I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Philip Lanham, was convicted of murdering his wife and tampering with physical evidence of his crime. He was sentenced to life in prison. He claims that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear an unedited recording of his confession wherein a police officer repeatedly accused him of lying, in admitting inflammatory entries from the victim’s diary, and in refusing to grant him a new trial based on prejudice stemming from the actions of the victim’s family in the courtroom. Because we hold that the officer’s comments were necessary to provide context for Appellant’s response, and because Appellant’s other claims that were preserved for our review were not prejudicial, we affirm Appellant’s convictions.
II. BACKGROUND
Appellant and his wife called 911 several times between October 5 and October 11, *172001. During the first call, Appellant claimed that his wife had mental problems and was suicidal, and he asked that an ambulance be sent to take her to the hospital. The 911 dispatcher told Appellant that he would have to pay for the ambulance if his wife refused to go to the hospital. Appellant’s wife got on the phone and told the dispatcher that she wanted to go to the hospital, but that she was not sure that she was sick. The dispatcher then told Appellant that he needed to obtain a mental health warrant from the sheriffs office. Appellant declined to do so because he had no one to stay with his wife.
Several days later, Appellant’s wife called 911. She stated that her husband was trying to force her out of the house. She then said she would call back and hung up the phone. The dispatcher tried to call back, got no answer, and tried to contact the state police. Appellant’s wife then called 911 again, and the dispatcher told her that the sheriffs department would be sending someone to the house. Appellant’s wife also said that Appellant was trying to kick down her door, that they had both been drinking all day, and that while Appellant did not have a weapon, there were loaded weapons in the house. A sheriffs deputy arrived at Appellant’s house around 11:00 p.m. Both Appellant and his wife were drunk. The deputy later testified that Appellant’s wife had no visible injuries and that she refused his offer to take her somewhere else or to call someone to come pick her up. There was another 911 call from Appellant’s house later that night, but Appellant’s wife called again and said that a sheriffs deputy need not come out to the house.
The next day, two Kentucky State Police Troopers went to Appellant’s house to do a “welfare check.” Appellant’s wife was drunk, and Appellant was cleaning the house. Both Appellant and his wife said they were fine, and neither had any injuries.
Appellant called 911 again on the evening of October 11, 2001. He told the dispatcher that his wife had fallen asleep, that she was barely breathing, and that she looked like she had frozen to death. He also said that he thought she had hypothermia and asked that an ambulance be sent.
Two volunteer firefighters, Shannon Causey and Carl Gadd, and two state police officers, Trooper Mike Ashley and Detective Robert Stephens, responded to Appellant’s call. When they entered the house, they noticed that there was blood on the carpet and that two large potted plants had been turned over. The house was warm and smelled of bleach. Appellant’s wife was in bed with the blankets pulled up to her neck. She had bruises and lacerations on her face and blood on her mouth. She was not breathing and had no pulse. Appellant’s wife was dead.
Appellant showed no emotion when Cau-sey informed him that his wife was dead. Appellant asked Trooper Ashley if she had died of hypothermia. Trooper Ashley said that he did not know how she died, but that she had bruises on her head. Appellant also asked how to go about contacting someone about his wife’s life insurance policy. Appellant told the troopers that his wife had gotten drunk the night before, fallen down several times, and then passed out. Appellant said that he also had gotten drunk and passed out. Appellant claimed that when he woke up on the morning of October 11, his wife was on the floor beside him. He put her in bed and cleaned the house. He claims that he decided to call 911 when he noted that she was not getting any better.
Trooper Ashley noticed that Appellant had a cut on his forehead, some small cuts on his hands, some bruises under his right *18arm and on his side. Appellant’s face looked somewhat yellow, but there were no noticeable bruises on it. He also had a large bruise at his collarbone, a scrape on his shin, and an injury to his left foot.
Trooper Stephen conducted a taped interview of Appellant later in the evening. During the interview, Appellant stated that he and his wife split half a case of beer on October 10. He claimed that he fell asleep on the couch and that his wife was still awake at that time. When he awoke the next morning, his wife was passed out on the floor beside him, so he moved her to the bed. Appellant initially said that he knew his wife was dead when he moved her; later he said that he thought she had been asleep. He again admitted to cleaning the house after moving his wife, but stated that he had done so because they had torn the house up while drunk. Appellant also said that his wife had fallen down repeatedly and had hit “corners” because she was so drunk. Later in the interview, Appellant claimed that his wife had frozen to death. He also claimed that he and his wife had not been fighting, and that “everything was a blackout,” his memory was fuzzy, and he could not really remember what had happened.
