The conviction is for the possession of intoxicating liquor and for the possession of equipment for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor.
The date of the offense was in November, 1919, subsequent to the date upon which chapter 78 of the Acts of the 36th Leg., Second Called Session (Vernon’s Ann. Pén. Code Supp. 1922, art. 588¼ et seq.), became effec-*951ti ve. That act of the-Legislature was amended by chapter 61 of the Acts of the 37th Leg., First Called Session, and as amended the -specific offense of possessing equipment for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor was omitted, and the definition of the offense of possessing intoxicating liquor was changed. We have heretofore, in numerous cases, expressed our views with reference to the effect of this amendment on both of these offenses and because of it have found it necessary to reverse judgments of conviction. The leading case touching equipment is Cox v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 234 S. W. 531; and among the leading cases touching the possession of liquor is Francis v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 235 S. W. 580. In Ex parte Mitchum (No. 6772, Tex. Cr. App.) 237 S.W. 936, recently decided, will be found a discussion of the necessity that in an indictment charging the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor there be an averment that the possession was for the purpose of sale. A further discussion of the matter is deemed unnecessary.
The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the prosecution ordered dismissed.