SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner-Appellant Victor Quiles appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that, inter alia, he failed to demonstrate that the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges violated his Equal Protection rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues presented for review.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Parker v. Ercole, 666 F.3d 830, 834 (2d Cir.2012). A writ may not issue for any claim that was adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly establishéd Federal law as deter*85mined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)). “The state court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner can rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” ' Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
In determining whether the prosecution has exercised peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, courts apply the three-pronged approach set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). First, the defendant has the burden of establishing a prima fade case of discrimination. Id. at 93-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. If the defendant satisfies this initial burden, the prosecution must then come forward with a race-neutral justification for the exercise of the challenge. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Finally, the trial court has the duty to determine whether the defendant has carried his ultimate burden of establishing “purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
On appeal, Quiles asserts that the state trial court failed to provide him with an adequate opportunity to argue his Batson motion with respect to prospective juror Frances Sinclair.2 As an initial matter, Quiles has forfeited this argument by failing to raise it at any time during the proceedings below.3 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“This Court has long held that a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition should be dismissed if the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies as to any of his federal claims.”). Regardless, the record does not support Quiles’ argument. Quiles initially raised his Batson challenge after the prosecution used a peremptory challenge to strike Sinclair. A back and forth ensued in which the prosecutor made arguments and the district court gave Quiles three chances to respond. Quiles cited as evidence of discrimination only the fact that the prosecutor had previously used a peremptory strike on a prospective juror described by Quiles as “dark-skinned.”4 J.A. 64. The court considered the parties’ arguments and concluded that there was no racial pattern in how the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges. It *86then denied the Batson motion. Later, Quiles renewed his Batson challenge with respect to “dark-skinned” venirepersons struck by the prosecution, including Sinclair. J.A. 182. When prompted by the court to explain how the strikes were discriminatory, Quiles argued that the prosecutor had given “no cause for the removal of these people, no reason to say why each one of these individuals should have been struck.” J.A. 188. Once again, the trial court denied the Batson motion based on Quiles’ failure to.establish a prima fade case. Quiles had multiple opportunities to present his Batson motion.
The trial court, moreover, properly ruled that Quiles failed to establish a prima fade case of discrimination. Aside from noting that Sinclair was African American, Quiles was unable to provide any facts showing that the peremptory strike was discriminatory. See United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 696 (2d Cir.1992) (“Reference merely to the face of one excused venireman, without more, is insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination.”). Although it is true that “striking even a single juror for a discriminatory purpose is unconstitutional,” Walker v. Girdich, 410 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir.2005), Quiles failed to meet his “burden of articulating the basis, both factual and legal, for [his] Batson challenge,” DeBerry v. Portuondo, 403 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir.2005).5
For these reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.