Toxicological testing indicated that Appellant had no alcohol in his blood, but that he had taken valium. A t-shirt, which was partially burned and had a substance that appeared to be blood on it, was later found in the microwave at Appellant’s house. A blood stained pillow was also found in the house. Testing showed that the blood on the carpet near the front window was similar to the victim’s. Blood similar to Appellant’s was found on the pillow, the couch, the carpet in the bedroom, a towel in the washing machine, and the bath mat. Tests of the substance on the t-shirt were inconclusive.
Appellant was indicted for murdering his wife and for tampering with physical evidence. At trial, the taped interview was played and excerpts of Appellant’s wife’s journal were read to the jury.
The medical examiner testified that an examination of the victim’s body revealed a variety of external bruises and contusions. The victim also had small hemorrhages on her face, neck, and inside her lower eyelids, all of which were consistent with smothering, choking, or strangling, and hemorrhages in her scalp, her aorta, and the muscles in her neck. The medical examiner concluded that she had died from asphyxia caused by smothering or suffocation due to compression of the nose and mouth. The medical examiner also found that she had alcohol and valium in her blood.
Appellant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal, which was denied. The jury found Appellant guilty of Murder and Tampering with Physical Evidence and recommended sentences of life in prison and five years. Ten days after trial, Appellant filed a motion to set aside his sentence because the victim’s family had been crying when photos of the crime scene were shown and because they had allegedly appeared in court during the sentencing phase wearing buttons with photographs of the victim on them. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant was finally sentenced to life in prison for the murder and five years, to run concurrently, for tampering with physical evidence. He appeals to this Court as a matter of right.1
III. ANALYSIS
A. Comments by Detective Stephens During Appellant’s Taped Interview
*19Appellant’s first claim of error is that the trial court improperly allowed the Commonwealth to play an unedited version of his audiotaped interrogation. During the last three-fourths of the interrogation, Detective Stephens made repeated statements to Appellant about whether Appellant was telling him the truth. All told, the taped interrogation includes at least fifteen such statements by the detective, including that Appellant had “better start telling the truth,” that “the only way out is to tell the truth,” that Appellant was “not telling the truth,” that the jury would not believe Appellant, and that Appellant was “lying.”
Between and in response to the detective’s comments, Appellant’s story of what happened on the night his wife died shifted repeatedly. For example, Appellant first stated that he only had three beers, but then stated that he had been drunk. He claimed that when he woke up, he knew his wife was dead; but in response to the detective’s comments, he then claimed that he thought his wife was asleep. As the interview progressed, Appellant gave details about what allegedly happened that night, e.g., that his wife had received the many marks and bruises on her body from falling down and running into corners because she was so drunk, yet later he claimed that everything from the evening before “was a blackout” and that everything was fuzzy. Near the end of the interview, Appellant repeated his assertion made before the interview started by stating that he thought his wife had “frozen to death.” And at the end of the interview, Appellant simply stated: “I really can’t remember.”
When the taped statement was played to the jury, Detective Stephens’s comments were left intact. The jury heard his repeated comments about Appellant’s truthfulness during the interview along with Appellant’s shifting, inconsistent story.
1. Preservation of the Issue
Before we can address the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must determine if the error was properly preserved for appellate review. Before trial, Appellant’s lawyer made an oral motion in limine to exclude Detective Stephens’s extensive commentary. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion, ruling that the comments were “just part of typical police interrogation techniques” and that they would have to be addressed in closing argument. Appellant did not object again when the prosecutor sought to play the tape at trial.
The Commonwealth claims that Appellant did not preserve this issue because he did not object to the unedited tape during trial. Appellant cites to Tucker v. Commonwealth,2 where we held:
While this Court has approved the use of motion in limine as a means of obtaining pretrial rulings concerning the admission and exclusion of evidence, we have not repealed the contemporaneous objection rule. One claiming error may not rely on a broad ruling and thereafter fail to object specifically to the matter complained of. When trial counsel is aware of an issue and fails to request appropriate relief on a timely basis, the matter will not be considered plain error for reversal on appeal.3
Despite the fact that KRE 103(d), which was in effect at the time Tucker was rendered, states that a “motion in limine re*20solved by order of record is sufficient to preserve error for appellate review,” our decisions have increasingly read Tucker, which did not cite the recently enacted KRE 103(d), in an expansive manner.4
This expansive reading of Tucker has come under increasing criticism.5 Such criticism is not a sufficient reason for us to overrule a nearly decade old case. However, Tucker also conflicts with some of our other cases that have held that a motion in limine overruled by an order of record is sufficient under KRE 103(d) to preserve an error.6 These cases have all been rendered since the enactment of the rules of evidence, unlike the cases upon which Tucker is based. Also, as Tucker’s critics have pointed out, and as a quick perusal of the rule reveals, Tucker and its progeny have exceeded the express language of KRE 103(d). As such, there is a clear conflict between some of our decisions and the express language of the rule and among our own cases since the introduction of the rule. This conflict has, no doubt, confused the bar and merits our reconsideration to remedy the inconsistency in our law.
