The National Labor Relations Board seeks enforcement of its order of November 30, 1951, as amended May 22, 1953, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. in proceeding No. 10-CA-1125 against respondent, Reynolds & Manley Lumber Company, Inc., called Company, under Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act. The charge was unfair labor practices committed in Savannah, Georgia, in this Circuit.
The Board held (1) respondent guilty of violating Section 8(a)(1) because its Vice President, Fred Shearouse, interrogated Isaac Jackson, Jr., as to how he felt about an impending strike, and requested that he persuade his fellow employees not to strike; and, also (2) of violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) in refusing to reinstate striker Joe Brown after the strike had ended.
On August 22, 1950, the Board had certified the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, called Union, as exclusive bargaining agent for respondent’s employees. Respondent refused to recognize the union on the ground that the Board had no jurisdiction to certify it, because at that time the parent, CIO, with which Union was af-filated, had not complied with Section 9(h) of the Act by having its officers file affidavits of Non-Communism.
Pursuant to vote, members of the Union struck on October 5, 1950, but on January 9, 1951, the strike was called off and all employees returned to work unconditionally.
Respondent’s position throughout has been to deny any violation of the Act.
CIO complied with the Act on December 22, 1949, and on September 15, 1950, expelled the Union, some 20 days before the strike began on October 5th.
There is little dispute as to the facts in either charge.
1. Learning that those of its employees who had joined the union were about to strike, Fred Shearouse, Vice President of the Company, approached Isaac Jackson, Jr., and asked what he thought about it. The latter’s reply was that he did not know. He was then asked if he would talk to the other employees and arrangements were made that he should do so and urge them not to strike. *157Pertinent parts of the testimony of both Jackson and Shearouse appear in footnotes.1 & 2
Under the Wagner Act, as interpreted by the Board an employer was not allowed to do anything that might in*158fluence the action of his employees in union matters. However, the present statute provides:
“The expressing of any views, arguments, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(c).
No “threats, coercion or promise of benefits” can be deduced from the testimony of either Jackson or Shearouse, and there is no other evidence to support that conclusion. It is true that Jackson was given a full day’s pay, notwithstanding he consumed about two hours in visiting and talking with his fellow employees at the suggestion of Shearouse, but it requires a strained and unreasonable interpretation to say that on this ground alone he received the extra or special benefits contemplated by the section of the Act quoted. It does not appear that he held any position of any great influence with his fellow workers. What was done certainly could not have been any worse than the expression by respondent “of any views, arguments, or opinions, or dissemination thereof * * * in written, printed, graphic, or visual form * * * The burden “was upon the Board to prove its charges by competent and credible evidence and not upon the Respondent to disprove them.” National Labor Relations Board v. Ray Smith Transport Co., 5 Cir., 193 F.2d 142, 144.
2. As to the second charge under section 8(a)(1) and (3), that Joe Brown was refused reinstatement because of his union activities, here, again, the facts are largely undisputed. He was a head fireman in charge of the boilers that provided steam power for the entire plant, who worked from one to 7 o’clock, a. m., or six hours. On the day of the strike he was visited about 6:00 a. m at his post of duty by two strikers and informed that it had started. Without consulting anyone in authority, he immediately began cooling the boilers down, putting cold water in them and pulling the fires. This had the effect of stopping and preventing the operation of all machinery, thus making it impossible to resume operations at the usual hour of 7:30 a. m.
While it is true that Brown testified he sent his helper to request his foreman, Lehman Jackson, to send someone to relieve him, none came and he walked off his job, leaving the boilers unattended. This undoubtedly created a very dangerous situation and was a violation of positive instructions that it should never be done. He must have known, since he had worked for the company many years at different times, that in 1945 a fire had broken out under similar conditions, resulting in a loss of some $200,000, and at that the time the plant had to be shut down for some six months while the sawmill was rebuilt.
Brown had also claimed that he did not leave his job until about 7:45 a. m., whereas the time clock showed that he checked out at 7:12 a. m., after walking some 250 yards from the boiler room to the office for that purpose, indicating that he must have left his post of duty at approximately 7:00 o’clock a. m., or about the end of his regular period.
Pertinent portions of his testimony are quoted in footnote.3
*159He attempted to justify leaving his post of duty by the fact that he pulled the fires, cooled the boilers down and attempted to get word to his foreman, Jackson. Nevertheless he left without succeeding. Testimony of witness *161Shearouse and Lehman Jackson is also quoted in the footnotes.4 & 5
Of course, it is argued that Brown had the right to join the strike, even *163though he had not gotten any responsible relief when he checked out. It would seem as logical to say that the cashier in a store and others responsible for the protection of its contents might walk out, leaving the employer’s property unattended, in such a situation, as to attempt to justify what Brown did with his knowledge of the danger. It will hardly be contended that, without a strike, the employer could be blamed for discharging him for disregarding instructions and creating such a hazardous situation. So long as the employer is not actuated by a desire to impose punishment for union activities, he is free to use his own judgment in such circumstances.
“No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. * * * 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c).
The only support for the examiner’s conclusion that refusal to reinstate Brown was due to union activities, rests upon inferences and suspicion, and not upon evidence as to matters where the burden of proof was, as above stated, upon the Board to prove it. National Labor Relations Board v. Ray Smith Transport Co., supra; Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Board, 5 Cir., 203 F.2d 486. In the absence of such proof the employer still has the right to discharge for just cause.
Enforcement is
Denied.