Division 1.
The question presented on this appeal is whether the appellant private hospital (The Good Samaritan Hospital, Inc.) is entitled to reimbursement from the County of Maricopa for emergency hospital services furnished to an escapee from the Arizona State Hospital. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the county and against the private hospital, based upon a record which showed that there were no disputed issues of fact.
On October 21, 1968, Timothy George (hereinafter “patient”) was found to be mentally ill by the Superior Court of Maricopa County, declared incompetent, and committed to the Arizona State Hospital until sufficiently restored to reason or otherwise discharged according to law.
He escaped from the State Hospital on December 4, 1968, and on December 6, 1968, was struck by an automobile and admitted to the private hospital in critical condition for emergency care. There is no dispute that the patient was an “indigent” within the normally accepted use of that term, or that, in the absence of his prior (and continuing) commitment to the State Hospital, the county would have been liable to reimburse the private hospital for all, or at least substantially all of the claim here involved.
The obligation of the county to provide for the hospitalization and medical care of the indigent sick arises out of statutory provisions to that effect.1 Likewise, *323the obligation of the county to reimburse a private hospital for emergency services rendered to the indigent sick arises out of statute.2 By the terms of the statute the obligation to reimburse is limited to emergency services rendered to “a patient qualified for such care and treatment under this article.” Looking to other statutory provisions in the same article we find the qualifications which generally govern the right to receive hospitalization and medical care at county expense in A.R.S. § 11-297, subsec. A as follows:
. . [N]o person shall be provided hospitalization, medical care or outpatient relief under the provisions of this article without first filing with a member of the board of supervisors of the county in which he resides a statement in writing, subscribed and sworn to under oath, that he is an indigent as shall be defined by rules and regulations of the state welfare department, an tin-employable totally dependent upon the state or county government for financial support, or an employable of sworn low income without sufficient funds to provide himself necessary hospitalization and medical care, and that he has been a resident of the county for the preceding twelve months.” (Emphasis added).3
From the foregoing statutory provisions it is readily apparent that reimbursement is required only where the county would have been initially responsible for furnishing medical care at county expense, and the emergency does not enlarge the county’s obligation, but merely justifies treatment in some other hospital subject to reimbursement.
Here the appellant private hospital contends that the patient is “an unemployable totally dependent upon the state or county government for financial support” within the meaning of § 11-297, subsec. A, and thus is a person qualified for care and treatment at county expense so as to make the reimbursement provisions of § 11-297.-01, subsec. B applicable. Taken literally, and without reference to other statutory provisions, appellant’s contention appears to have merit. However, the county contends that A.R.S. § 36-202 carves out an exception to the county’s general responsibility for the care of the indigent sick.4 *324We agree. As we have previously pointed out, the emergency reimbursement provisions of § 11-297.01, subsec. B do not enlarge the right to have medical care at county expense, but rather only create a method whereby private hospitals may be reimbursed by the county for services which the county was obligated to furnish, and presumably would have furnished, but for the emergency. Here, the patient was a ward of the state, and the State Hospital unquestionably would ordinarily be responsible for his medical care and treatment at the expense of the state.5 At the time of the accident, the patient was still legally committed to the State Hospital and subject to the provisions of § 36-202. The fact of escape is immaterial — if appellant’s interpretation of the statute were adopted, the cost of medical care for all state hospital patients would become a county expense regardless of whether the problem were to arise on or off state hospital grounds or be of an emergency or non-emergency nature. We do not believe that such was intended by the legislature. As a matter of social policy, it is perhaps unfortunate for appellant that the legislature has restricted the reimbursement provision of § 11-297.01 to county obligations, but the fact still remains that appellant is not entitled to reimbursement in the absence of statutory provision therefor, and under the statute here involved, the county is not required to reimburse appellant for medical expenses for which the county itself would not have been initially responsible.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
EUBANK and JACOBSON, JJ., concur.