Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the incorporation of a federal standard in a state-law private action, when Congress has intended that there not be a federal private action for violations of that federal standard, makes the action one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
I
The Thompson respondents are residents of Canada and the MacTavishes reside in Scotland. They filed virtually identical complaints against petitioner, a corporation, that manufactures and distributes the drug Bendectin. The complaints were filed in the Court of Common Pleas in Hamilton County, Ohio. Each complaint alleged that a child was born with multiple deformities as a result of the mother’s ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy. In five of the six counts, the recovery of substantial damages was requested on common-law theories of negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, fraud, and gross negligence. In Count IV, respondents alleged that the drug Bendectin was “misbranded” in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill), because its labeling did not provide adequate *806warning that its use was potentially dangerous. Paragraph 26 alleged that the violation of the FDCA “in the promotion” of Bendectin “constitutes a rebuttable presumption of negligence.” Paragraph 27 alleged that the “violation of said federal statutes directly and proximately caused the injuries suffered” by the two infants. App. 22, 32.
Petitioner filed a timely petition for removal from the state court to the Federal District Court alleging that the action was “founded, in part, on an alleged claim arising under the laws of the United States.” After removal, the two cases were consolidated. Respondents filed a motion to remand to the state forum on the ground that the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Relying on our decision in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921), the District Court held that Count IV of the complaint alleged a cause of action arising under federal law and denied the motion to remand. It then granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 766 F. 2d 1006 (1985). After quoting one sentence from the concluding paragraph in our recent opinion in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U. S. 1 (1983), and noting “that the FDCA does not create or imply *807a private right of action for individuals injured as a result of violations of the Act,” it explained:
“Federal question jurisdiction would, thus, exist only if plaintiffs’ right to relief depended necessarily on a substantial question of federal law. Plaintiffs’ causes of action referred to the FDCA merely as one available criterion for determining whether Merrell Dow was negligent. Because the jury could find negligence on the part of Merrell Dow without finding a violation of the FDCA, the plaintiffs’ causes of action did not depend necessarily upon a question of federal law. Consequently, the causes of action did not arise under federal law and, therefore, were improperly removed to federal court.” 766 F. 2d, at 1006.
We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 1004 (1985), and we now affirm.
II
Article III of the Constitution gives the federal courts power to hear cases “arising under” federal statutes. That grant of power, however, is not self-executing, and it was not until the Judiciary Act of 1875 that Congress gave the federal courts general federal-question jurisdiction. Although the constitutional meaning of “arising under” may extend to all cases in which a federal question is “an ingredient” of the action, Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823 (1824), we have long construed the statutory grant of federal-question jurisdiction as conferring a more limited power. *808Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 494-495 (1983); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 379 (1959).
Under our longstanding interpretation of the current statutory scheme, the question whether a claim “arises under” federal law must be determined by reference to the “well-pleaded complaint.” Franchise Tax Board, 463 U. S., at 9-10. A defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 (1908). Since a defendant may remove a case only if the claim could have been brought in federal court, 28 U. S. C. § 1441(b), moreover, the question for removal jurisdiction must also be determined by reference to the “well-pleaded complaint.”
As was true in Franchise Tax Board, supra, the propriety of the removal in this case thus turns on whether the case falls within the original “federal question” jurisdiction of the federal courts. There is no “single, precise definition” of that concept; rather, “the phrase ‘arising under’ masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system.” Id., at 8.
This much, however, is clear. The “vast majority” of cases that come within this grant of jurisdiction are covered by Justice Holmes’ statement that a “ ‘suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.’” Id., at 8-9, quoting American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257, 260 (1916). Thus, the vast majority of cases brought under the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts are those in which federal law creates the cause of action.
We have, however, also noted that a case may arise under federal law “where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law.” *809Franchise Tax Board, 463 U. S., at 9. Our actual holding in Franchise Tax Board demonstrates that this statement must be read with caution; the central issue presented in that case turned on the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), but we nevertheless concluded that federal jurisdiction was lacking.
This case does not pose a federal question of the first kind; respondents do not allege that federal law creates any of the causes of action that they have asserted. This case thus poses what Justice Frankfurter called the “litigation-provoking problem,” Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 *810U. S. 448, 470 (1957) (dissenting opinion) — the presence of a federal issue in a state-created cause of action.