Though Tucker is correct in that we have not repealed the contemporaneous objection rule, it is clear from the language of KRE 103(d) that the rule has, in effect, been modified. Also, as observed in The Study Committee Notes to the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, also known as the Commentary, KRE 103(d) “eliminates [the] *21doubt [as to whether an error has been preserved by a motion in limine] by providing that motions in limine resolved by order of record are sufficient to preserve errors for appellate review.”7 While the Commentary is not binding on this Court, it is useful in interpreting the rules.8 More importantly, however, we cannot ignore the plain language of the rule.9 Thus, we resolve the conflict in our case law in favor of the plain language, and to the extent that Tucker and its progeny may contradict the plain language of the rule, they are overruled.
This is not to say, however, that a blanket motion in limine is sufficient to preserve an error for appellate review. As Tucker correctly observed:
An objection made prior to trial will not be treated in the appellate court as raising any question for review which is not strictly within the scope of the objection as made, both as to the matter objected to and as to the grounds of the objection. It must appear that the question was fairly brought to the attention of the trial court.... One claiming error may not rely on a broad ruling and thereafter fail to object specifically to the matter complained of.10
Our other cases have similarly limited KRE 103(d). For example, in Davis v. Commonwealth,11 we noted that a motion in limine challenging “the presentation of any evidence supporting the Commonwealth’s theory of the case without specifying any other reason why a particular fact should be suppressed”12 was insufficient to preserve objection to the introduction of specific items of evidence because they were not addressed by the broad objection embodied by the motion in limine. We noted, in what amounts to an extension and clarification of the rule in Tucker, that:
Usually, a motion in limine requests an advance ruling on a specific evidentiary fact, not a theory of the case requiring proof by multiple facts. Where a party specifies what evidence should be suppressed and why, the question has been “fairly brought to the attention of the trial court” and the trial court’s ruling preserves the issue for appeal. In that scenario, the opponent of the evidence need not object when the same evidence is offered at trial. However, the same principle does not apply to broad, generic objections.13
More recently, in Metcalf v. Commonwealth,14 we held that a specific motion in limine properly preserves an issue for appeal and we explained the intersection of Davis and Tucker:
As explained in Davis v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.Bd 709, 722-23 (Ky. 2004), Tucker applies when the motion in limine is directed at a general area of inquiry, sometimes referred to as a *22“class of evidence,” Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 1.10[3][f], at 36 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2003), not a particular evidentiary fact. Appellant’s motion in limine and the trial court’s rulings thereon covered testimony regarding particular evidentiary facts and thus properly preserved all three of these issues for appellate review.15
Some commentators have noted that such a limited reading of KRE 103(d) contradicts KRE 103(a)(l)’s allowance of general objections as sufficient to preserve an error for appeal.16 Such a reading, however, is supported by the Commentary:
It should be noted a motion in limine would not be sufficient to preserve errors for appellate review unless it provided the trial court with the type of information which would be required to preserve errors at trial (i.e., information sufficient to satisfy the requirements of subdivision (a) — the specific ground for the objection being made and the substance of any evidence being offered).17
This is because of the nature of a motion in limine: it is primarily a pretrial tool aimed, in essence, at “heading off at the pass” the introduction of evidence. KRE 103(a)(1) allows a general contemporaneous objection during trial to preserve an error for review because it is usually clear from the context what the grounds for the objection are (and if they are not, the rule provides that the trial judge can ask for grounds). But motions in limine cannot function in this manner because they are not contemporaneous with the introduction of the evidence that they are aimed at. If motions in limine are not required to be specific, then KRE 103(d) could be turned into a catch-all, allowing the preservation of all manner of errors through the artful use of vague, broad motions in limine. This is clearly not what was intended by the rule. Thus, we reaffirm the portion of Tucker, as extended by Davis and Metcalf, that requires a motion in limine to specify the evidence objected to in order to preserve an error for appeal.
Under this rule, we hold that Appellant’s lawyer’s oral motion in limine was sufficiently detailed to preserve the issue for appeal. Appellant’s lawyer specifically said:
[Ojn the defendant’s taped statement that he gave to Detective Stephens at the time of the death. There [are] a couple of areas that I think should be kept out. One is that Stephens is saying to him that the jury ain’t going to buy that. Another time he refers to a jury is not going to believe that. I think those parts should be omitted because here you have a detective kind of telling the jurors you shouldn’t be believing this crap.
