MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Counsel for defendant Brown filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging violation of the District Court of the Virgin Islands Speedy *627Trial Act of 1974 Plan for the Disposition of Criminal Cases (1978) (hereinafter the “1978 Plan”) which is based on the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq. (Supp.1982) (hereinafter the “Act”). Memoranda were submitted by both parties and oral argument was heard on May 5, 1982. The Court finds that Brown’s rights under the Act and under the District Court of the Virgin Islands Speedy Trial Act of 1974 Plan for the Disposition of Criminal Cases (1980) (hereinafter the “Plan”) were violated and, therefore, the information filed against Brown is dismissed without prejudice.1
FACTS
On December 1, 1981, Brown was arrested on charges of violations of Virgin Islands criminal law, and he was released on his own recognizance. On December 16, 1981, Brown was brought before the Territorial Court, Feuerzeig, J., presiding, where he was given his advice of rights and he was remanded to the custody of the Youth Services Administration. It is alleged by defense that Brown was then transferred to the Youth Rehabilitation Center in St. Croix pending a petition filed by the Virgin Islands Department of Public Safety to transfer the matter to the District Court because Brown “required adult prosecution.” Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Defendant’s Memorandum”) at 1. The petition was granted and Brown’s case was transferred to the District Court on February 2, 1982. Bail was set for $1,000.00, it was posted, and Brown was released from custody. Defense counsel alleges that as of that date, Brown had spent 49 days in detention. The file transferring the case to the District Court was received by the Clerk’s Office on February 11, 1982. The file was then forwarded to the U.S. Attorney’s Office the following day.
On March 25, 1982, the U.S. Attorney’s Office filed an information charging Brown with grand larceny, attempt, buying or receiving stolen property, possession of a firearm, assault in the third degree, and petit larceny.2 Brown was arraigned on March 31, 1982 and the date for trial was set for May 3, 1982. On May 3, 1982, this Court granted the Government’s motion to consolidate this matter with two other cases involving persons charged in the same incident.
DISCUSSION
Defense counsel argued that a memorandum by Chief Judge Christian to the Virgin Islands Bar, dated February 18, 1982 (hereinafter the “Chief Judge’s Memorandum”), reactivated the 1978 Plan which had been previously suspended.3 Counsel further argued that the 1978 Plan is applicable to Brown because the information filed against him was filed after the date of reactivation, and, pursuant to the Chief Judge’s Memorandum, the time limit as to when an information should be filed after *628arrest and the corresponding sanctions of the 1978 Plan apply. Because the information was not filed within the time limit permitted under the 1978 Plan counsel argued that in accordance with the Act and the 1978 Plan the information against Brown should be dismissed with prejudice.
The Government responded by arguing that the Act and the 1978 Plan do not apply to Virgin Islands offenses in the District Court because the Act refers specifically to federal offenses. The Government also argued that it did not question the authority of the Court to make rules in accordance with the standards of the Act, but the Court was not authorized to “adopt the mandatory dismissal of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3162 unless the Congress has conferred that power.” Government’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Government’s Memorandum”) at 2. Alternatively, the Government argued that should the Court find that the Act applies, the information should be dismissed without prejudice.
I.
APPLICABILITY OF THE PLAN AND ACT TO TERRITORIAL OFFENSES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The Government argues that the very language of the Act itself refers only to federal offenses. Section 3172(2) provides that the “term ‘offense’ means any Federal criminal offense which is in violation of any Act of Congress and is triable by any court established by Act of Congress ...” 18 U.S.C. § 3172(2) (Supp.1982).
The Plan adopts the time limits set forth in the Act to be applicable to all criminal offenses triable in the District Court which includes Virgin Islands offenses. Plan at II — 1. In a footnote, it is noted:
The District Court of the Virgin Islands hereby adopts this plan in compliance with Rule 50(b) [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure], thus extending all Speedy Trial Act standards to proceeding resulting from criminal offenses which are in violation of statues (sic) enacted by the Virgin Islands Legislature.
Plan at II — 3. Another section of the Plan provides that because the District Court of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction over both federal and Virgin Islands offenses,4 it has a “very high” criminal caseload. In order to prevent procedural differences between local and federal cases, the judges chose to apply the Act to all criminal cases before it.5
Rule 54(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to “all criminal proceedings in ... the District *629Court of the Virgin Islands ...” Fed.R.Crim.P. 54(a) (1981).6 More specifically, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern Virgin Islands crimes prosecuted in the District Court. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Solis, 334 F.2d 517, 519 (3rd Cir.1964).7 The District Court, by establishing and adopting the Plan, was acting pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires all district courts to formulate plans in accordance with the Act.8 The applicability of the Plan by the District Court to Virgin Islands offenses brought before this Court is permitted under Rule 54(a) and Solis.9 This Court, therefore, holds that, notwithstanding the Act’s definition of “offense” as “any Federal criminal offense,” the Act and Plan are applicable to all Virgin Islands offenses brought before the District Court.
