The court also finds its conclusion to be not inconsistent with the congressional mandate that “victims of a nuclear incident receive ‘equitable and uniform treatment’ ”.... Absent any dispute as to where the nuclear incidents alleged occurred, the court finds § 2014(hh) unambiguous in its call for the application of the “law” of only one state.... This result can therefore be said to be “uniform” in treatment, as that body of law will be the same (at least theoretically) for all persons similarly situated. It can also be fairly regarded as “equitable,” and indeed more so than any system which mandates, without further thought, the blind application of some state’s substantive law provisions.
In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 780 F.Supp. at 1570, 1571 n. 36 (internal *1479citation omitted).24 Thus, the applicable state law on Iotech’s claims is that of Georgia.
D. VENUE
Venue in RSI’s action may be proper in Georgia:
With respect to any public liability action arising out of or resulting from an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, the United States district court in the district where the extraordinary nuclear occurrence takes place ... shall have original jurisdiction.... Upon motion of the defendant ... any such action pending in any ... United States district court shall be ... transferred to the United States district court having venue under this subsection.
42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2).
Similarly, venue in Iotech’s action may be appropriate in Georgia:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Because no motion to change venue has been filed, the Court makes no findings or decisions on the issue of proper venue.
E. CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Rockwell's Motion for Order Determining Applicable State Law is GRANTED. The applicable state law on Iotech’s claims in No. CY-91-154-AAM is that of Georgia. The applicable state law on RSI’s claims in No. CY-91-155-AAM is that of Georgia.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk is instructed to enter this Order accordingly and forward copies to counsel.