Though the detective actually made more than just a few references to whether the jury would believe Appellant and, among other things, actually accused Appellant of not telling the truth, the lawyer’s request clearly conveyed what evidence she sought *23to exclude. Furthermore, the trial court denied the motion on the record. This meets the requirements of KRE 108(d)— “[a] motion in limine resolved by order of record” — and the requirements of our case law to preserve the alleged error for appeal.
2. Merits of Appellant’s Claim
Appellant claims that Detective Stephens’s comments amount to an improper characterization of the testimony of another witness. We agree that it is generally improper for a witness to characterize the testimony of another witness as “lying” or otherwise. We have held: “ ‘A witness’s opinion about the truth of the testimony of another witness is not permitted. ... That determination is within the exclusive province of the jury.’ ”18 This is also supported by KRE 608(a), which limits character-based attacks on the credibility of a witness to “evidence in the form of opinion and reputation” that refers only to the witness’s “character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”19 Whether this rule applies to non-testimonial statements made by a police officer during an interrogation of a criminal suspect as part of the overall interrogation technique, however, is a different and far more complex question.
Because this is an issue of first impression in Kentucky, our only recourse, aside from declaiming a rule out of the ether, is to look to the decisions of other states for guidance. Fortunately, the appellate courts of several states and at least one federal court have had the opportunity to address this issue or at least a variant of it.
In State v. O’Brien,20 the Supreme Court of Missouri was faced with testimony by an officer about his interrogation of the defendant. The officer testified that during the interrogation, he interrupted the defendant and told him that was lying. The court noted that the issues were whether the testimony “constitute[d] impermissible ‘opinion evidence’ as to the ultimate question before the jury and [whether] its admission violated his right to a fair trial.”21 The court held that the testimony was not error because the officer “was not telling the jury that, in his opinion, the defendant is a liar. Rather, the witness was describing the give-and-take of his interrogation of [the defendant].” 22 The court also noted that the officer’s comments were the “reason for or the cause” of any additional statements by the defendant thus giving “color as to why these additional statements or remarks [were] made.”23
In Commonwealth v. Kitchen,24 Pennsylvania’s intermediate appellate court addressed whether certain comments by police officers contained in a videotape of an interrogation must be redacted. The court delineated the comments into two categories: (1) those in which the officers accused the defendant of lying by saying, for example, “you’re lying” or “we know that *24you’re lying”; and (2) those in which the officers asked the defendant whether she had lied about certain facts, thus eliciting a response from the defendant. The court held that the first category of statements were inadmissible because they were “akin to a prosecutor offering his or her opinion of the truth or falsity of the evidence presented by a criminal defendant ... [or] a prosecutor’s personal opinion, either in argument or via witnesses from the stand, as to the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant .... ”-25 The court allowed the introduction of the second category of comments because “they were in question form, did not involve an opinion as to the truth or falsity of [the defendant’s] statements or an opinion as to the guilt of [the defendant], and [the defendant] offered responses to the inquiries.”26
In State v. Demery,27 the Supreme Court of Washington also addressed the admissibility of portions of a videotaped interrogation where the officers suggested that the defendant was lying. For example, one of the officers in that case told the defendant: “[R]ight now nobody’s gonna believe your story. Now you need to start tellin’ the truth.” When the defendant said the officer was “talkin’ to me like I’m lying,” the officer replied, “Cause you are.”28 The defendant claimed that when these statements were played at trial, they amounted to improper opinion evidence. The court’s vote was fractured, with four claiming no error, one claiming harmless error, and four claiming reversible error. Because a majority of the justices voted not to reverse, the opinion claiming no error became the plurality opinion of the court.
The plurality opinion noted the officers’ comments on the tape “were not offered during live testimony at the trial”29 and were “part of a commonly used police interview technique, designed to see whether a defendant will change her story during the course of an interrogation.”30 As such, the plurality held that the officers’ statements were not prohibited opinion testimony.31 The plurality also noted that the purpose of introducing the statements — i.e., to show the context of the defendant’s responses, not to impeach her credibility — was an important consideration and that police statements showing the context of a defendant’s responses were admissible to provide context.32 Ultimately, the court imposed a requirement that the introduction of such evidence be accompanied by a jury instruction “explaining that only the defendant’s responses, and not the third party’s statements, should be considered as evidence,”33 but then noted that such a limiting instruction was unnecessary in that particular case “because the jury clearly understood from the officer’s testimony that the statements were offered solely to provide context to the defendant’s relevant responses.”34
The dissent claimed that the officers’ statements were impermissible opinion evidence introduced in violation of Washington’s Rule of Evidence 608(a), which bars the use of opinion evidence to impeach *25another witness (as opposed to the Federal Rule and our current version of the rule, which allow both opinion and reputation evidence). The dissent also noted that Rule 608(a) referred to “evidence,” not testimony. Ultimately, the dissent concluded that the problem was that admission of the evidence allowed the jury to “hear[] the officers’ opinions concerning the veracity of a witness.”35 Such evidence, the dissent reasoned, was no different than if the officers had testified in court that the defendant was lying.
