*28 SUMMARY ORDER
Harold Haygood alleges that he was subject to racial discrimination, a hostile work environment, and unlawful retaliation by his supervisor, Dawn Cruz, during the two years he was employed by ACM Medical Laboratory, Inc. (“ACM”). Haygood, acting pro se, filed two substantially identical charges of discrimination on the same date, one with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and one with the New York State Division of Human Rights (the “Division”). The EEOC did not find any violations of anti-discrimination laws and sent Haygood a dismissal notice on January 30, 2014. The Division, which held a fact-finding conference to investigate the allegations, also dismissed Haygood’s complaint. Haygood appealed the Division’s determination to the EEOC, which issued a second dismissal notice on May 20. Both EEOC dismissal notices informed Haygood that he had 90 days to file suit or his right to sue based on those claims would be lost.
On August 13, 2014, Haygood filed a complaint against ACM and Cruz, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the New York State Human Rights Law. His com- ' plaint was filed within 90 days of receiving the EEOC’s second dismissal notice, but more than 90 days after he received the first. The defendants jointly moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Telesca, S.J.) granted the motion and dismissed all of Hay-good’s claims. It determined that Hay-good’s Title VII claims were untimely and denied him equitable tolling. The court also concluded that Haygood’s § 1981 claims were collaterally estopped because he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate before the Division. Haygood now appeals on both grounds.
We find that the district court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, as Haygood’s complaint was filed well after the expiration of the 90-day deadline from his first dismissal notice. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Haygood had not met the “extraordinary” burden to invoke equitable tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (“[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”). As a unanimous Supreme Court recently “reaffirm[ed],” “the second prong of the equitable tolling test is met only where the circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary and beyond its control.” Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. U.S., — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 750, 756, 193 L.Ed.2d 652 (2016); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (tolling should be “applied sparingly’).
Although there is no indication here that Haygood sought two dismissal notices in a deliberate attempt to get around the statutory time limits, see, e.g., Soso Liang Lo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 787 F.2d 827 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam), the deadline stated in the first notice was controlling. Because Haygood’s filing was indisputably untimely and he has not shown any “extraordinary circumstances” warranting equitable tolling, we affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing the Title VII claims.
We have examined the remainder of Haygood’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, for the fore*29going reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.