Opinion PER CURIAM.
The Reverend Clovis Carl Green, Jr., seeks leave to appeal in forma pauperis two orders of the district court entered March 10 and June 12, 1981.1 The first order *781Green seeks to have this court review is the district court’s denial of reconsideration of an order entered September 3, 1980, directing the clerk of the district court not to file any further papers submitted by Green.2 The second order amended the first to provide that Green would be permitted to file claims in the district court only upon payment of all filing fees plus a $100 cash deposit as security for costs. Because we hold that these orders violate Green’s statutory and constitutional rights of access to the courts, we grant the motions to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis and sua spontc vacate the district court’s amended order of June 12, 1981. We are in complete agreement, however, with the conclusion reached by the district court, and the other federal courts Green has besieged, that Green’s pattern of repetitive, frivolous and malicious filings constitutes a flagrant and serious abuse of the judicial process and must come to a stop. The injunctive order we direct the district court to enter today is designed to curb this abuse while observing Green’s constitutional rights of access to the courts.
I. BACKGROUND
Clovis Carl Green is in all likelihood the most prolific prisoner litigant in recorded history. In the last decade Green has filed between 600 and 700 complaints in federal and state courts.3 His litigious sojourns throughout the nation’s prison systems have been recounted and catalogued by many other courts.4 It will suffice for present purposes to observe that the vast majority of these complaints have concerned the terms and conditions of Green’s confinement in state and federal prisons, and more specifically, the activities of the Human Awareness Universal Life Church, of which Green is founder and sole reverend.5
Green apparently is not a wealthy man. The sheer cost in terms of time and money of submitting hundreds of complaints and *782petitions to prison authorities, district courts and appellate courts would generally be prohibitive. But Green has had the time (he has at all relevant times been incarcerated in prison) and he has not needed the funds. Section 1915(a) of Title 28 has allowed him to proceed in the district court in forma pauperis upon a showing by affidavit of inability to afford the usual fees or costs.6
Some of Green’s filings have been found by courts to be malicious and therefore have been dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).7 Many are patently frivolous and have been properly dismissed for that reason. Most of Green’s complaints are, as might be expected, duplicative of prior frivolous ones and therefore have not been entertained at all by the courts. Furthermore, it appears that such repetitive filings are a result of neither inadvertence nor forgetfulness. Rather, Green has deliberately flooded the courts with his complaints and petitions (and encouraged other prisoner-churchmembers to do the same), in a vain attempt to gain his release from prison.8
Ironically, Green appears to be his own worst enemy. Green’s ten-year sentence for rape, imposed by the Jackson County, Missouri circuit court in 1975, apparently was completed in 1980. United States v. Green, 630 F.2d 566, 567 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904, 101 S.Ct. 277, 66 L.Ed.2d 135 (1980). Although he has had prior scrapes with the law,9 Green would be a free man today were it not for the several sentences the district court for the Western District of Missouri imposed for contempt convictions in 1978 and 1979 stemming from Green’s writ-writing and jailhouse lawyering “on behalf of” his fellow inmates.10 If *783he does not abandon “his desire to prevent the federal court from being able to process its docket,” 11 he may well end up with still more jail time for his contumely.
Several circuits plagued by Green’s indefatigable litigiousness have resorted to extraordinary and novel remedies to halt this blatant abuse of the judicial process. See Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1981) (threat of contempt sanction if Green’s pattern should continue), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 646, 70 L.Ed.2d 623 (1981); Green v. Martinez, Nos. 81-9028 et al. (5th Cir. April 27, 1981) (order barring the filing of complaints or petitions accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis unless Green specifically alleges “constitutional deprivation by reason of physical harm or threat to Green’s person”), cert. denied, U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 299, 70 L.Ed.2d 146 (1981); Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 1980) (same, plus order requiring (1) verification of each complaint and petition and (2) inclusion in every pleading of a list of all causes previously filed on the same, a similar or a related cause of action); In re Clovis Carl Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (order directing clerk not to file any mandamus petitions submitted by Green challenging the regularity of district court proceedings).
This circuit unfortunately has not escaped Green’s attention. Green has filed thirty-eight complaints in the district court, eighteen of these in one year (1980).12 The most recent controversy grows out of a class action Green filed in the district court in April 1980 alleging harassment by prison officials of the Human Life Awareness Church and deprivation of constitutional rights. Specifically, however, Green injected into the complaint his own particular grievance, protesting his frequent transfer among federal prisons as an alleged effort to deprive him of access to the courts. The district court ordered the suit transferred to the Northern District of Georgia. D.D.C. Civ. Action No. 80-1039. Green sought re*784view of this order by way of mandamus.13 His motion for leave to file such a petition in forma pauperis was granted by a panel of this court. D.C.Cir. No. 80-8013 (May 19, 1980). Thereafter, the United States Attorney responded to the mandamus petition on behalf of the district court. The government’s response brought Green’s litigious history to the attention of the panel for the first time. This court denied Green’s petition and ordered “that the Clerk is instructed not to file any further papers submitted by this litigant.” D.C.Cir. No. 80-1760 (August 29, 1980).
