SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Felipe Mulero, pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment granting the defendants’ summary judgment motions in his employment discrimination action; granting the motion of his appointed counsel, Brian J. Wheelin, to withdraw from Mulero’s action against the Connecticut State Department of Education (“DOE”); and denying his motion to appoint new counsel. On appeal, Mulero challenges the latter two decisions only, and thus has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s summary judgment decision. See LoSacco v. City of Middletorn, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that this Court “need not manufacture claims of error for an appellant proceeding pro se ” and that issues not raised in the appellant’s pro se brief were abandoned). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case.
We review the grant or denial of both a motion to appoint counsel and a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel for abuse of discretion. See Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir.2003) (motion to appoint counsel); Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 320 (2d Cir.1999) (motion for leave to withdraw as counsel). In ruling on a motion to appoint counsel, a district court “should first determine whether the [movant’s] position [is] likely to be of substance.” Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir.1989). In ruling on a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel, rules of professional conduct may “provide[] guidance for the court as to what constitutes ‘good cause’ ” for granting such a motion. See Whiting, 187 F.3d at 321. Pursuant to Rule 1.16(c)(6) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client when “the client insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”
Although Wheelin’s explanation for withdrawal was apparently made off *131the record, the record suggests that he determined that Mulero’s claims against the DOE lacked merit, and that Mulero disagreed with this determination. (See Order On Motion to Appoint Counsel, Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 92) (“Wheelin moved to withdraw because of Plaintiffs unwillingness to heed his advice concerning the merits and propriety of continuing with the action.”). Wheelin’s conduct would have been appropriate. Mulero alleged only that the DOE had denied his application for a teaching certificate, which would not render the DOE his employer under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 379 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that courts should apply “traditional indicators of employment under the common law of agency” in determining whether an entity is a plaintiffs employer under Title VII, including whether the entity “hired and compensated” the plaintiff and exercised a “direct, obvious, and concrete” level of control over the plaintiffs “day-to-day activities”); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448-50, 123 S.Ct. 1673, 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (employing a similar analysis with respect to the ADA). Accordingly, Mulero’s complaint against the DOE was likely meritless, providing Wheelin with good cause to withdraw under Rule 1.16(c)(6) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Wheelin’s motion to withdraw. For similar reasons, and after reasonably finding that Mulero was unlikely to follow the advice of another attorney, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mulero’s motion to appoint new counsel.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.