No. 8512.
A. Miltenberger & Co. vs. A. V. Dubroca, Recorder, et als.
The registry of the judgment rendered on a mortgage note, in this case, was not a sufficient reinscription of the original mortgage, as the judgment did not contain and, when registered, did not convey all the necessary information for the purpose of the reinscription.
APPEAL from tlie Twenty-third Judicial District Court, Parish of West Baton Ro'uge. Cole, J.
3. M. Favrot, for Plaintiffs and Appellees:
The registry preserves the evidence of mortgages and privileges during ten years, reckoning from the day of its date 5 its effect ceases, even against the contracting parties, if the inscriptions have not been renewed before the expiration of this time, in the manner in ichich they were first made. R. 0. 0. 3369 [3333].
The event spoken of in Art. 2038 R. C. C., upon which depends the existence of mortgages as to third persons, is both inscription and reinscription. "When ten years elapse without reinscription, the condition upon which the mortgage depends is cónsidered as broken, and the mortgage, of necessity, lapses. Shepherd vs. N. 0. Cotton Press Co., 2 A. 109.
It is now a rule of property in this State, that inscription and reinscription of mortgages, in the manner in which they were first made, are essential requisites to their effect upon prop* erty, in regard to third persons.
Legal delays are fatal in ail cases, unless expressly declared otherwise
If the party having an interest fails to inscribe or reinscribe Ms mortgage, lie cannot complain of losses suffered through his own neglect.
The effect of inscription must not; be left a matter en pais, and, therefore, uncertain. It would give rise to endless litigation.
The object of reinscription is to dispense with searching for the evidence of mortgages more than ten years hack. 2 A. 210 to 213.
Nalle & Cammack’s judgment fails to give any clue to the origin of the mortgage which it makes executory, in this: 1st. The name of the officer who drew up the act is not mentioned. 2d. It refers to no date as to the execution of the mortgage deed. 3d. It is silent as to the date of its registry. 4th. It does not fix the amount which the original act of mortgage intended to secure. 5th. It fails to give the names of mortgagor and mortgagee.
Nalle & Cammack caDnot be permitted to inscribe a loose and obscure notice, and have third persons to ferret out elsewhere the extent of the antecedent encumbrance claimed by them. Their judgment should be obtained iu a distinct and intelligible form. If a contrary practice were tolerated, confusion, mistakes and injustice would be the inevitable result. 2 A. 610; 4 R. 67; 2 A. 800-918; 7 A. 534 ; 23 A. 132; 25 A. 180 ; 27 A. 299; 28 A. 775.
The inscription of Nalle & Cammack’s judgment was no notice to third persons. 21 A. 427 ; 22 A. 402; 28 A. 775.
Neither knowledge nor notice supply the want of reinscription. L. L. p. 611, Nos. 7, 8, 9.
In forced alienation of property, the observance of the forms of law supplies the want of consent of the seized debtor. So, if a judgment, by its registry, can supply the inscrip, tion of a conventional moitgage, it should contain all the facts necessary to a valid inscription of the original act. The facts must not be ascertained by an examination dehors the judgment.
The mortgagor, after the peremption of the inscription, could not be held liable for the damages allowed by R. C. C. 3365, by giving another mortgage on his property to a third party. The registry of the Nalle & Cammack judgment is neither notice to the mortgagor nor mortgagee. Liddell vs. Rucker, 13 A. 571.
JRead & GoodaUj for Defendants and Appellants.
*314The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Fenner, J.
The sole question involved in this case is whether the registry of a judgment, obtained by the holder of a mortgage note, recognizing and rendering executory the mortgage, operates as a sufficient reinscription of the original mortgage by which the note was secured.
The note sued on was one of several notes secured by the mortgage, and the suit and judgment were in favor of a third holder, not the original mortgagee. The judgment sufficiently describes the property, but fails to mention the name of the officer who passed the act, or the date of the act or of its original registry, or tho name of the original mortgagee, or the total amount for which the mortgage was given. The judgment really contains nothing on its face to identify it with the particular mortgage, of which its registry is claimed to operate as a r'einscription, and leaves the reader under the necessity of looking outside of the record in order to ascertain all those facts, which should be patent on the face of the inscription.
The Code requires that the inscriptions shall be renewed “ in the manner in which they were first made,” Art. 3369.
The manner in which the original inscriptions are required to be made, is set forth in the case of Sue. of Simon, 23 A. 533, where it is held that the act itself must be transcribed, and that the registry of a mere certificate of the notary that he had passed even the act, though containing a complete description of all particulars of the mortgage, could not avail as a substitute for the act. A strict interpretation of Art. 3369 would impose like requisites for the reinscription ; but even if some latitude be allowed in the matter, it is clear that the reinscription must, in some form, either on its face or by distinct reference, present complete evidence of the mortgage intended to be perpetuated, so that the searcher may ascertain all the essential particulars thereof, without leaving the register’s office. Whother this object might be accomplished by a memorandum reciting the renewal or reinscription with reference to the date, book and page of the original inscription, is not presented in this case. See on this subject: 4 Rob. 7; 2 A. 610, 799; 4 A. 212; 7 A. 534; 20 A. 388 ; 21 A. 427; 22 A. 402; 23 A. 132; 25 A. 180; 27 A. 299; 28 A. 775.
The judgment inscribed in this case accomplishes none of the purposes had in view in valid reinscriptions.
So far as third persons are concerned, mortgages derive their effect, not from the mere convention of the parties, but from compliance with the laws of registry, and nothing can dispense from a strict observance thereof.
Judgment affirmed at appellants’ cost.