In the interim the district court had dismissed twelve more complaints filed by Green. The district court issued a short opinion citing Green’s scorecard of abuse and the efforts of other courts to curb it. Green v. United States District Court, 494 F.Supp. 1037 (D.D.C.1980). Green appealed only the first five dismissals.14 Pursuant to this court’s August 29 order, the clerk terminated the dockets in these five unresolved appeals.15 See D.C.Cir. No. 80-8023 (Clerk’s order of September 9, 1980).
Following this court’s prophylactic order of August 29, 1980, the district court on September 3 opened a new docket, Misc. No. 80-0223, and issued an identical order prohibiting the filing of any papers submitted by Green. Green did not appeal this order. The Supreme Court declined to review by way of certiorari both this court’s August 29 order, 449 U.S. 904, 101 S.Ct. 277, 66 L.Ed.2d 135 (No. 80-5415, October 14, 1980), and the September 9 clerk’s order terminating five dockets, 449 U.S. 1064, 101 S.Ct. 790, 66 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980).
On March 9, 1981, Green submitted to this court a motion for reconsideration of the August 29 order. One day later, Green moved in the district court for similar reconsideration of the district court’s September 3 order. The district court denied this latter request March 26. On April 10, Green sought leave to appeal in forma pau-peris this denial of reconsideration. This court filed Green’s motion and assigned it a miscellaneous number, D.C.Cir. No. 80-8014.
In the interim this court had amended its August 29 order in No. 80-1760. As amended by order of March 6, 1981, this court instructed the clerk of th'is court
to review all pleadings and other documents submitted by this litigant upon receipt and to file and enter same on the docket, unless it appears that the tendered materials are repetitive or frivolous on their face in which case they are to be brought to the attention of the sitting motions division of this Court for appropriate summary disposition.16
The district court, now without the support of this court’s “no further papers” order, filed Green’s motion for modification of the September 3 order on June 12 in Misc. No. 80-0223 and amended its order to read that
Petitioner is permitted to file actions in this court provided he first pays all filing fees and for each action filed makes a cash deposit of $100 with the Clerk as security for costs.
Green noticed his appeal from this order on July 6.17 In his pro se motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, Green charges, citing only Bounds v. Smith, 430 *785U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), that the district court’s orders deprive him of his constitutional right of access to the court. Thus, these appeals seek judicial review of the constitutionality of the efforts of the district court to rid this circuit of the Reverend Clovis Carl Green, Jr. Ironically, these appeals do raise nonfrivo-lous issues concerning the scope of Green’s right of access to federal court. We thus must give Green still another day in court.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The right of access to the courts.
The Supreme Court recently stated, “It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1494, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Indeed, the Eighth Circuit, in In re Clovis Carl Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc), conceded that “[i]t is axiomatic that no petitioner or person shall ever be denied his right to the processes of the court.” That right of access to the courts, however, is neither absolute nor unconditional.
The scope of such a right depends in part on the nature of the suit. Although the right of access is most clearly established in cases involving a direct appeal from a criminal conviction, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358, 83 S.Ct. 814, 817, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) (indigent criminal defendant must be provided with appointed counsel at state expense); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 1168-69, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959) (filing fee as a prerequisite for filing direct appeal of an indigent criminal defendant held unconstitutional); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (trial transcript must be provided at state expense), the right of access extends to collateral review of criminal convictions, see, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961) (filing fee for habeas corpus petition unconstitutional as applied to indigent), and to civil cases involving a fundamental constitutional right, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (filing fee for divorce unconstitutional as required of indigent); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (right to obtain legal assistance to prisoner in prosecuting actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).18
Here, of course, no state or federal statute operates to deny Green access to the district court, whatever the nature of his claim. In fact, federal law specifically permits a person to proceed in the district court in forma pauperis, without prepayment of fees and costs, providing only that such person show by affidavit that he is unable to afford such fees or costs and that the claim or defense is neither frivolous nor malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (d). The district court’s June 12 order, however, suspends the operation of subsection (a) of section 1915. The order conditions the filing of an action upon the full payment of the filing fee plus the payment of $100 as security for costs. In the Supreme Court cases canvassed above, the major inquiries concerned the nature of the indigent litigant’s claim and the extent to which the challenged restriction or barrier (financial or otherwise) deprived that litigant of “meaningful access” to the courts. Here, the court’s order on its face is unlimited as to the nature of claims (the order appears to be equally applicable to civil complaints and habeas petitions, and to constitutional and non-constitutional claims) and a total barrier (no papers submitted by Green will be considered in the court without the full payment required by the order).
Although the district court expressly found that Green had “flagrantly abused the judicial process” — an observation not open to doubt — the court has in effect entered a conclusive presumption that anything Green submits to the district court will be duplicative, frivolous or malicious. While methods that other courts have em*786ployed to deter Green from continuing to harass them amount in effect to rebuttable presumptions that Green is submitting papers in bad faith, those orders have left the courthouse door ajar, if only slightly.