In undertaking this inquiry into whether jurisdiction may lie for the presence of a federal issue in a nonfederal cause of action, it is, of course, appropriate to begin by referring to our understanding of the statute conferring federal-question jurisdiction. We have consistently emphasized that, in exploring the outer reaches of § 1331, determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system. “If the history of the interpretation of judiciary legislation teaches us anything, it teaches the duty to reject treating such statutes as a wooden set of self-sufficient words. . . . The Act of 1875 is broadly phrased, but it has been continuously construed and limited in the light of the history that produced it, the demands of reason and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy which have emerged from the Act’s function as a provision in the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation.” Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S., at 379. In Franchise Tax Board, we forcefully reiterated this need for prudence and restraint in the jurisdictional inquiry: “We have always interpreted what Skelly Oil [Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667, 673 (1950)] called ‘the current of jurisdictional legislation since the Act of March 3, 1875’. . . with an eye to practicality and necessity.” 463 U. S., at 20.
In this case, both parties agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that there is no federal cause of action for FDCA violations. For purposes of our decision, we assume that this is a correct interpretation of the FDCA. Thus, as the case comes to us, it is appropriate to assume that, under the settled framework for evaluating whether a federal cause of action lies, some combination of the following factors is present: (1) the plaintiffs are not part of the class for whose special benefit the statute was passed; (2) the indicia of legis*811lative intent reveal no congressional purpose to provide a private cause of action; (3) a federal cause of action would not further the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) the respondents’ cause of action is a subject traditionally relegated to state law. In short, Congress did not intend a private federal remedy for violations of the statute that it enacted.
This is the first case in which we have reviewed this type of jurisdictional claim in light of these factors. That this is so is not surprising. The development of our framework for determining whether a private cause of action exists has proceeded only in the last 11 years, and its inception represented a significant change in our approach to congressional silence on the provision of federal remedies.
The recent character of that development does not, however, diminish its importance. Indeed, the very reasons for the development of the modern implied remedy doctrine— the “increased complexity of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation,” as well as “the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent,” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 377 (1982) (footnote omitted) — are precisely the kind of considerations that should inform the concern for “practicality and necessity” that Franchise Tax Board advised for the construction of § 1331 when jurisdiction is as*812serted because of the presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action.
The significance of the necessary assumption that there is no federal private cause of action thus cannot be overstated. For the ultimate import of such a conclusion, as we have repeatedly emphasized, is that it would flout congressional intent to provide a private federal remedy for the violation of the federal statute. We think it would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to conclude that the federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question jurisdiction and provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely because the violation of the federal statute is said to be a “rebuttable presumption” or a “proximate cause” under state law, rather than a federal action under federal law.
*813HH HH HH
Petitioner advances three arguments to support its position that, even in the face of this congressional preclusion of a federal cause of action for a violation of the federal statute, federal-question jurisdiction may lie for the violation of the federal statute as an element of a state cause of action.
First, petitioner contends that the case represents a straightforward application of the statement in Franchise Tax Board that federal-question jurisdiction is appropriate when “it appears that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” 463 U. S., at 13. Franchise Tax Board, however, did not purport to disturb the long-settled understanding that the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction. Indeed, in determining that federal-question jurisdiction was not appropriate in the case before us, we stressed Justice Cardozo’s emphasis on principled, pragmatic distinctions: “‘What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of causation... a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the web *814and lays the other ones aside.Id., at 20-21 (quoting Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 117-118 (1936)).
Far from creating some kind of automatic test, Franchise Tax Board thus candidly recognized the need for careful judgments about the exercise of federal judicial power in an area of uncertain jurisdiction. Given the significance of the assumed congressional determination to preclude federal private remedies, the presence of the federal issue as an element of the state tort is not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would serve congressional purposes and the federal system. This conclusion is fully consistent with the very sentence relied on so heavily by petitioner. We simply conclude that the congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently “substantial” to confer federal-question jurisdiction.
*815Second, petitioner contends that there is a powerful federal interest in seeing that the federal statute is given uniform interpretations, and that federal review is the best way of insuring such uniformity. In addition to the significance of the congressional decision to preclude a federal remedy, we do *816not agree with petitioner’s characterization of the federal interest and its implications for federal-question jurisdiction. To the extent that petitioner is arguing that state use and interpretation of the FDCA pose a threat to the order and stability of the FDCA regime, petitioner should be arguing, not that federal courts should be able to review and enforce state FDCA-based causes of action as an aspect of federal-question jurisdiction, but that the FDCA pre-empts state-court jurisdiction over the issue in dispute. Petitioner’s concern about the uniformity of interpretation, moreover, is considerably mitigated by the fact that, even if there is no original district court jurisdiction for these kinds of action, this Court retains power to review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause of action.