The justice with the deciding vote agreed with the “dissent” that introduction of such statements was error, but he claimed that the error not prejudicial and therefore was harmless.36 He noted that the officers’ statements did “not appear to be a significant part of the [prosecution’s] case.”37 He also concluded: “[W]hen the statement is considered in fight of the officer’s testimony at trial, it is apparent that the officer was not expressing a judgment about the defendant’s veracity. Rather, he concedes that he was making the accusation merely in an effort to trick the defendant into changing his story.”38
In Dubria v. Smith,39 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in the context of reviewing a denial of a petition for habeas corpus, specifically whether the admission of such evidence violates due process. The defendant in that case claimed that the comments and questions of the officer contained, among other things, “statements of disbelief of [the defendant’s story], [and] opinions concerning [the defendant’s] guilt ....”40 Drawing on the findings of the California Supreme Court, which noted that the interview was “generally unremarkable” though “[t]here is no doubt that the officers were accusatory and suggested in a variety of ways that they did not believe [the defendant],”41 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the interview was “quite properly described as an ‘unremarkable interview’ ”42 and that “[t]he questions and comments by [the officer] placed [the defendant’s] answers in context, much like a prosecutor’s questions at trial.”43 The court also noted that because the comments arose in the context of a pre-trial interview, “[t]hey were not the type of statements that carry any special aura of reliability [with the jury].”44 Finally, the court noted that even if it was error to admit the tapes of the officers’ statements, the trial court’s two cautionary instructions, which informed the jury that the officers’ questions and statements were to be considered only as questions and not for their truth, were sufficient to alleviate any error.45 As such, the court ruled that the defendant’s due process rights had not been violated by introduction of the officers’ taped statements.
More recently, in State v. Cordova,46 Idaho’s intermediate appellate court addressed the same issue with an added *26twist. Like the other cases, the officers in Cordova told the defendant that he was lying, but one of the officers also told the defendant “that he was an expert in deception detection and that he knew the victim was telling the truth.” 47 The court ruled that the “expert” officer’s comments “appeared to be the comments of an expert,”48 and because the comments were not necessary to give context to the defendant’s answers, they were improperly admitted. The other comments were properly admitted because they provided context for the defendant’s answers. The court also noted that the admissible comments could not be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, thus the trial court had erred in not giving a limiting instruction. Ultimately, however, the court ruled that the admission of the officers’ comments, though erroneous, was harmless in light of the large amount of evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
The issue was addressed most recently by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Elnick.49 The officer in that case made repeated comment to the defendant while questioning him, including:
“[Y]ou just told me a flat-out lie.”
“When somebody lies, their eyes shift, did you realize that?”
“You’re sitting here bullshitting me.”
‘You’re weaving a web of fucking lies, man.”
The court concluded that the comments violated Kansas’s “well-known rule that a witness may not express an opinion on the credibility of another witness.”50 The court refused to distinguish between statements made on the witness stand and those presented in a videotape. The court also noted that context for the defendant’s answers could have been provided “simply by having [the officer] testify and point out the progression of [the defendant’s] various stories as the tape played — minus [the officer’s] numerous negative comments on [the defendant’s] credibility,”51 and that the lack of a limiting instruction “compounded the already serious problem.”52 Nonetheless, because of various other errors in the case, including extensive commentary on the defendant’s truthfulness by the prosecutor, the court ruled that it “need not determine whether the improper allowance of [the officer’s] statements itself constitutes reversible error or simply harmless error”53 and chose instead to reverse because of “cumulative trial errors [that] prevented him from receiving a fair trial ....”54
Though various courts across the country have addressed this issue, it is quite difficult to synthesize a majority rule, especially given that the evidentiary rules in these various states differ significantly.55 We first note that even the courts that have recognized introduction of this type of evidence as error have been hesitant to consider such introduction alone to be re*27versible error. Even the courts that have reversed when presented with this issue have done so because the error was multiplied by other errors.
We also note that such statements are not the sort of impeachment character contemplated by KRE 608 (both the old and new versions). “The word ‘character’” used most narrowly and accurately, describes the personal disposition or personality of an individual.”56 Such comments are not an attempt to describe to the jury the defendant’s personality; nor are they statements aimed at impeaching a witness, especially when it is unknown whether a criminal defendant will take the stand. By making such comments, the officer is not trying to convince anyone — not the defendant (who knows whether he or she is telling the truth), other officers, a prosecutor, or the jury — that the defendant was lying. Rather, such comments are part of an interrogation technique aimed at showing the defendant that the officer recognizes the holes and contradictions in the defendant’s story, thus urging him or her to tell the truth.
