Francis McMonagle appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage questioning the equitable distribution of marital assets, and Peggy McMonagle, his former wife, cross appeals an award of attorney’s fees to Francis. The trial judge made findings concerning the nature and value of the parties’ marital and nonmarital assets, and awarded the marital assets equally to each party. However, it did not reference the factors listed in section 61.075(1),1 which should be used in any contested case to justify any equitable distribution of mari*374tal assets, fifty-fifty or otherwise.2 Further, the trial judge expressly stated that he thought the final result of his decree was “inequitable because the Wife will have more than doubled her assets while the Husband’s will be cut in half.” We reverse.
The record in this case discloses that this was a short, incompatible marriage (less than two years), entered into by the parties when they were fifty-six years of age and it was (at least) a second marriage for both. All of the parties’ assets had been acquired prior to their marriage. Neither made any substantial contribution to the other’s income or assets during the marriage.
Francis put his residence, which he owned prior to the marriage (valued at $130,000), in their joint names, and also gave Peggy an interest in his certificates of deposit ($19,439.66) by putting them in joint names. Peggy had $60,000 in premarital assets, in which she retained the sole interest. The trial judge found Francis intended to make a gift to Peggy of one-half of his premarital assets. He concluded that Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So.2d 491 (Fla.1991) and § 61.075(5)(a)5 were controlling, and that they mandate an equal split of these gifted assets.
We think that is a misconception of both Robertson and section 61.-075(5)(a)5. The record supports the trial judge’s finding that a gift to Peggy was intended of Francis’ assets, and therefore they became “marital assets.”3 However, nothing in either the statute or Robertson requires an equal split of marital assets between the parties. That may be a “good starting point” 4 in some dissolution cases, but it should not end with an “inequitable result” in any case.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment appealed, including the award of attorney’s fees, so that the trial judge may revisit this case in its totality. In making an equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets, the trial judge should reference the relevant factors set forth in section 61.075(1).5
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DIAMANTIS, J., and WHITE, A.B., Associate Judge, concur.