287 Minn. 482 178 N.W.2d 897

STATE v. JOHN JOSEPH BOROUGH.

178 N. W. (2d) 897.

June 30, 1970

No. 41924.

*483 C. Paul Jones, State Public Defender, and Rosalie Wahl, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.

Douglas M. Head, Attorney General, and Jerome D. Truhn, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Heard before Knutson, C. J., and Nelson, Otis, Sheran, and James F. Murphy, JJ.

Sheran, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of conviction of the crime of escape in violation of Minn. St. 609.485.

The issue on appeal is whether a delay from June 16, 1967, the date on which appellant escaped for 5 hours from the custody of the Youth Conservation Commission, until October 14, 1968, when he was tried and found guilty of escape contrary to Minn. St. 609.485, subd. 2(1), as charged by an information filed October 7, 1968, constitutes such a denial of the right to a speedy trial as to justify or require a reversal of the conviction. Although the right to a speedy trial is not suspended by confinement as punishment for a different offense,1 we affirm the de-*484cisión under the facts of this particular case for these reasons:

Two applicable principles of law support the trial court:

(a) The established rule in Minnesota has been that a delay-in commencing a prosecution in a criminal case will not entitle the defendant to an absolute discharge in the absence of a formal demand by him or on his behalf that the prosecution be commenced or dismissed at some earlier point in time. State v. Robinson, 262 Minn. 79, 114 N. W. (2d) 737; State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153, 216 N. W. 787. Although a motion to dismiss the prosecution was made on defendant’s behalf on October 14, 1968, no attempt was made to show that a formal demand for an earlier prosecution had ever been made.

(b) The record does not adequately demonstrate prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay. The rule in this state has been that prejudice must be made to appear. See, State ex rel. *485Knott v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 305, 161 N. W. (2d) 617; State v. Hartman, 272 Minn. 58, 136 N. W. (2d) 543.2

Minn. St. 611.04 provides that when any person has been held to answer for a public offense, the court shall order the prosecution to be dismissed if an indictment is not found in the next term of court against the person so held unless good cause to the contrary is shown. We do not believe the legislature intended Minn. St. 611.04 to apply where a person accused of a crime is in custody for a different offense. It is clear to us that the legislature intended situations such as the present one to be controlled by Minn. St. 629.292, which establishes a procedure by which an imprisoned person can effectually request final disposition of any untried indictment or information pending against him in this state.

While we affirm the decision of the trial court in this case, it is imperative to emphasize the necessity of proceeding with the prosecution of criminal cases with utmost dispatch whether the person against whom the criminal charge is pending is incarcerated or not. It is now established that the failure of states to accord a speedy trial is a deprivation of the right accorded by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L. ed. (2d) 1; Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374; 89 S. Ct. 575, 21 L. ed. (2d) 607; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 26 L. ed. (2d) 26. *486While a delay of 18 months in accomplishing a prosecution does not constitute a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial under the facts of this case (see, United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 86 S. Ct. 773, 15 L. ed. [2d] 627), we recognize that in some situations a defendant suffering prejudice3 in fact resulting from a delayed trial may be entitled to insist upon a dismissal even though the formal demand heretofore required by our decisions has not been made in a technically adequate way.

In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Burger, who delivered the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30, 37, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 1568, 26 L. ed. (2d) 26, 32:

“The right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality on the need to have charges promptly exposed. If the case for the prosecution calls on the accused to meet charges rather than rest on the infirmities of the prosecution’s case, as is the defendant’s right, the time to meet them is when the case is fresh. Stale claims have never been favored by the law, and far less so in criminal cases. Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial.”

Affirmed.

State v. Borough
287 Minn. 482 178 N.W.2d 897

Case Details

Name
State v. Borough
Decision Date
Jun 30, 1970
Citations

287 Minn. 482

178 N.W.2d 897

Jurisdiction
Minnesota

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