This last point is perhaps most important, at least for the purpose of developing a rule that will address future instances of similar evidence. Almost all of the courts that have considered the issue recognize that this form of questioning is a legitimate, effective interrogation tool. And because such comments are such an integral part of the interrogation, several courts have noted that they provide a necessary context for the defendant’s responses. We agree that such recorded statements by the police diming an interrogation are a legitimate, even ordinary, interrogation technique, especially when a suspect’s story shifts and changes. We also agree that retaining such comments in the version of the interrogation recording played for the jury is necessary to provide a context for the answers given by the suspect.
We also agree, however, that such comments are not admissible for the truth of the matter that they appear to assert, i.e., that the defendant is lying. We recognize that the introduction of such comments, no doubt, entails the possibility that the jury will misunderstand and accord to those comments an impermissible weight during deliberation. The solution to this problem suggested by the Kansas Supreme Court, i.e., to redact the comments from the recording and have the officer give live testimony as to how the suspect’s story shifted in response to questioning, however, is unworkable. Requiring that the interrogating officer intersperse the recording with his or her explanation of the progression of the defendant’s various stories could dilute the effectiveness of the playing of the recording because it would require a stop-and-go approach, thus breaking up the recording. Such a practice could also run the same risk of prejudice to the defendant in some cases. For the officer “to point out the progression of [the defendant’s] various stories as the tape played,” as the Kansas Supreme Court described its approach, would require the officer to say, for example, “Here the defendant changed his story.” The clear implication of such a statement is that the defendant is lying with regard to at least one version of his or her story, thus such a statement is an indirect comment on whether the defendant is telling the truth. This has the same effect of leaving in the officer’s statements (and further shows how necessary such com*28mentary is to give context to the defendant’s statement in response).
We think the better remedy to any possible adverse inference by the jury is a limiting admonition given by the court before the playing of the recording. Our Rules of Evidence specifically provide for such an admonition.57 Most of the other courts that have addressed this issue have endorsed limiting admonitions58 either by approving the trial court’s use of such an admonition59 or by proposing the use of such an admonition.60 The admonition should be phrased so as to inform the jury that the officer’s comments or statements are “offered solely to provide context to the defendant’s relevant responses.”61 This means, however, that a trial court’s failure to give such an admonition when requested by a defendant is error, though such an error is still subject to harmless error analysis.
As such, the comments in Appellant’s case, while admissible under our holding, would have been sufficient to require the giving of a limiting instruction or admonition to the jury. We need not address whether the lack of such an instruction in this case was harmless error, however, because Appellant failed to ask for such an admonition. We have previously held that where an admonishment is sufficient to cure an error and the defendant fails to ask for the admonishment, we will not review the error.62 This may appear to contradict our interpretation of KRE *29103(d) above, i.e., that a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve an error for appellate review, but it conforms to the limitations on the rule that we have expressed. By failing to ask for an admonition, even after the trial court returned a ruling that Appellant thought was in error, Appellant’s “objection” was incomplete. As such, an admonition was “not strictly within the scope of the objection as made... [and was not] fairly brought to the attention of the trial court....”63 Basically, even our relaxed reading of KRE 103(d) and Tucker requires that a defendant still has to ask for a remedy in order to get the remedy.
We further note that our holding in this case, and the rule that it establishes, is limited to the types of comments in this case, i.e., accusations by an officer that a defendant is not telling the truth. The rule does not address the types of comments that some of the other courts have dealt with and were not present in this case. For example, the officer in this case never told Appellant, directly or indirectly, that he was an expert in lie detection. Such comments raise additional concerns that we have not addressed in this opinion, and we decline to fashion a rule to cover such circumstances without the necessity to do so.
B. The Victim’s Diary
Appellant also claims that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of portions of the victim’s diary. Appellant admits that he wanted to introduce some of the diary entries, specifically those related to the victim’s drug addiction and her intent to stop taking drugs. He claims that other diary entries were improper KRE 404(b) evidence. Appellant specifically raises issue with those entries related (1) to the victim’s portrayal of Appellant as a drug abuser who had her get drugs for him, (2) to Appellant’s desire that the victim not see her granddaughters, (3) to the victim’s hatred of Appellant, and (4) to the victim’s wish that Appellant would be caught and imprisoned for some unspecified illegal activity. Appellant also claims generally that this evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial.
