This case presents an unusual legal question: does a divorce proceeding with an incidental property action for revocation of a spousal donation abate upon the death of the donor spouse, or may the succession representative of the deceased continue to litigate the matter because of the property interest of the deceased spouse’s heirs? Mrs. Isabelle Larocca died while her appeal of the divorce judgment was pending and her succession’s executrix, a daughter from a previous marriage, was substituted for her. On its own motion, the court of appeal dismissed the appeal, declared that Isabelle’s death abated the entire action, and nullified a divorce judgment. We granted the writ because it appeared that the court of appeal erroneously applied the law and its decision would cause a material injustice.1
For the reasons which follow, we determine that because of the property rights involved, Isabelle’s appeal regarding the divorce judgment did not abate upon her death and the district court’s judgment of divorce is not null. We remand to the court of appeal to decide the merit of the appeal.
Isabelle and Carlo Larocca were married in September, 1971 and had no children *1001during their seventeen-year marriage. Isabelle had three children from a prior marriage. In 1988, the parties voluntarily separated. On November 28, 1988, a judgment of separation was rendered in favor of Carlo and against Isabelle based upon abandonment. Her asserted cruel treatment cause of action was dismissed by the district court in the same judgment which granted Carlo’s reconventional demand.
Carlo then moved to Lake Charles. Suspecting adultery, Isabelle hired private investigators to conduct surveillance of his activities. Carlo filed this suit for divorce in early 1989 on the grounds of a one year voluntary separation of the parties. Isabelle answered and reconvened, seeking a divorce based on adultery. Included in her reconventional demand was the allegation that Isabelle had donated to Carlo a substantial amount of property in Jefferson Davis and Calcasieu Parishes in contemplation of their marriage. In her demand, she sought revocation of the property donation, even though she stated her belief that a judgment in her favor (granting the divorce on the basis of Carlo’s adultery) would revoke the donations under the self-operative provisions of former Louisiana Civil Code Articles 156 and 159.2
The Legislature removed Article 156 and amended Article 159 in the recent revision of the divorce law. One effect of this legislation was to eliminate this provision in our law for the revocation of donations made to a spouse against whom a separation or divorce was pronounced. This change took place coincident with the elimination of judicial separations altogether, and all references thereto in the Louisiana Civil Code, effective January 1, 1991.3 Because this change regarding spousal donations was substantive rather than simply procedural or remedial, it is not retroactive. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So.2d 1331, 1339 (La.1978). Thus, the former provisions apply in the present case.
Isabelle’s evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of three investigators and that of her son-in-law. She presented circumstantial evidence of Carlo’s adultery.4 *1002At the conclusion of Isabelle’s case, Carlo moved for a directed verdict under La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B). The district court denied the motion. Carlo thereupon put on his evidence, which consisted of photographs showing the layout of the area surrounding the trailer where Carlo allegedly committed adultery, a photography expert disputing some of the testimony of the private investigators, and the testimony of his daughter, his good friend, his alleged paramour, and himself. On June 22, 1989, the district court found in favor of Isabelle, rendering a judgment of divorce based on Carlo’s adultery. The judge was unimpressed with the testimony of Carlo and his witnesses, including his alleged paramour, Ms. Nehrt, and was satisfied with plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence.
Carlo timely moved for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict for him at the conclusion of Isabelle’s case. He argued
that she did not carry the heavy burden of proof required of the person seeking to prove adultery, contending that uncorroborated testimony of private investigators is not sufficient to form the basis of a judgment. He cited McCartan v. Filkins, 134 La. 795, 64 So. 717 (1914) and Patrick v. Patrick, 212 So.2d 145, 146 (La.App.2d Cir. 1968), in support of this contention.5 Carlo claimed that the son-in-law’s testimony about an earlier incident was not sufficiently corroborative because the latter was unable to testify regarding how the truck came to be parked outside Mrs. Nehrt’s trailer on that occasion, how long it had been there, who was present in the trailer when the truck was parked outside, or that Carlo either arrived at or departed from the trailer on that occasion.6 Further, he argued that even the investigators’ testimony regarding the later incident in January, 19897 was itself contradictory and unbe*1003lievable. Among other things, they were not able to provide the court with a photograph of Carlo leaving the trailer (although they did furnish photographs of Ms. Nehrt leaving the trailer on one of the two mornings in January, 1989).
On July 31,1989, the district court granted a new trial for argument only and then reversed its prior judgment.8 Persuaded by Carlo’s argument, the judge decided that the testimony of the private investigators was not corroborated as “required” by McCartan v. Filkins, 134 La. 795, 64 So. 717 (1914). Annulling the first judgment, the district judge signed another granting a divorce on the ground of voluntary separation after restricting his re-examination only to the evidence presented in Isabelle’s case-in-chief (regarding the adultery allegation).
Isabelle timely appealed this latter judgment, and then died on December 27, 1990 while the appeal was pending. Her succession was opened in Jefferson Davis Parish. Beverly Matheson, one of her children by the prior marriage, was appointed testamentary executrix. Ms. Matheson obtained an order from the Third Circuit Court of Appeal substituting the succession for the appellant, her deceased mother. No objection to this substitution was made by Carlo, nor did either party raise the issues of mootness of the appeal or abatement of the action.
