The plaintiff assigns as error that the court below denied the right of the plaintiff to the specific conveyance of the land and denied making order requiring trustee to convey the land to the plaintiff and to restrain the defendant from reselling the said land. We think plaintiff’s assignment of error'cannot be sustained.
The principle upon which specific performance of a binding contract to convey land is enforceable, has no application to the successful bidder at a sale under the power contained in a mortgage or deed of trust of lands, during the 10-day limitation prescribed in C. S., 2591, there is no binding contract of purchase, and the bargain is- incomplete. Under the provisions of this section, the bidder at the sale during the period of ten days acquires no interest in the property itself, but only a position similar to a bidder at a judicial sale, before confirmation. He is only considered as a preferred bidder, his right depending upon whether there is an increased bid and a resale of the.land ordered under the provisions of the statute. In re Sermon’s Land, 182 N. C., 122; Cherry v. Gilliam, 195 N. C., 233.
C. S., 2591 is as follows: “In the foreclosure of mortgages or deeds of trust on real estate, or in the case of the public sale of real estate, by an executor, administrator, or administrator with .the will annexed, or by any person by virtue of the power contained in a will, the sale shall not be deemed to be closed under ten days. If in ten days from the date of the sale, the sale price is increased ten per cent where the price does not exceed five hundred dollars, and five per cent where the price exceeds five hundred dollars, and the same is paid to the clerk of the Superior Court, the mortgagee, trustee, executor, or person offering the real estate for sale shall reopen the sale of said property and adver*187tise the same in the same manner as in the first instance. The clerk may, in his discretion, require the person making such advance bid to execute a good and sufficient amount to guarantee compliance with the terms of sale should the person offering the advance bid be declared the purchaser at the resale. Where the bid or offer is raised as prescribed herein, and the amount paid to the clerk, he shall issue an order to the mortgagee or other person and require him to advertise and resell the said real estate, it shall only be required to give fifteen days notice of a resale. Resales may be had as often as the bid may be raised in compliance with this section. Upon the final sale of the real estate, the clerk shall issue his order to the mortgagee or other person, and require him to make title to the purchaser. The clerk shall make all such orders as may be just and necessary to safeguard the interest of all parties, and he shall keep a record which will show in detail the amount of each bid, the purchase price, and the final settlement between parties,” etc.
Under the provisions of C. S., 2591, the clerk of the court has no jurisdiction, except to order a resale of land sold under 'the power of sale in a mortgage, when, within the ten days required by the statute, the bid at the sale has been raised; and a mere statement made at the foreclosure sale that the purchase price be paid in cash upon confirmation, implies only that the cash would be required if the bid should not be raised in the amount and time prescribed by law. In re Mortgage Sale of Ware Property, 187 N. C., 693.
In Cherry v. Gilliam, 195 N. C., at p. 234-5, citing numerous authorities, the following observations are made: “It is provided in section 2591, that in the foreclosure of the mortgages the sale shall not be deemed to be closed under ten days, and if within this time an increased bid is paid to the clerk the mortgagee, by order of the clerk, shall reopen the sale, advertise the property as in the first instance, and make a resale; and that upon the final sale the .clerk shall issue an order to the mortgagee to make title to the purchaser. It has been held with respect to this statute that it was .enacted for the protection of the mortgagees when sales are made under a power of sale without a decree of foreclosure by the court; that it confers no power on the clerk to make any orders unless the bid is increased; that in the absence of such' bid no report is necessary; and that if an increased bid is paid, the clerk cannot make any orders until the expiration of ten days.” In re Bauguess, 196 N. C., 278.
Chapter 146, Public Laws 1915, relating to the resale of land was amended as follows: “Section 1. That chapter one hundred and forty-six, of Public Laws of one thousand nine hundred and fifteen be and the same is hereby amended by striking out all of section four and in*188serting in lieu thereof the following: ‘Section -4. That resale may be had as often as the bid may be raised in compliance with this chapter.’ ” The section stricken out was as follows: “That not more than one sale shall be required under this act.”
The plaintiff contends that plaintiff’s upset bid was duly advertised for 15 days. The bidding and sale therefore was open for 15 days and there was no other bid. No one was interested enough to appear within the 15 days, or at the expiration thereof, and the upset bidder became the last and final bidder. He can be held to his bid by the court, and has right to confirmation unless another bid is put upon the mortgaged premises on the sale day. Of course, if there was an advanced bid, then the sale would lie open 10 days. There being no such bid on the sale day, and the plaintiff having been declared the purchaser by the trustee and by the clerk of court, the plaintiff insists that the clerk could not cancel his first order of confirmation and order the resale, and that the plaintiff is entitled to an order of confirmation of the sale on 3 August, 1928, and upon full payment to a deed for the premises. ¥e cannot so hold. We do not think that the language or intent of the statute warrants plaintiff’s contention. The construction is too narrow.
The fact that plaintiff became the last, only and highest bidder at the third sale, and that his bid at that time was the same as his upset bid filed within ten days after the second sale, does not preclude another upset bid from being filed within ten days after the third or any other sale. .
The clerk had no power to make the order for the trustee to make deed to plaintiff until the ten days required by the statute expired. It was his duty under the statute to allow the bid to remain open for ten days and to see to it that resales be had as often as the bid was raised within the ten days and the statute complied with. Having no power to make the order, he very properly struck it out and upon an advance bid within ten days ordered a resale. The statute fixes no limit to the number of resales, which must be had as often as there is an advance bid within the ten days, and the statute complied with. It is a statute that does not hurt the mortgagee, but is beneficial to the mortgagor and often saves mortgaged property from being sacrificed. The judgment below is
Affirmed.