— The State appeals a trial court order *642suppressing marijuana that police obtained pursuant to a search warrant. The trial court declared the search warrant insufficiently particular because it did not identify marijuana as the item to be seized. Rather, it allowed police to search for "any and all controlled substances.” Concluding that the warrant satisfies Fourth Amendment particularity requirements, we reverse.
FACTS
Police Detective Kevin Jepson applied for a search warrant for Mark Chambers’s residence. In the affidavit of probable cause supporting the application, Jepson recited facts that caused him to believe that Chambers was growing marijuana at the residence. A superior court judge issued the search warrant.
The warrant had the following caption: "SEARCH WARRANT FOR FRUITS/ INSTRUMENTALITIES OF A CRIME: VIOLATION OF THE UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ACT.” The warrant allowed the police to search for "any and all controlled substances,” along with related items such as those used for growing, selling, storing, ordering, transporting, manufacturing, purchasing, and distributing controlled substances; proceeds from the manufacture, possession, and distribution of controlled substances; weapons and ammunition for the protection of the premises from law enforcement; and indicia of ownership or dominion and control of the premises. The warrant did not expressly incorporate the affidavit by reference.
Jepson executed the warrant and seized more than 40 grams of marijuana, various items of drug paraphernalia, $3,000 in cash, and a number of weapons. The affidavit was not physically attached to the warrant at the time of execution.
Following a CrR 3.6 hearing, the trial court found the affidavit to be adequate but held that the warrant was facially invalid because it did not specify marijuana as the *643particular controlled substance to be seized. The court also declined to find in Washington law a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Thus, it granted Chambers’s suppression motion and dismissed the marijuana possession charge. The State appeals these rulings.1
DISCUSSION
When confronted with a challenge to a search warrant on particularity grounds, we conduct a de novo review. State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 549, 834 P.2d 611 (1992).
The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants be based "upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The particularity requirement serves to prevent general searches; the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption they fall within the issuing magistrate’s authorization; and the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927); Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 545; 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(a), at 234-36 (2d ed. 1987).
We determine the validity of a search warrant on a case-by-case basis; the constitutional requirements are met if the warrant describes the property with reasonable particularity under the circumstances. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 546-47. The required degree of particularity depends upon the nature of the materials sought and the circumstances of each case. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 547; State v. Olson, 32 Wn. App. 555, 557, 648 P.2d 476 (1982). Courts are to evaluate search warrants in a commonsense, practical manner, rather than in a hypertechnical sense. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 549. Although the officers executing the warrant must be able to identify the things to be seized *644with reasonable certainty, United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 277 (7th Cir. 1992), "[t]he fact that a warrant lists generic classifications . . . does not necessarily result in an impermissibly broad warrant.” State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 692, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997).
We review a warrant describing physical objects with less scrutiny than we use for a warrant for documents because the former involves less potential for intrusion into personal privacy. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 692; Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976). When a warrant lists items protected by the First Amendment, courts demand the highest degree of particularity. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 547; Gonzales v. State, 577 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). If items such as books or films are the subject of the search, the particularity requirement " 'takes on special importance.’ ” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 548 (quoting LaFave, supra). Thus, in Perrone, a case involving child pornography, the court applied the higher standard of "scrupulous exactitude” to a warrant authorizing the seizure of "photographs, movies, slides, video tapes, magazines or drawings of children or adults engaged in sexual activities or sexually suggestive poses” and held the warrant to be overbroad. 119 Wn.2d at 543, 550, 558.
In addition, courts evaluating alleged particularity violations have distinguished between property that is "inherently innocuous” and property that is "inherently illegal.” Olson, 32 Wn. App. at 557-58; Carlton v. State, 418 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 4.6(a), at 550 (3d ed. 1996). A lesser degree of precision may satisfy the particularity requirement when a warrant authorizes the search for contraband or inherently illicit property. State v. Clark, 281 N.W.2d 412, 416 (S.D. 1979). Thus, a warrant describing property alleged to have been stolen must be more specific than one describing controlled substances. Olson, 32 Wn. App. at 558 (citing Gonzales v. State, 577 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. (1979)).
*645There is a sound rationale for this distinction — the risk of an invasion of constitutionally protected privacy is minimal when there is probable cause to search for a controlled substance. Officers executing a warrant for marijuana are authorized to inspect virtually every aspect of the premises. Olson, 32 Wn. App. at 558-59. If, during their search they discover another illegal substance, the nonspecified substance would be subject to seizure under the plain view doctrine. Olson, 32 Wn. App. at 559) (citing State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 713-20, 630 P.2d 427 (1981)). Thus, officers executing the warrant at hand had no broader discretion to search than they would have had if the warrant had specified "marijuana.”