Finally, petitioner argues that, whatever the general rule, there are special circumstances that justify federal-question jurisdiction in this case. Petitioner emphasizes that it is unclear whether the FDCA applies to sales in Canada and Scotland; there is, therefore, a special reason for having a federal *817court answer the novel federal question relating to the extraterritorial meaning of the Act. We reject this argument. We do not believe the question whether a particular claim arises under federal law depends on the novelty of the federal issue. Although it is true that federal jurisdiction cannot be based on a frivolous or insubstantial federal question, “the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system,” Franchise Tax Board, 463 U. S., at 8, would be ill served by a rule that made the existence of federal-question jurisdiction depend on the district court’s case-by-ease appraisal of the novelty of the federal question asserted as an element of the state tort. The novelty of an FDCA issue is not sufficient to give it status as a federal cause of action; nor should it be sufficient to give a state-based FDCA claim status as a jurisdiction-triggering federal question.
IV
We conclude that a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
*818Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting.
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution provides that the federal judicial power shall extend to “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.” We have long recognized the great breadth of this grant of jurisdiction, holding that there is federal jurisdiction whenever a federal question is an “ingredient” of the action, Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823 (1824), and suggesting that there may even be jurisdiction simply because a case involves “potential federal questions,” Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Osborn, supra, at 824; Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816); Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1 (1885); Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 492-493 (1983).
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1331 provides, in language that parrots the language of Article III, that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Although this language suggests that Congress intended in § 1331 to confer upon federal courts the full breadth of permissible “federal question” jurisdiction (an inference that is supported by the contemporary evidence, see Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U. S. 1, 8, n. 8 (1983); Forrester, The Nature of a “Federal Question,” 16 Tulane L. Rev. 362, 374-376 (1942); Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 568 (1985)), § 1331 has been construed more narrowly than its constitutional counterpart. See Verlinden B. V., supra, at 494-495; Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 379 (1959). Nonetheless, given the language of the statute and its close relation to the constitutional grant of federal-question jurisdiction, limitations on federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331 must be justified by careful consideration of the reasons *819underlying the grant of jurisdiction and the need for federal review. Ibid. I believe that the limitation on federal jurisdiction recognized by the Court today is inconsistent with the purposes of § 1331. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I
While the majority of cases covered by §1331 may well be described by Justice Holmes’ adage that “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action,” American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257, 260 (1916), it is firmly settled that there may be federal-question jurisdiction even though both the right asserted and the remedy sought by the plaintiff are state created. See C. Wright, Federal Courts § 17, pp. 95-96 (4th ed. 1983) (hereinafter Wright); M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 64-71 (1980) (hereinafter Redish). The rule as to such cases was stated in what Judge Friendly described as “[t]he path-breaking opinion” in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921). T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F. 2d 823, 827 (CA2 1964). In Smith, a shareholder of the defendant corporation brought suit in the federal court to enjoin the defendant from investing corporate funds in bonds issued under the authority of the Federal Farm Loan Act. The plaintiff alleged that Missouri law imposed a fiduciary duty on the corporation to invest only in bonds that were authorized by a valid law and argued that, because the Farm Loan Act was unconstitutional, the defendant could not purchase bonds issued under its authority. Although the cause of action was wholly state created, the Court held that there was original federal jurisdiction over the case:
“The general rule is that where it appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court has jurisdic*820tion under [the statute granting federal question jurisdiction].” 255 U. S., at 199.