The determination of a court whether to allow one to proceed in forma pauperis must be made separately in every case. A district court cannot read out of § 1915(a) the discretion Congress placed with the district courts in any “suit, action or proceeding.” Although a reviewing court will seldom if ever dictate to the district court the manner in which the latter must exercise its discretion, it can and must compel the court to exercise it. See Steffler v. United States, 319 U.S. 38, 63 S.Ct. 948, 87 L.Ed. 488 (1943). Thus, any order that does not allow a district court the appropriate exercise of discretion under § 1915 is invalid. We therefore hold that the district court’s preclusive order of June 12 requiring the full payment of the necessary filing fee and a cash security deposit of $100 violates 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).19
Apart from the necessity of a case-by-case determination of poverty, frivolity or maliciousness, a court may impose conditions upon a litigant — even onerous conditions — so long as they assist the court in making such determinations, and so long as they are, taken together, not so burdensome as to deny the litigant meaningful access to the courts. In erecting a potentially prohibitive financial barrier that encompasses all civil suits including habeas corpus petitions as well as those involving a fundamental constitutional right, the district court’s order fails both of these requirements. First, the order does not purport to be and in fact is not geared to discerning whether each claim presents a new nonfrivolous issue. It appears that the district court and other courts that have interposed financial barriers as a method to deter Green assume not that Green will choose to file only those suits he truly believes are meritorious, but that he will not be able to meet the required filing fee. The court’s June 12 order therefore is simply punitive and is not designed to aid the section 1915 determinations. Second, because Green cannot comply with the court’s order if he is without the necessary funds, the order effectively denies Green any and all access to the district court. Even a new, nonfrivolous claim submitted in good faith would not be heard if Green could not meet the filing fee and cash deposit. This underscores the general inappropriateness of withdrawing the in forma pauperis privilege as a means to curtail the arrant abuse of that privilege and of the judicial process. On the one hand, Green is totally free to flood the courts with paper provided that he pays the going rate: orders erecting financial barriers are only as effective as the litigant is truly impoverished. On the other hand, these restrictions are clumsily overinclusive: if Green does not have the money to file a frivolous claim, he also does not have the money to file a legitimate one.
We hold, then, that the district court’s amended order unduly impairs Green’s constitutional right of access to the courts.
B. Guidance to the district court.
We sympathize with the frustration experienced by the district court here as well as by other district courts deluged with Green’s parade of pleadings, petitions, and other papers.20 Faced with just one litigant who has a fanatical desire to flood the courts — a litigant armed with materials paid for by the state, an in forma pauperis statute, and the United States Constitution — these district courts have had to respond with determination and imagination.
*787The singular nature of Clovis Carl Green’s abuse of the judicial process may explain why there is so little guidance for district courts in dealing with this problem. Yet the accumulated frustration of the federal judiciary and the present need to deter Green and others who may follow him require us to enter an order that is both effective and constitutional. We follow the lead of other courts21 but proceed in a somewhat different manner. The district court is directed to vacate its amended order of June 12 and to enter in its stead the following:
Petitioner may not file any civil action without leave of court. In seeking leave of court, petitioner must certify that the claims he wishes to present are new claims never before raised and disposed of on the merits by any federal court. Upon a failure to certify or upon a false certification, petitioner may be found in contempt of court and punished accordingly.
Our order is admittedly severe. But we believe severity is called for at this time. This court does not intend to be burdened and harassed by the frivolous and malicious filings that have become the trademark of Clovis Carl Green. We hope the genuine prospect of further incarceration that our order raises will send a clear message to Green to observe strictly the terms and conditions of this order or else risk another postponement of his release from prison. We are not relying on any hope of reforming Green, or of appealing to his reason; we are saying point-blank that if he continues to show his contempt for the orderly judicial process, that process will accord him further time in prison as summarily as the law allows.
We believe our order also meets the constitutional and statutory concerns outlined above. First, the order does not impose any financial restrictions that might operate to preclude Green from filing a new and legitimate complaint. Green is free to seek to proceed in the district court (and this court on appeal, if necessary) in forma pauperis. However, Green must in each case satisfy, in addition to the terms of the order, the requirements of section 1915. Second, Green is entitled to the processes of the district court to file any claim upon a satisfactory demonstration of the novelty of the claim and its bona fide nature. This condition is not at all onerous and certainly does not interfere with Green’s right of access. In determining whether a claim Green wishes to raise is a new one, the district court shall employ traditional notions of res judicata.22 Failure to certify that the claim has not been decided before in any federal court or a false certification will render Green in violation of this order and in con*788tempt of court. Although the penalty for any further abuse of the processes of this court is potentially substantial, the order does not preclude or even unduly burden Green from submitting a new and nonfrivo-lous complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court under review is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court with directions to enter the order set forth in this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.