1. Preservation
The Commonwealth again relies on Tucker v. Commonwealth and claims that Appellant failed to preserve any error in this regard because there was no contemporaneous objection when the evidence was introduced at trial. Appellant’s lawyer, however, made a pretrial oral motion in limine regarding this evidence. As we discussed above, if such a motion is specific enough and the trial judge rules on the motion with an order on the record, then the alleged error is preserved for appellate review under KRE 103(d). The mere fact that Appellant’s lawyer moved in limine to suppress some of the diary entries, however, does not alone determine whether the issue is sufficiently preserved.
The prosecutor filed a notice regarding the diary entries pursuant to KRE 404(c). The trial court held a pretrial hearing in January 2003 to address the evidence in the notice. During this hearing, Appellant’s lawyer stated that she wanted to introduce some of the diary entries because they supported her theory that the victim’s injuries were caused by staggering from being in withdrawal after stopping taking valium. When the court asked Appellant’s lawyer if the entire diary was to come in, she stated:
Well, I just want to let my part in. I don’t know his reason for letting the *30other part in. We are now getting over to his motion, 404 motion, that he is wanting to show my client was an abuser of drugs from the diary ... Constantly asked her to get the drugs for him, and that they would fight over it. He is wanting to put that in, but I don’t know for what purpose.
The lawyers and the judge discussed some of the questionable diary entries and the possible justifications for admission of such evidence. The judge indicated that he thought they went to the victim’s state of mind, and that some of the entries that the prosecutor sought to introduce overlapped with those that Appellant wanted to introduce. The judge then asked Appellant’s lawyer to compare the proposed entries. After a few minutes, Appellant’s lawyer stated, “Well, your Honor, I just think this is highly inflammatory,” and then she pointed specifically to an entry where the victim said Appellant was not worth the price of a bullet and that she wished he would die. The judge then stated, ‘Well, I am inclined to allow that,” and noted that the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The following exchange then took place:
Judge: I am not going to foreclose you submitting some authority .... If you all want to submit anything else in terms of a memo or some case law on any of the offerings he is making.
McCollough (Appellant’s Lauryer): So far a lot of these we are together on. So at this point the Court is going to allow all of it in.
Judge: Yes, I am going to allow the part [the prosecutor] has tendered and highlighted. I am giving you the opportunity to respond to any of these, either collectively or individually.
McCollough: Okay. Right now it looks like the ones that are highlighted are the ones I would want to use anyway. There is just some additional that I would want. So I guess the day of trial—
Judge: Well, I would rather not wait until the day of trial. If you have some things that he is not asking for, I think we need to try to address those in advance of the trial. You all may be able to work that out on your own. If you can’t, then call me and we will set something up.
The judge entered a handwritten order at the end of the hearing addressing the diary and several other issues. The portion of the order dealing with the diary reads as follows:
III. Admissibility of Diary Entries
The Commonwealth has tendered certain entries shown by the highlighted copy admitted at the hearing. Those entries are admissible in that they are offered to prove the state of mind of the victim. The defendant also wants many of the same entries admitted to prove the victim’s addiction and withdrawal from drugs and the physical consequences of the withdrawal. Counsel to confer about what will be admitted by agreement. Defense may renew objections on portions not agreed.
Appellant’s pretrial objection at the January 2003 hearing was not sufficient to preserve this issue for review. The oral motion was neither specific enough, since it referred only generally to the diary entries, nor was it sufficiently resolved by an order of record. Appellant’s lawyer’s comments at the end of the hearing and the judge’s order indicate that Appellant’s lawyer was in agreement with the prosecutor as to what diary entries would be admissible at trial. The judge’s comment at the hearing and his notation in the order that the lawyers could address other diary entries with further objection show that the issue was not resolved and that any objec*31tions should be presented again at a later time. The motion was, in effect, deferred to trial, in which event it did not preserve the claimed error.64 As such, the oral motion at the January 2003 hearing was insufficient to preserve this issue for appellate review.
Appellant’s lawyer followed the judge’s order and raised the issue again by objecting to some of the diary entries in the judge’s chambers on the day of trial. While in the judge’s chambers, the judge asked, “And you all have agreed to put in substantial parts of the diary anyway, right?” The prosecutor replied, “Right.” Appellant’s lawyer did not object to this. A few minutes later, however, Appellant’s lawyer stated, “Now, we have pretty much tried to agree as you suggested on the diary entries. The only objection I have— we are pretty much in agreement — one of the entries that he wants to put in is just about [how] he doesn’t want me to see the girls so much anymore. I don’t know what the relevance of that is.” She was referring to a diary entry that reads: “March 4,2001. He can’t seem to stand the girls anymore. He wants cut back the x’s [times] I see them .... I gotta do something.” The judge allowed the diary entry because, he noted, it illustrated an area of conflict between Appellant and the victim.
