We reverse the judgment of summary contempt entered against an attorney in the course of the trial of his client for assault and battery in a six-person jury session of the Haverhill District Court. We see no evidence of contempt of court on the record before us. In any event, a judgment of summary contempt was not warranted under Mass. R. Crim. P. 43, 378 Mass. 919 (1979). Even if it had been warranted, the judge did not follow certain requirements of rule 43 concerning summary contempt.
The Commonwealth proceeded at trial with the alleged victim unavailable. It was important, although not indispensible, to the Commonwealth’s proof to introduce in evidence certain statements in a hospital record attributed to the alleged victim *96concerning the source of her injuries. The following occurred at a bench conference when the Commonwealth offered the hospital record:
Defense counsel: “I object to them, Your Honor, for several reasons. Number one, I’ve never seen them before today.”
The judge: “(Inaudible).”
Defense counsel: “I didn’t know they existed, Your Honor. I had discovery from the Commonwealth.”
The judge: “You knew she went to Bon Secours Hospital. ”
Defense counsel: “Your Honor, I took for granted I was on full discovery. That’s not the — that’s not my main reason here. Number Two, the Keeper of the Records is not here to testify that indeed, she is the Keeper of the Records.”
The judge: “All right, your objection is overruled. I’m not hearing from you any further.”
Defense counsel: “Your Honor, I have —”
The judge: “No. Mr. Segal, I’m not hearing from you any further.”
Defense counsel: “I object to —”
The judge: “Mr. Segal, do you want to be locked up? Do you want to be? Mr. Ryan [court officer] — do you want to be locked up, or are you going to take the Court’s ruling?”
Defense counsel: “Your Honor, I accept the Court’s ruling
The judge: “Mr. Ryan, take him into custody.”
The judge: “All right, Jurors. The Court’s declaring a mistrial. You are free to leave. You may leave, Jurors. The Court will stand in recess.”
There is no suggestion that the jury heard any of this colloquy. There is nothing to suggest that circumstances not shown in the transcript, such as gestures or counsel’s tone of voice, had any bearing on the judge’s determination to have the attorney taken into custody.
After the recess the judge held a hearing on the question of the sentence to be imposed for summary contempt. The entire *97discussion is set forth in the margin.1 In the course of the discussion, defense counsel quite correctly pointed out to the judge that, if his challenges to the admission of the entire hospital record were unsuccessful, he had a nonfrivolous hearsay (and perhaps constitutionally-based) objection to the admission of the alleged victim’s statements contained in that hospital *98record. See G. L. c. 233, § 79 (1986 ed.) (admission of hospital records as they “relate to the treatment and medical history” but not to “the question of liability”); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 385 Mass. 733, 749-750 (1982); Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 527-530 (1978); Commonwealth v. Lannon, 364 Mass. 480, 484 (1974). The judge erred in thinking that a general objection would have preserved that question for appellate review. See Costonis v. MedfordHous. Auth., 343 Mass. 108, 116 (1961); Irving v. Goodimate Co., 320 Mass. 454, 460 (1946); Solomon v. Dabrowski, 295 Mass. 358, 359 (1936). Defense counsel tried to make that valid point and had a duty to his client to do so.
First, as we have said, as a matter of law we see nothing contemptuous of the court in what defense counsel did. See Sussman v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 692, 702 (1978). It is true that defense counsel sought to raise an objection after the judge said that he was not going to hear further from defense counsel. That persistence cannot be seriously faulted, however, because defense counsel had a further and different point to argue. See Sussman v. Commonwealth, supra at 698 (after a warning, a lawyer “should desist, taking such steps only as are necessary to preserve his client’s right of appellate review”). When warned and asked if he accepted the court’s ruling, defense counsel said that he did. The judge’s inexplicable response to that statement was to order defense counsel into custody forthwith in front of the jury. Contempt or the threat of contempt should not be used to chill an attorney’s vigorous but respectful advocacy on behalf of a criminal defendant.
Surely circumstances warranting the imposition of summary contempt were not involved. Rule 43, which is set forth in the *99margin,2 permits the summary punishment of a criminal contempt only if “summary punishment is necessary to maintain order in the courtroom” and if certain other conditions are met. All that transpired here occurred at a bench conference. There was not even a hint of a threat to order in the courtroom. Defense counsel had done nothing earlier in the trial which approached contempt of court or threatened order in the courtroom. Defense counsel accepted the judge’s ruling. Quite simply, a judgment of summary contempt was not justified, even if for some reason (which we do not see) defense counsel did commit contempt of court.
Moreover, the judge did not follow the procedures of rule 43(b) in ruling that defense counsel was in summary contempt of court. He made the judgment of contempt before giving defense counsel, as the rule requires, “at least a summary opportunity to adduce evidence or argument relevant to guilt *100or punishment.” Mass. R. Crim. P. 43 (b). See Sussman v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass, at 699. Nor is there, as the rule requires, a judgment of contempt “signed by the judge and entered on the record” containing “a recital of those facts upon which the adjudication of guilt is based.” The rights of the defendant on trial probably required that the judge, in the words of rule 43 (b), “defer imposition or execution of sentence until after the trial [was] completed.” See Sussman v. Commonwealth, supra at 700 n.7.3
Judgment reversed.