In this taxpayer’s action, plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance hereinafter discussed was heard on complaint, answer, and affidavits. It was denied, and plaintiff appeals. The ordinance attacked, passed by the city council of Minneapolis February 28, 1930, is entitled: “An ordinance relating to and designating and redesignating the ward *148boundaries -of the several wards of the city of Minneapolis.” The council’s power so to reapportion the city plaintiff denies.
Minneapolis adopted a home rule charter November 2, 1920. The existing division of the city into 13 wards was confirmed and the Avard boundaries designated by the new charter. There was no express indication of the manner in which or the authority by which the city Avas to be redistricted if and when the occasion should arise. The charter can be amended only on the proposal of the charter commission and the approval of a popular • vote. G. S. 1923 (1 Mason, 1927) § 1286.
Notwithstanding the absence from the charter itself of any language conferring upon the city council the poAver of reapportionment, its possession is asserted because the charter continued to the council the authority given it by L. 1919, p.- 217, c. 221. By that act the city council of any city of the first class, having a population of over 50,000, and not governed by home rule charter, was authorized by ordinance “to designate and redesignate the ward boundaries of such cities so as to keep the population of the various wards of such cities as nearly as may be equal.” So, before the adoption of its home rule charter, the city council of Minneapolis had the power to reapportion.
After declaring expressly that 49 designated existing statutes should continue as part of the new charter, that document went on to provide (c. XX, § 2) as follows:
“The city of Minneapolis and the several boards and departments of said city, in addition to all the rights, powers, duties, functions, privileges, and immunities expressly conferred upon and vested in them or any of them under and by virtue of the proiúsions of this charter, shall under this charter also have, possess, perform, exercise, and enjoy all other rights, powers, duties, functio'ns, privileges, and immunities held, possessed, performed, exercised, or enjoyed by said city and its several departments and boards respectively at the time of the adoption of this charter.”
Unless by this omnibus preservation of former competence there has been saved to the city council the poAver of reapportionment, that *149body does not have it. But Ave think that the poAver was preserved. The careful enumeration of existing statutes, the benefits of Avhich the framers of the charter Avanted to make sure of preserving, Avas apparently considered not quite enough. The intention, and that is the controlling thing, plainly Avas to preserve, undiminished, all the poAvers conferred by the laAvs then in force upon any board or department of the city. The language is general and inclusive. Were Ave noAv to read into it by construction an exception of the poAver conferred upon the council by the LaAvs of 1919, Ave Avould be to that extent amending it, Avhich is beyond our poAver.
That conclusion disposes of the case. The home rule charter read as one instrument, as it must be, is to the effect, so far as reapportionment is concerned, that Avhile the division into Avards and their boundaries Avas confirmed or established by the charter, it Avas subject to the poAver reserved to the council from time to time “to designate and redesignate the Avard boundaries * * * so as to keep the population of the various Avards * * * as nearly as may be equal.” That conclusion accords Avell Avith general practice. The task of reapportionment, as increases and shifts of population require, is everyAvhere left to ordinary legislation rather than the relatively unchangeable fundamental laAV of constitution or charter.
The charter is of course, as argued for plaintiff, supreme within its field. But like other laws, it seems to require construction from time to time. That is our present task—nothing more. We had a similar problem in Park v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 159 N. W. 627. The council is not in effect amending the charter. It is only exercising a charter power. Amish v. City of Phoenix, — Ariz. —, 282 P. 42.
Order affirmed.