The continuing vitality of Smith is beyond challenge. We have cited it approvingly on numerous occasions, and reaffirmed its holding several times — most recently just three Terms ago by a unanimous Court in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, supra, at 9. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U. S. 350, 357 (1921); Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 685 (1946); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U. S. 437, 450, and n. 18 (1955) (plurality opinion); Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682, 696 (1963); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 70 (1978). See also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 356 (1936) (separate opinion of McReynolds, J.); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra, at 470 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 659 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 112 (1936) (“To bring a case within [§ 1331], a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action”). Moreover, in addition to Judge Friendly’s authoritative opinion in T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, supra, at 827, Smith has been widely cited and followed in the lower federal courts. See, e. g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 174 U. S. App. D. C. 253, 263, n. 8, 531 F. 2d 585, 595, n. 8 (1976); Mungin v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 416 F. 2d 1169, 1176-1177 (CA5 1969); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F. 2d 486, 492 (CA2 1968); Warrington Sewer Co. v. Tracy, 463 F. 2d 771, 772 (CA3 1972) (per curiam); New York by Abrams v. Citibank, N. A., 537 F. Supp. 1192, 1196 (SDNY 1982); Kravitz v. Homeowners Warranty Corp., 542 F. Supp. 317, 319 (ED Pa. 1982). See also Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F. 2d 323 (CA2 1982); Christopher v. Cavallo, 662 F. 2d 1082 (CA4 1981); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson Oil Co., 586 F. 2d 1375 (CA10 1978), *821cert. denied, 441 U. S. 952 (1979); Garrett v. Time-D. C., Inc., 502 F. 2d 627 (CA9 1974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 913 (1975); Sweeney v. Abramovitz, 449 F. Supp. 213 (Conn. 1978). Furthermore, the principle of the Smith case has been recognized and endorsed by most commentators as well. Redish 67, 69; American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 178 (1969) (hereinafter ALI); Wright § 17, at 96; P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 889 (2d ed., 1973); Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 166 (1953); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 225 (1948).
*822There is, to my mind, no question that there is federal jurisdiction over the respondents’ fourth cause of action under the rule set forth in Smith and reaffirmed in Franchise Tax *823Board. Respondents pleaded that petitioner’s labeling of the drug Bendectin constituted “misbranding” in violation of §§201 and 502(f)(2) and (j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), and that this violation “directly and proximately caused” their injuries. App. 21-22 (Thompson complaint), 31-32 (MacTavish complaint). Respondents asserted in the complaint that this violation established petitioner’s negligence per se and entitled them to recover damages without more. Ibid. No other basis for finding petitioner negligent was asserted in connection with this claim. As pleaded, then, respondents’ “right to relief depend[ed] upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Smith, 255 U. S., at 199; see also Franchise Tax Board, 463 U. S., at 28 (there is federal jurisdiction under § 1331 where the plaintiff’s right to relief “necessarily depends” upon resolution of a federal question). Furthermore, although petitioner disputes its liability under the FDCA, it concedes that respondents’ claim that petitioner violated the FDCA is “colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation.” Smith, supra, at 199. *824Of course, since petitioner must make this concession to prevail in this Court, it need not be accepted at face value. However, independent examination of respondents’ claim substantiates the conclusion that it is neither frivolous nor meritless. As stated in the complaint, a drug is “mis-branded” under the FDCA if “the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts material . . . with respect to consequences which may result from the use of the article to which the labeling or advertising relates . . . .” 21 U. S. C. §321(n). Obviously, the possibility that a mother’s ingestion of Ben-dectin during pregnancy could produce malformed children is material. Petitioner’s principal defense is that the Act does not govern the branding of drugs that are sold in foreign countries. It is certainly not immediately obvious whether this argument is correct. Thus, the statutory question is one which “discloses a need for determining the meaning or application of [the FDCA],” T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F. 2d, at 827, and the claim raised by the fourth cause of action is one “arising under” federal law within the meaning of § 1331.
II
The Court apparently does not disagree with any of this — except, of course, for the conclusion. According to the Court, if we assume that Congress did not intend that there be a private federal cause of action under a particular federal law (and, presumably, a fortiori if Congress’ decision not to create a private remedy is express), we must also assume that Congress did not intend that there be federal jurisdiction over a state cause of action that is determined by that federal law. Therefore, assuming — only because the parties *825have made a similar assumption — that there is no private cause of action under the FDCA, the Court holds that there is no federal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim:
“The significance of the necessary assumption that there is no federal private cause of action thus cannot be overstated. For the ultimate import of such a conclusion, as we have repeatedly emphasized, is that it would flout congressional intent to provide a private federal remedy for the violation of the federal statute. We think it would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to conclude that the federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question jurisdiction and provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely because the violation of the federal statute is said to be a ‘rebuttable presumption’ or a ‘proximate cause’ under state law, rather than a federal action under federal law.” Ante, at 812 (footnotes omitted).
