It is provided by statute in this State that “the plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of action, of legal or equitable nature, or both, when they all arise out of the same transaction, or transaction connected with the subject of the action.” C. S., 507.
Construing the provisions of this statute, it has been uniformly held by this Court that if the causes of action united in the same complaint be not entirely distinct and unconnected, if they arise out of one and the same transaction, or a series of transactions forming one course of dealing, and all tending to one end, if one connected story can be told of the whole, the objection that there is a misjoinder of causes of action in the same complaint, although aptly made by demurrer to the complaint (C. S., 511 [5]), will not be sustained. In such case, the demurrer will be overruled. Hood v. Love, 203 N. C., 583, 166 S. E., 743; Shaffer v. Bank, 201 N. C., 415, 160 S. E., 481; Trust Co. v. Peirce, 195 N. C., 717, 143 S. E., 524; Cotton Mills v. Maslin, 195 N. C., 12, *543141 S. E., 348. In the last cited case, it is said by Brogden, J.: “The rule for determining misjoinder of causes of action is thus stated by Walker, J., in Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., p. 48: ‘the result of the decisions is that, if the causes of action be not entirely distinct and unconnected, if they arise on one and the same transaction, or a series of transactions forming one course of dealing and all tending to one end, if one connected story can be told of the whole, the objection of multifariousness does not arise.’ ” the decisions of this Court cited by Justice Walker in support of the rule stated by him in Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 48, 58 S. E., 603, are McGowan v. Ins. Co., 141 N. C., 367, 54 S. E., 287; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135, 52 S. E., 198; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224, 50 S. E., 659; Daniels v. Fowler, 120 N. C., 14, 26 S. E., 635; Cook v. Smith, 119 N. C., 350, 25 S. E., 958; Benton v. Collins, 118 N. C., 196, 24 S. E., 122; King v. Farmer, 88 N. C., 22; and Young v. Young, 81 N. C., 91.
In tbe opinion in tbe last cited case, it is said by Ashe, J. :
“Before tbis section of tbe Code (now O. S., 507), was adopted, tbe doctrine of multifariousness was generally understood by tbe profession, and as tbe Code bas in tbe main conformed to tbe equity practice, it may be well to look to those old landmarks for a guide through tbe mist tbat envelopes tbe subject.
“We find it held that if the grounds be not entirely distinct and unconnected; if they arise out of one and the same transactions or series of transactions, forming one course of dealing, and all tending to one end; if one connected story can be told of the whole, the objection of multifariousness does not arise. Story Eq. Pl., sec. 271; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313. And if the objects of the suit are single, and it happens tbat different persons have separate interests in distinct questions which arise out of the single object, it necessarily follows tbat such different persons must be brought before the court in order tbat the suit may conclude the whole subject. Salvidge v. Hyde, 5 Mad. Ch. Rep., 138. the same doctrine was laid down by Chancellor Walworth in the case of Boyd v. Hoyt, 5 Paige, 78. And in the case of Whaley v. Dawson, 2 Seb. & Lef., 370, it was held tbat in English cases where demurrers, because the plaintiff demanded in bis bill matters of distinct natures against several defendants not connected in interest have been overruled, there bas been a general right in the plaintiff covering the whole case, although the rights of the defendants may have been distinct; and so it was held in the case of Dimmick v. Vixby, 20 Pick., 368, tbat where one general right is claimed by the plaintiff, although the defendants may have distinct and separate rights, the bill of complaint is not multifarious. All these cases were decided upon the principle of preventing a multiplicity of suits, which was the object of the ‘clause’ under consideration.
*544“Applying the principles enunciated in the cases cited to our case, we are of the opinion the causes of action in the complaint were properly united and the first ground of objection taken by the demurrer cannot be sustained.”
It is not specifically alleged in the complaint in this action that the defendants entered into a conspiracy to binder, delay, and defraud their creditors, and that the deeds which the plaintiff seeks to have set aside and declared null and void for that reason, were executed pursuant to such conspiracy. However, an inference to that effect is permissible. Indeed, such inference from the facts alleged in the complaint is inescapable. In Trust Co. v. Peirce, 195 N. C., 717, 143 S. E., 524, it is said in the opinion by Stacy, C. J.:
“The one circumstance which differentiates this case from those cited by the defendants, especially Emerson v. Gaither, 103 Ind., 564, 7 Am. Cas., 1114, most nearly in point and upon which great reliance is put, is the allegation of a general course of dealing and systematic policy of wrongdoings, concealment, and mismanagement, virtually amounting to a conspiracy, in which the defendants are all charged with having participated at different times and in varying degrees. Cotton v. Laurel Parle Estates, 195 N. C., 848, 141 S. E., 339. A connected story is told and a complete picture is painted of a series of transactions, forming one general scheme, and tending to a single end. This saves the pleading from the challenge of the demurrers.”
There is no error in the order overruling the demurrer in this action. It is
Affirmed.