The court of appeal, on its own motion, declared that the death of Isabelle abated the entire action. 579 So.2d 1211. “[W]e determine that, considering this circumstance, this court should declare ex proprio motu that the trial court’s judgment, pending on appeal, is null and of no force and effect.” Id. The court relied upon La. C.C.P. article 428 and La.C.C. article 1766 which provide respectively:
Article 428. No abatement on death of party
An action does not abate on the death of a party. The only exception to this rule is an action to enforce a right or obligation which is strictly personal.
Article 1766. Strictly personal obligation
An obligation is strictly personal when its performance can be enforced only by the obligee, or only against the obli-gor. ...
The court also cited jurisprudential support for the abatement of divorce upon death of one of the parties. Arceneaux v. Arceneaux, 232 La. 494, 94 So.2d 449 (1957); Draper v. Draper, 554 So.2d 79 (La.App.2d Cir.1989). The court further explained that at the time of Isabelle’s death, when the action purportedly abated, the district court’s judgment was final, but not definitive; thus, that judgment had not acquired the authority of a thing adjudged. La.C.C.P. art. 1842 (since repealed by Acts 1990, No. 521, § 3, eff. January 1, 1991).
The dissenting court of appeal judge concluded that because substantial property interests are at stake, the divorce action should not abate upon the death of one of the parties, unlike the general rule that a strictly personal action abates upon death. He cited common law jurisdictions for support of his conclusion, as well as a Louisiana case involving the property rights of an adopted child.9
An action does not abate upon death of one of the parties unless the action is one to enforce a right or obligation which is strictly personal. La.C.C.P. art. 428. An *1004obligation is strictly personal when its performance can only be enforced by the obli-gee or enforced against the obligor. La. C.C.P. art. 1766. An action of divorce is a personal action which abates upon death of one of the parties. Arceneaux, supra; Draper, supra.
A party seeking a divorce and combining with that action a claim for revocation of a donation need not file a separate suit to have the donation revoked. Vaughn v. Coco, 409 So.2d 282, 285 (La.App. 1st Cir.1981). Prior to the recent repeal of La.C.C. art. 156, effective September 7, 1990 for mutually at fault spouses and January 1, 1991 for all spouses,10 the party at fault in a judicial separation lost all advantages and donations conferred by a marriage contract or made during the marriage.11 This rule has been judicially interpreted to include donations made in contemplation of marriage as well. Roy v. Florane, 239 La. 749, 119 So.2d 849 (1960). The effect of Article 156 (i.e., that the party at fault in a separation loses all advantages or donations made for or during the marriage by the other spouse) was adopted by reference in La.C.C. art. 159 12 to extend to fault via divorce action as well as separation. Succession of Moran, 535 So.2d 369, 373 (La.1988).
Thus, although Article 156 was repealed coincident with the legislative revision abolishing legal separations, it was in effect at the time of the Laroccas’ marriage, separation and divorce. The spouse found to be at fault in the separation or divorce judgments (before September 7, 1990) lost any advantages and donations previously made by the other spouse in contemplation of or during the marriage. Fargerson v. Fargerson, 593 So.2d 454 (La.App.2d Cir.1992).13 The revocation was self-operative under Articles 156 and 159 following a judgment of separation or divorce based on the fault of the donee spouse.
Louisiana jurisprudence has thus far not addressed the precise issue presented here: whether the death of one of the parties abates a divorce action to which there is appended an ancillary claim involv*1005ing property interests where resolution of the latter depends upon a determination of fault in the final divorce judgment. However, reference to the French sources concerning revocation of spousal donations because of fault sufficient to warrant separation or divorce provides some guidance for the resolution of this issue of first impression.
This court reviewed the history of Article 156 in Roy v. Florane, supra. In the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, Article 18 provided:
“In case of separation, any donation which the husband or wife may have made the one to the other, in consideration of their marriage, shall be void and without effect,.... ”
In the 1825 Civil Code, Article 18 was brought into conformance with Article 299 of the Code Napoleon, 1804, which provided:
“No matter what may have been the cause for divorce, excepting mutual consent, the husband or wife against whom it shall have been granted, shall lose all the advantages which the other party shall have made to him or her, whether by marriage contract or since the marriage.”
The court explained in Roy that:
“Article 156 of the LSA-Civil Code is consistent with the articles of [the Code Napoleon] providing for revocation of donations in consideration of marriage for cause of ingratitude.”
Roy v. Florane, 119 So.2d at 852, n. 2.
Planiol noted that under Article 955 of the Code Napoleon, the source article of the Louisiana Civil Code Article 1560 which enumerates the instances in which ingratitude can be found,14 the second cause for revoking a donation, “serious crimes, cruelty, and libel,” includes matrimonial infidelity. Marcel Planiol, 3 Treatise on the Civil Law 292 (1938). He also explained that:
The case law has been very liberal. It has considered the action for rescission implied in the action for divorce, for it the petitioner prevails in the divorce action, the gratuities fall automatically. Therefore heirs of a donor spouse have been permitted to continue the divorce action, extinguished by his death, as action for rescission.
Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
Moreover, when considering the operation of Article 299 (the source article for Louisiana Civil Code Article 156), Planiol stated:
Article 299 also produces its effect by operation of law. The law itself pronounces the forfeiture. “The spouse will lose” says Article 299. On the other hand, to obtain the desired revocation, a suit must always be brought against ungrateful donees. The revocation is obtained solely by judicial decree. The analogy however is quite striking. So much so that certain decisions permit the heirs of a spouse who died when a divorce suit was pending to resume it in order to obtain the revocation of liberalities on the ground of ingratitude.
Marcel Planiol, 1 Civil Law Treatise 706 (1959).
Similar to the French view, where property interests are at stake and one of the parties dies during the pendency of the appeal, most common law jurisdictions would allow the continuation of what would otherwise be a strictly personal action. Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Effect of Death of Party to Divorce Proceeding Pending Appeal or Time Allowed for Appeal, 33 A.L.R. 4th 47-62 (1984). For example, in Owen v. Owen, 208 Ark. 23, 184 S.W.2d 808 (1945), it was contended that the evidence upon which the judgment was based lacked corroboration and was not sufficient to support the judgment. The court held that although the death of one of the spouses pending an appeal would normally terminate the suit, because of the *1006property rights in the case which depended upon the correctness of the divorce decree, it was the duty of the appellate court to review the judgment in order to settle the property rights. Similarly, in Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830 (Tex.1969), the court held that where the property rights of the parties would be significantly affected depending upon whether the marriage was determined to have terminated by divorce or by death, the question of property rights did not become moot for purposes of appeal upon the death of one of the litigants.15
The author of the annotation cited above notes that it is important to distinguish between “the abatement of the appeal, as such, and the abatement of the whole pro-ceeding_” Annotation, 33 A.L.R. 4th at 52. In Nickerson v. Nickerson, 34 Or. 1, 48 P. 423 (1897), the wife obtained a divorce judgment against the husband giving her the title to an undivided portion of her husband’s property. After perfecting his appeal, the husband died. Counsel for both parties sought abatement: the husband contended that abatement of the appeal would place the spouses in the position they were in prior to the judgment of divorce, and the wife claimed that abatement would allow the judgment of the trial court to remain in full force and effect as a final determination of the rights of the parties. The court disagreed with both parties. It held that where the consequences of a divorce would affect the property rights of the parties, the heirs or representatives may have such an interest in the resolution of the litigation that the cause survives for the heirs, but only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the property interests had been properly decided by the lower court.
Although Louisiana courts have not dealt with this exact issue, they have protected others’ property interests in somewhat analogous situations by permitting the continuance of an appeal rather than considering an action abated. For example, the court in Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So.2d 611 (La.1973), aff'd, on rehearing, 307 So.2d 618 (La.1974), originally held that alimony was a civil effect of marriage in favor of a good faith putative wife when her husband was in bad faith. Then, the court discovered that the husband had died prior to release of the judgment. The judgment had been rendered against a deceased party; therefore, it was null. On rehearing, the court held that: “[T]he right of the plaintiff to the alimony past due is a property right which is not defeated by the death of the defendant.” Id. at 620.
Similarly, in Kirby v. Albert T.J., M.D., 517 So.2d 974 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied (in a 4-3 vote), 519 So.2d 107 (La.1987), the court of appeal permitted an adoptive father’s succession representative to continue with an appeal on the merits. The natural father was appealing the trial court’s judgment which granted an adoption by the adoptive father. The court of appeal emphasized the importance of the vested property rights in holding that the otherwise personal action did not abate upon the adoptive father’s death:
In view of these substantive rights [inheritance rights, survival action and wrongful death action beneficiaries] becoming vested in the respective parties, ... we are unable to accept appellant’s argument [i.e., that the petition of adoption is a personal action which should abate upon the adoptive father’s death] that the adoption should be disturbed because of the death of the adoptive parent, Michael Kirby.
Kirby, 517 So.2d at 977.
In the instant case, as in the ones discussed above, there exists a substantial property interest that distinguishes it from simply a divorce action without an incidental claim affecting property rights. If the second divorce judgment, the one in favor of Carlo (based on living apart for over one year) is found to be the proper and disposi-*1007tive judgment, Cario would continue to own the property.16 On the other hand, if the trial judge erred in granting the new trial, the first fault-based judgment in favor of Isabelle would perhaps be reinstated and, as a consequence, the spousal donation revoked.
The divorce action, a strictly personal one, abates upon the death of either of the parties. However, because of the inextricable property rights, which depend upon whether the first divorce judgment based on adultery was properly upset by the district court, this case did not abate upon Isabelle’s death. We therefore remand to the court of appeal to decide the merit of the appeal which is properly being pursued at this time by the executrix of the succession.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal which declared the Laroccas’ divorce action abated, nullified the judgment of divorce and dismissed the succession representative’s appeal. We remand to the court of appeal to decide the merit of the appeal and render judgment in the case.
REVERSED, REMANDED TO THE COURT OF APPEAL.
DENNIS, J., concurs with reasons.