The Court nowhere explains the basis for this conclusion. Yet it is hardly self-evident. Why should the fact that Congress chose not to create a private federal remedy mean that Congress would not want there to be federal jurisdiction to adjudicate a state claim that imposes liability for violating the federal law? Clearly, the decision not to provide a private federal remedy should not affect federal jurisdiction unless the reasons Congress withholds a federal remedy are also reasons for withholding federal jurisdiction. Thus, it is nec*826essary to examine the reasons for Congress’ decisions to grant or withhold both federal jurisdiction and private remedies, something the Court has not done.
A
In the early da' 's of our Republic, Congress was content to leave the task of interpreting and applying federal laws in the first instance to the state courts; with one short-lived exception, Congress did not grant the inferior federal courts original jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law until 1875. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. The reasons Congress found it necessary to add this jurisdiction to the district courts are well known. First, Congress recognized “the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat., at 347-348 (Story, J.) (emphasis in original). See also, Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 634, 636 (1984) (hereinafter Comment); D. Currie, Federal Courts 160 (3d ed. 1982) (hereinafter Cur-rie). Concededly, because federal jurisdiction is not always exclusive and because federal courts may disagree with one another, absolute uniformity has not been obtained even under § 1331. However, while perfect uniformity may not have been achieved, experience indicates that the availability of a federal forum in federal-question cases has done much to advance that goal. This, in fact, was the conclusion of the American Law Institute’s Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts. ALI 164-168.
In addition, § 1331 has provided for adjudication in a forum that specializes in federal law and that is therefore more likely to apply that law correctly. Because federal-question *827cases constitute the basic grist for federal tribunals, “[t]he federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation and application of federal law.” Id., at 164-165. By contrast, “it is apparent that federal question cases must form a very small part of the business of [state] courts.” Id., at 165. As a result, the federal courts are comparatively more skilled at interpreting and applying federal law, and are much more likely correctly to divine Congress’ intent in enacting legislation. See ibid.; Redish 71; Currie 160; Comment 636; Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the “Arising Under” Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 Ind. L. J. 563, 564-565 (1981).
These reasons for having original federal-question jurisdiction explain why cases like this one and Smith — i. e., cases where the cause of action is a creature of state law, but an *828essential element of the claim is federal — “arise under” federal law within the meaning of § 1331. Congress passes laws in order to shape behavior; a federal law expresses Congress’ determination that there is a federal interest in having individuals or other entities conform their actions to a particular norm established by that law. Because all laws are imprecise to some degree, disputes inevitably arise over what specifically Congress intended to require or permit. It is the duty of courts to interpret these laws and apply them in such a way that the congressional purpose is realized. As noted above, Congress granted the district courts power to hear cases “arising under” federal law in order to enhance the likelihood that federal laws would be interpreted more correctly and applied more uniformly. In other words, Congress determined that the availability of a federal forum to adjudicate cases involving 'federal questions would make it more likely that federal laws would shape behavior in the way that Congress intended.
By making federal law an essential element of a state-law claim, the State places the federal law into a context where it will operate to shape behavior: the threat of liability will force individuals to conform their conduct to interpretations of the federal law made by courts adjudicating the state-law claim. It will not matter to an individual found liable whether the officer who arrives at his door to execute judgment is wearing a state or a federal uniform; all he cares about is the fact that a sanction is being imposed — and may be imposed again in the future — because he failed to comply with the federal law. Consequently, the possibility that the federal law will be incorrectly interpreted in the context of adjudicating the state-law claim implicates the concerns that led Congress to grant the district courts power to adjudicate cases involving federal questions in precisely the same way as if it was federal law that “created” the cause of action. It therefore follows that there is federal jurisdiction under § 1331.
*829B
The only remaining question is whether the assumption that Congress decided not to create a private cause of action alters this analysis in a way that makes it inappropriate to exercise original federal jurisdiction. According to the Court, “the very reasons for the development of the modem implied remedy doctrine” support the conclusion that, where the legislative history of a particular law shows (whether expressly or by inference) that Congress intended that there be no private federal remedy, it must also mean that Congress would not want federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over a state-law claim making violations of that federal law actionable. Ante, at 811. These reasons are “The increased complexity of federal legislation/” “The increased volume of federal litigation/ ” and “ The desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent.’” Ibid. (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 377 (1982)).