Appellant’s lawyer then raised another diary entry by stating, “Another one is where she states he is going out in the car now, and I hope he gets caught and gets twenty years.” The entry she was referring to reads: “May 27, 2001. I still wish that SOB would die. He’s out in the car now. I hope he gets caught & put in jail for 20 years. God only knows how much I HATE HIM.” The judge also allowed this entry, noting that it was like other diary entries that were to be admitted by agreement and that it would not lead to any “real prejudice.”
Appellant’s lawyer’s objection to these two diary entries was specific enough to fall within our interpretation of KRE 103(d) above. We also note that the judge’s ruling allowing the admission of the diary entries was an “order of record.” The record, however, indicates that Appellant agreed as to the other diary entries. As such, we hold that only the alleged error regarding these two diary entries was preserved for our review.
2. Merits of Appellant’s Claim
We now turn to the merits of Appellant’s claim as to the two diary entries that were preserved for our review.
The diary entry relating to the victim’s grandchildren was admissible. It does not appear to refer to an act; thus it does not fall within the purview of KRE 404(b). But even if we were to read it as falling under that rule, we agree with the trial judge that it is further evidence of the growing conflict between Appellant and the victim. As such, it is evidence of a motive for the crime, which makes it potentially admissible under KRE 404(b). In determining whether to admit such evidence, the trial court is still bound by KRE 403’s balancing test. The diary entry related only to a portion of the overall cause of the conflict between Appellant and the victim, but it was not repetitive or cumulative because it related to an aspect of the conflict not covered by the other diary entries. Furthermore, it was not more prejudicial than probative. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this diary entry.
*32This leaves the entry regarding a possible crime being committed by Appellant and describing how the victim hated Appellant and wished he would die. The Commonwealth attempts to justify introduction of this entry under the rule of completeness in KRE 106. The rule of completeness, however, does not necessarily justify the introduction of diary entries.65 Several diary entries were omitted by agreement of the parties, and there is little chance that the rest of the diary would have presented a misleading impression absent this entry.
Furthermore, the entry does not appear to fall under the exceptions to KRE 404(b). Though the entry is vague, there is little doubt that it refers to criminal activity of some sort committed by Appellant. Though the entry as a whole further illustrates the conflict between Appellant and the victim, and thus could be considered indirect evidence related to his motive, the criminal activity referenced does not appear to fall under any of the KRE 404(b) exceptions. The introduction of the entry, with its solitary and vague reference to criminal activity, however, does not appear to have been prejudicial, especially when considered in light of the other diary entries that Appellant agreed to introduce and that make reference to Appellant’s illicit drug use and a growing conflict with the victim. As such, even if this diary entry was introduced improperly, it was harmless error.
C. Victim’s Family Members During Trial
Finally, Appellant raises two issues regarding the actions of several members of the victim’s family during trial.
During the guilt phase, several members of the victim’s family began crying when photos detailing the crime scene and the victim’s injuries were introduced. Appellant’s attorney objected and noted that several members of the jury had looked at the crying family members. She asked the judge to allow the family to stay in the courtroom, but asked that they be moved so that the jury could not see them, but the judge declined to do so. Appellant raised this issue again in a motion for a new trial. The victim’s family members were understandably upset by the presentation of the crime scene photos, but as the trial judge recognized, the family members were “being fairly restrained under the circumstances.” As such, their crying was not the sort of emotional outburst that would inflame the jury’s passions, and thus it did not rise to the level of error.66
Appellant also claims that during the penalty phase, several members of the victim’s family wore large buttons bearing a photograph of the victim with her two grandchildren. Appellant also notes that this photo is similar to one that the trial judge had previously ruled was inadmissible at trial. While no objection *33was made during trial to the victim’s family members’ wearing these buttons, Appellant now claims this issue was preserved by raising the issue in his motion for a new trial pursuant to RCr 10.02. A motion for a new trial, however, depends on evidence newly discovered after trial. That the victim’s family was wearing such buttons during the penalty phase was not newly discovered evidence; the family members were in the courtroom and in the presence of Appellant and his attorney. We would add that if the wearing of the buttons were not noticeable to Appellant and his attorney, we doubt that it was noticeable by the jury. Regardless, if the wearing of such buttons was erroneous, it should have been brought to the trial judge’s attention so that he could have a chance to address the issue. Because there was no contemporaneous objection at trial, this error was not preserved for our review.67
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant’s convictions.
GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, ROACH and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ„ concur.
COOPER, J., dissents by separate opinion in which LAMBERT, C.J., and SCOTT, J., join.