Appealing from a judgment remitting as to appellee, claimant below, the forfeiture of a Dodge Truck, but taxing the costs against the claimant,1 the United States is here insisting that the court erred in remitting the forfeiture.
The primary reason assigned by it is that the evidence showed, and the court found, that, though the ostensible purchaser of the car and maker of the paper purchased by claimant was without any record or reputation as a violator, one who had such a record was a secret owner of a part interest in the car.
The secondary reason was: that the evidence did not acquit the dealer from whom the paper was purchased of bad faith in making the sale; that, under the representations accompanying the assignment oif the conditional sales contract and note, the claimant could have 'had recourse against it; and that, rather than remitting the forfeiture, the court should have remitted the claimant to his action on these representations.
*501The appellee, relying on the findings of the court,2 insists: that the case is ruled by our case of United States v. Automobile Financing, Inc., 5 Cir., 99 F.2d 498, affirmed in 307 U.S. 219, 59 S.Ct. 861, 83 L.Ed. 1249; and that, as was held of the judgment in that case, the entry of the judgment here was well within the discretion confided to the district judge. We agree.
There is nothing in the findings of the court or in the record to support the contention that claimant, as assignee of the paper, had any recourse for the moneys advanced on account of it, against the dealer from whom it took it. Moreover, there is nothing in the statute or in any of the controlling decisions which supports the view advanced by the appellant that where it is made to appear that a claimant for remission may, in addition to his claim to the car, have a cause of action to the sums advanced on account of its purchase of the paper, remission of forfeiture must he denied.
This is not to say that the district judge may not, in the exercise of his discretion, take such facts into consideration in determining on the record as a whole whether the forfeiture should he remitted.
It is to say, though, that the effect to be given to such facts and the actions to be taken by him, in the light of all the facts and circumstances, were confided to the discretion of the district judge, and that discretion having been exercised in favor of remission, the facts may not now be put forward as a basis for reversal.
The judgment is Affirmed.