These reasons simply do not justify the Court’s holding. Given the relative expertise of the federal courts in interpreting federal law, supra, at 826-827, the increased complexity of federal legislation argues rather strongly in favor of recognizing federal jurisdiction. And, while the increased volume of litigation 'may appropriately be considered in connection with reasoned arguments that justify limiting the reach of § 1331, I do not believe that the day has yet arrived when this Court may trim a statute solely because it thinks that Congress made it too broad.
*830This leaves only the third reason: “‘the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent.”’ Ante, at 811. I certainly subscribe to the proposition that the Court should consider legislative intent in determining whether or not there is jurisdiction under § 1331. But the Court has not examined the purposes underlying either the FDCA or § 1331 in reaching its conclusion that Congress’ presumed decision not to provide a private federal remedy under the FDCA must be taken to withdraw federal jurisdiction over a private state remedy that imposes liability for violating the FDCA. Moreover, such an examination demonstrates not only that it is consistent with legislative intent to find £hat there is federal jurisdiction over such a claim, but, indeed, that it is the Court’s contrary conclusion that is inconsistent with congressional intent.
The enforcement scheme established by the FDCA is typical of other, similarly broad regulatory schemes. Primary responsibility for overseeing implementation of the Act has been conferred upon a specialized administrative agency, here the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Congress has provided the FDA with a wide-ranging arsenal of weapons to combat violations of the FDCA, including authority to obtain an ex parte court order for the seizure of goods subject to the Act, see 21 U. S. C. § 334, authority to initiate proceedings in a federal district court to enjoin continuing violations of the FDCA, see §332, and authority to request a United States Attorney to bring criminal proceedings against violators, see § 333. See generally 1 J. O’Reilly, Food and Drug Administration, chs. 6-10 (1979 and Supp. 1985). Significantly, the FDA has no independent enforcement authority; final enforcement must come from the federal courts, *831which have exclusive jurisdiction over actions under the FDCA. See §§ 332(a), 333, 334(a)(1). Thus, while the initial interpretive function has been delegated to an expert administrative body whose interpretations are entitled to considerable deference, final responsibility for interpreting the statute in order to carry out the legislative mandate belongs to the federal courts. Cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843, n. 9 (1984) (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent”).
Given that Congress structured the FDCA so that all express remedies are provided by the federal courts, it seems rather strange to conclude that it either “flout[sj” or “undermine[s]” congressional intent for the federal courts to adjudicate a private state-law remedy that is based upon violating the FDCA. See ante, at 812. That is, assuming that a state cause of action based on the FDCA is not preempted, it is entirely consistent with the FDCA to find that it “arises under” federal law within the meaning of § 1331. Indeed, it is the Court’s conclusion that such a state cause of action must be kept out of the federal courts that appears contrary to legislative intent inasmuch as the enforcement provisions of the FDCA quite clearly express a preference for having federal courts interpret the FDCA and provide remedies for its violation.
It may be that a decision by Congress not to create a private remedy is intended to preclude all private enforcement. If that is so, then a state cause of action that makes relief available to private individuals for violations of the FDCA is pre-empted. But if Congress’ decision not to provide a private federal remedy does not pre-empt such a state remedy, then, in light of the FDCA’s clear policy of relying on the federal courts for enforcement, it also should not foreclose federal jurisdiction over that state remedy. Both § 1331 and the enforcement provisions of the FDCA reflect Congress’ strong *832desire to utilize the federal courts to interpret and enforce the FDCA, and it is therefore at odds with both these statutes to recognize a private state-law remedy for violating the FDCA but to hold that this remedy cannot be adjudicated in the federal courts.
The Court’s contrary conclusion requires inferring from Congress’ decision not to create a private federal remedy that, while some private enforcement is permissible in state courts, it is “bad” if that enforcement comes from the federal courts. But that is simply illogical. Congress’ decision to withhold a private right of action and to rely instead on public enforcement reflects congressional concern with obtaining more accurate implementation and more coordinated enforcement of a regulatory scheme. See National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 462-465 (1974); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 158 U. S. App. D. C. 207, 218-220, 485 F. 2d 986, 997-999 (1973); Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1208-1209 (1982). These reasons are closely related to the Congress’ reasons for giving federal courts original federal-question jurisdiction. Thus, if anything, Congress’ decision not to create a private remedy strengthens the argument in favor of finding federal jurisdiction over a state remedy that is not pre-empted.