The Government, while acknowledging that the Court may promulgate rules in accordance with the standards of the Act, questions the Court’s authority to impose sanctions. The Government argued that the dismissal sanction had not been conferred on cases involving territorial offenses.
The Virgin Islands’ Plan was prepared in accordance with the Act. The goals of the Plan, which parallel the goals of the Act, are, in pertinent part:
As required by [18 U.S.C. § 3165(b)], the planning and implementation process seeks to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases consistent with the time standards in the statute and the objectives of effective law enforcement, fairness to accused persons, efficient judical (sic) administration, and increased knowledge concerning the proper functioning of the criminal law.
Plan at I — 1. Sanctions are needed for the efficient judicial administration of the Plan. To establish rules or court procedure with no means of implementing or enforcing the *630rules would make the Plan meaningless and frustrate the purpose of the Act and Plan.
Moreover, § 3166 of the Act, in detailing what should be included in each District plan, provides that each plan shall include information regarding the implementation of the time limits and other objectives including the invocation of sanctions for noncompliance.10
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the application of the Act to Virgin Islands offenses in the District Court Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and § 3165(a) of the Act11 require the preparation of plans to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases in the District Court. Section 3166(b)(3) of the Act also requires that information about sanctions to be used to implement objectives, such as the time limits, be included in each plan. The Court, which is permitted by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and, hence, the Act to prepare a plan, also by those same sources has the authority to adopt the sanctions provided by the Act.12
II.
APPLICABILITY OF THE CHIEF JUDGE’S MEMORANDUM REACTIVATING THE PLAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Chief Judge Christian’s Memorandum to the Virgin Islands Bar dated February 18, 1982, provides as follows:
All are advised that the period during which this Court was relieved from the sanctions of the “Speedy Trial Act” has expired. To the end that there be orderly administration of the Act, it is hereby made known that from and after the date hereof, all persons arrested or charged with criminal offenses cognizable in the District Court of the Virgin Islands are entitled to full benefits of the “Speedy Trial Act.” The prescribed periods of limitation and all sanctions are now in full force and effect.
Brown was officially charged within the jurisdiction of the District Court when the information was filed with the Court on March 25, 1982. Because Brown was charged after the Plan was reactivated, he is entitled to the “full benefits of the ‘Speedy Trial Act.’ ” The Plan provides that no more than 30 days shall pass from the time of arrest until the filing of the information.13
The issue then becomes at what point was Brown arrested for the purposes of the Plan. Brown was arrested on December 1, 1981 and initially brought before the Territorial Court. Until the ease was transferred to the District Court, jurisdiction was retained by the Territorial Court. The “date of arrest,” then, becomes the date that the case came under District Court jurisdiction which was February 11, *6311982, the date of the filing of the case in District Court.14
As of that date, however, the Plan was still suspended and, in this case, the Court will not penalize the Government for failure to act prior to February 18, 1982, when there was no notice about the reactivation to the Bar.15 The Court also notes that there was some confusion regarding the Chief Judge’s Memorandum when it was released. For the purposes of determining the time period between arrest and the filing of the information pursuant to the Plan, the date of arrest is deemed to be February 18, 1982, the date of the Chief Judge’s Memorandum. Thirty five days had lapsed between the “date of arrest” and the filing of the information, in violation of the 30 day limit.16 The Government failed to comply with the Act and Plan, and, therefore, Brown’s rights under the Act and Plan were violated.
III.
SANCTIONS: DISMISSAL WITH OR WITHOUT PREJUDICE
This Court, under the Plan, may dismiss the information against Brown for failure to comply with the time limits.17 Dismissal may be with or without prejudice. Section 3162(a)(1) of the Act provides:
If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an offense, no .. . information is filed within the time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended by section 3161(h) of this chapter, such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors': the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.
18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) (Supp.1982).
The offenses involved, as admitted by the defense, are serious. The delay of three days, however, is not correspondingly serious to require a dismissal with prejudice. Moreover, as previously mentioned, there was some confusion regarding the Chief Judge’s Memorandum expressed by members of the Bar, and it also may have influenced the actions of the Government in prosecuting this case.
Defense counsel also claimed that because of the 49 day detention, defendant has lost his job, and, because of “lack of purposeful activity” on the part of the Government, defendant spent the Christmas holidays and a full month thereafter incarcerated. Defendant’s Memorandum at 6. At the time of the detention, defendant *632was not within the jurisdiction of the District Court. At all times that defendant was within the jurisdiction of the District Court, he was not in custody. The only delay pertinent to the Act in this matter is the three day delay in the filing of the information. Nothing was presented to this Court to indicate that the Government’s failure to timely file the information was more than mere negligence. There is, therefore, little or no adverse impact on the administration of the Act or on the administration of justice should Brown be reprosecuted. See United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 531-34 (7th Cir.1980). The Court is of the opinion that dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate sanction to apply-