Plaintiff appeals as of right from a December 19, 1984, order of the Muskegon Circuit Court which granted summary judgment *93to defendants under GCR 1963, 117.2(1), now MCR 2.116(C)(8), for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs amended complaint alleged that plaintiff was a resident of Michigan. It further alleged that defendants were foreign corporations conducting business in Michigan as interstate common carriers, and that they carried Michigan no-fault insurance pursuant to MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq.
The amended complaint alleged that on March 9, 1983, plaintiff sustained accidental bodily injury in Portland, Oregon, while employed by defendants and that the injury arose out of the ownership, operation or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. It alleged that the vehicle was registered and licensed in South Dakota by defendant Midwest Coast Transport, Inc. The complaint alleged that defendants refused to pay personal protection benefits under MCL 500.3105; MSA 24.13105.
In their answers, defendants raised an affirmative defense based upon the exclusion of Michigan workers’ compensation benefits contained in MCL 500.3106(2); MSA 24.13106(2). This provision. was added when 1981 House Bill 4524 was enacted into 1981 PA 209. The statute provides:
Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle if benefits under the worker’s disability compensation act of 1969, Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being sections 418.101 to 418.941 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, are available to an employee who sustains the injury in the course of his or her employment while loading, unloading, or doing mechanical work on a vehicle unless the injury arose from the use or operation of another vehicle.
*94Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(2) on the ground that defendants had failed to state a valid defense to the claims asserted against them. Defendants then filed their motion for summary judgment which the trial court ultimately granted.
A motion for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) tests the legal basis of the complaint. It does not test the nonmoving party’s ability to prove the allegations. This Court reviews the pleadings alone and accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, along with any inferences or conclusions which may fairly be drawn from those facts. This Court will not affirm the grant of a motion for summary judgment unless the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly supply a basis for recovery. Abel v Eli Lilly & Co, 418 Mich 311; 343 NW2d 164 (1984).
We reverse the order of summary judgment, because the trial court’s construction of MCL 500.3106(2); MSA 24.13106(2) is erroneous as a matter of law. The function of a reviewing court is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. Aikens v Dep’t of Conservation, 387 Mich 495, 499; 198 NW2d 304 (1972). If the language of the statute is clear, then the Legislature must have intended the meaning it has plainly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. Hiltz v Phil’s Quality Market, 417 Mich 335, 343; 337 NW2d 237 (1983). The Legislature used clear and explicit language when it described the exclusion as one arising "if benefits under the worker’s disability compensation act of 1969, Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being §§ 418.101 to 418.941 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, are available” to an employee injured in the course of his employment while loading, unloading or doing mechanical work *95on a vehicle. The statute plainly refers to benefits available under the Michigan Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. No reference is made to the worker’s disability compensation act of another jurisdiction.
When granting defendants’ motion, the trial court reasoned that a literal interpretation of the statute would lead to an absurd and unjust result. The trial court found that the statute tended to discriminate against Michigan residents and appeared to favor out-of-state residents. We note that the statute has withstood a constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds. Babbitt v Employers Ins of Wausau, 136 Mich App 198; 355 NW2d 635 (1984), lv den 419 Mich 962 (1984). We further note that the Legislature need not deal with every aspect of a problem at the same time. O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 543; 273 NW2d 829 (1979).
Defendants argue that the spirit of the statute precludes personal protection benefits under the no-fault act if workers’ compensation benefits are available from any source. Defendants apparently rely upon dicta from Babbitt, supra, pp 201-202, that "[by] limiting the coverage of no-fault benefits, it appears that the Legislature was attempting to maintain cost controls over the system by limiting its scope.” Defendants contend that the Legislature intended to limit the scope of the no-fault act by this provision, leaving workers’ compensation benefits as the exclusive remedy for injured workers such as plaintiff. We decline to rewrite or expand the scope of the exclusion to include workers’ compensation benefits available from any source. If the Legislature had intended to include workers’ compensation benefits from other jurisdictions within the scope of the exclusion, it could have expressly stated so. It did not.
*96We find no such intention, after reviewing the legislative history materials submitted by defendants. Although the legislative history materials indicate that the Legislature was concerned with reducing costs, it appears that the Legislature was only concerned with reducing costs to Michigan businesses.1 The effect of the bill on the costs of an *97out-of-state carrier liable for workers’ compensation benefits in another jurisdiction and concurrently liable for no-fault benefits in Michigan was not directly addressed. After reviewing the legislative history, wé are persuaded that our view of the statute is proper. Compare, Bell v FJ Boutell Driveaway Co, 141 Mich App 802, 809-811; 369 NW2d 231 (1985).
We remand this case to the trial court to determine whether no-fault benefits are available to plaintiff. According to defendants’ brief on appeal, the injury alleged by plaintiff was never formally reported to them. Defendants have accepted as true the nature and circumstances of plaintiff’s injury for purposes of argument only in their motion for summary judgment. This apparent factual dispute may be pursued on remand.
We leave it to the trial court to determine the amount of setoff of South Dakota workers’ compen*98sation benefits against Michigan no-fault benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3109(1); MSA 24.13109(1), if any setoff is warranted. We decline to decide the setoff issue on this underdeveloped record on claims of possible "available” benefits since the present status of plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim is not clear.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.