To reach its conclusion that the warrant here was unconstitutionally general, the trial court relied upon State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 28, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993), and three Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cases: Center Art Galleries-Haw., Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986); and United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1982). But we find the warrants at issue in those cases to be distinguishable in several critical ways. First, those warrants all authorized the seizure of items protected by the First Amendment. Thus, the highest degree of particularity was necessary. Second, the warrants did not indicate the specific crime under investigation. Thus, the discretion of the officers executing the affidavit was not limited by the crime at issue.2 And third, unlike here, the items described were neither contraband nor inherently illegal. Carlton, 418 So. 2d at 450; Clark, 281 N.W.2d at 416. Because of the type of items sought and the type of crimes involved, the courts were concerned that there was no way to "distinguish items used lawfully from those the *646government had probable cause to seize.” Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 964.
In Riley, the crime under investigation was computer trespass. The search warrant authorized the seizure of any "fruits, INSTRUMENTALITIES and/or evidence of a crime, to-wit: notes, records, lists, ledgers, information stored on hard or floppy discs, personal computers, modems, monitors, speed dialers, touchtone telephones, electronic calculator, electronic notebooks or any electronic recording device.” Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 26 (emphasis added). Although the warrant contained this broad list of constitutionally protected items, it failed to identify the crime under investigation or any other crime. And it was not possible to infer the crime from the described items. Further, there was no reasonable way to determine which of the "inherently innocuous” items on the list were subject to seizure. The court held that "[a] search warrant that fails to specify the crime under investigation without otherwise limiting the items that may be seized violates the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 27.
By contrast, the warrant here contained the caption, "Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act.” It then further indicated the crime under investigation by identifying, as items to be seized, "any and all controlled substances.” RCW 69.50.401(a) is the statute that criminalizes the manufacture, delivery, or possession of controlled substances, including marijuana. Reading the warrant as a whole and in a commonsense, nonhypertechnical manner, it is clear that RCW 69.50.401(a) was the crime under investigation and that the search was circumscribed by reference to the crime. Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 28.
Further, the warrant here limits the items subject to seizure. In seven of its nine subparagraphs, the items subject to seizure relate to controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, drug transactions, or drug manufacturing. The other two subparagraphs specifically relate to necessary proof of the crime under investigation. In contrast to *647Riley, this warrant limited police officer discretion. And significantly, the items here were contraband, unlike the "inherently innocuous” computers and electronic equipment in Riley.
We agree with the reasoning of the court in a similar case, State v. Christiansen, 40 Wn. App. 249, 698 P.2d 1059 (1985). In Christiansen, the police had probable cause to believe there was a marijuana grow on the defendant’s property, but the search warrant authorized the search and seizure of "all evidence and fruits of the crime(s) of manufacturing, delivering or possessing controlled substances . . . .” 40 Wn. App. at 251. In response to an overbreadth challenge, the court stated:
The fact the warrant could have been more precise in terms of identifying marijuana as the focus of the search does not affect its validity, since reasonable particularity is all that is required. State v. Olson, supra at 557; State v. Cohen, 19 Wn. App. 600, 604, 576 P.2d 933, review denied, 90 Wn.2d 1022 (1978); State v. Salinas, 18 Wn. App. 455, 458, 569 P.2d 75 (1977); State v. Cowles, 14 Wn. App. 14, 19, 538 P.2d 840, review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1004 (1975); State v. Withers, 8 Wn. App. 123, 126-27, 504 P.2d 1151 (1972). The description of the items to be seized was confined to evidence of the suspected crime. A grudging and overly technical requirement of elaborate specificity has no place in determining whether a warrant satisfies the Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity. State v. Withers, supra at 126, 504 P.2d 1151.
Christiansen, 40 Wn. App. at 254.
Christiansen is in accord with the decisions of numerous courts from other jurisdictions. See Spears, 965 F.2d 262; United States v. Sierra, 585 F. Supp. 1236 (D.N.J. 1984); United States v. Rubio, 526 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Carlton v. State, 449 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1984); Hagler v. State, 726 P.2d 1181 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); Clark, 281 N.W.2d 412. Applying reasoning similar to ours, these courts have concluded that a warrant for controlled substances does not allow for "abuse and unbridled discretion by law enforcement personnel or allow[] for a 'general *648search’ . . . .” Carlton, 449 So. 2d. at 252. The courts have upheld these warrants based upon their determination that a hypertechnical reading would not further the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Sierra, 585 F. Supp. at 1237. The situation is the same here: to reject the warrant because it used the word "marijuana” instead of the phrase "controlled substance” would elevate form over any substantive enhanced privacy protection. Thus, we conclude that the warrant here satisfies constitutional particularity requirements.3
Notwithstanding the above holding where the police have probable cause to believe that a specific controlled substance will be found at a location, the preferred practice is to identify that substance specifically. Under the circumstances here, however, the failure to do so was not constitutionally fatal.
Because we hold the warrant satisfied the particularity requirement, we need not address the State’s alternative argument that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.
*649We reverse the trial court’s ruling granting Chambers’s motion to suppress and dismissing the charge against him and remand for trial.
Hunt, J., concurs.