This appeal is from an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment. No statement of facts accompanies the record. From the transcript, it appears that, in May, 1928, the respondent began an action against the appellant on a promissory note made and delivered by the appellant to the respondent’s assignor. The complaint, with the usual summons, was served on the appellant on May 18, 1928. On June 8, 1928, an amended complaint was filed and served on the appellant. The appellant did not appear in the action, and on June 19, 1928, the respondent moved for, and obtained, an order of default and a judgment against her; the judgment being for the amount stated in the amended complaint as being due on the note.
On November 20,1929, some seventeen months after the entry of the judgment, the appellant appeared by attorney and moved to set aside and vacate the judgment, basing the motion on the ground that the judg*427ment was void for want of jurisdiction, because tbe time allowed by law for tbe appearance of tbe appellant in tbe action bad not expired at tbe time of its entry. Tbe court entered an order denying tbe motion, and it is from tbis order tbat tbe appeal before us is taken.
From tbe dates above given, it will appear tbat, while more than twenty days elapsed between tbe time tbe summons in tbe action was served upon tbe appellant and tbe time of tbe entry of tbe judgment against ber, less than twenty days elapsed between tbe time of tbe service of tbe amended complaint upon ber and such entry.
Tbe appellant’s contention is, as we gather it, tbat she was not obligated to appear on tbe return day of tbe summons, but, because of tbe service upon ber of an amended complaint between tbe date of the summons and its return day, she bad twenty days after tbe time of tbat service in which to appear in tbe action, and any judgment entered in tbe action prior thereto is premature and void.
But we cannot follow tbe appellant in ber conclusions. We think it can be seriously questioned whether an amended complaint filed and served on a defendant prior to tbe return day of tbe summons extends tbe time for tbe appearance of tbe defendant in tbe action; but, waiving tbis, she is mistaken in ber contention tbat a judgment prematurely entered is void. Such is not tbe rule. A judgment prematurely entered is voidable, but it is not void. Chehalis Coal Co. v. Laisure, 97 Wash. 422, 166 Pac. 1158. Being voidable, it may be successfully attacked under certain conditions by a motion made within tbe statutory limit of time fixed for attacking judgments by motion, but after tbat time, tbe judgment becomes invulnerable to a motion.
*428Iii this instance, the motion was filed long after the statutory period for attacking judgments had expired. It was not accompanied by any showing of fraud or concealment on the part of the plaintiff, or excusable neglect on her part. It was based wholly on the face of the record, from which it appears that the judgment might possibly have been prematurely entered. This was not enough to warrant setting aside the judgment.
The order of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is so directed.
Mitchell, C. J., Holcomb, Main, and French, JJ., concur.