When the defendant’s wife told her nine-year-old son, of a prior marriage, that she was going to divorce the defendant because the defendant “was a bad man”, the defendant’s stepson agreed and told his mother that the defendant had, some four years earlier, committed sexual abuse on the stepson. The child was interviewed by the usual detectives and child abuse prevention *849personnel, interviewed on video tape, and examined by a pediatrician.
Based on the child’s statements, the defendant was charged in Count I with capital sexual battery relating to anal sexual penetration, and in Count II with capital sexual battery by oral sexual abuse. Prior to trial, the child had asserted a completed act of oral sexual abuse and that assertion was contained in three separate hearsay statements.1
During the trial, the State asked the child witness a direct but leading question relating to the completed act of oral sex which the child had previously and repeatedly asserted. Defense counsel objected to the question as being leading and at a bench-side conference, the prosecutor advised defense counsel and the judge that defense counsel would want the leading question answered because two days prior to trial, the prosecutor had learned that the child witness had recanted his prior statements in this particular, explaining that he, the witness, was confused and when he had earlier claimed that the defendant engaged in oral sex with him, “it wasn’t true; I wasn’t meaning to lie, but I just accidently said that”. Count II was subsequently reduced to allege attempted capital sexual battery.
The defendant testified and denied any sexual battery of the child. The jury became deadlocked but after an Allen charge, returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment (with a 25 year minimum mandatory) on Count I and a concurrent life sentence on Count II.
On appeal the State defends the convictions but concedes that the judgment incorrectly describes the attempted sexual battery offense in Count II as a capital felony and that that count was properly a first degree felony (§§ 794.011(2), 777.04(4)(a), Fla.Stat.), the statutory maximum sentence for which is a term of imprisonment not to exceed 30 years (§ 775.082(3)(b), Fla.Stat.).
However, we hold that the State’s presentation of the child’s videotaped statement and the reinforcing introduction of repetitive hearsay with knowledge by the State, but not by the trial judge or defense counsel, that the child had recanted a critical portion of his statement prior to trial, violated the defendant’s due process rights2 and deprived him of a fair trial as to both charges. Therefore, the convictions are reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
• REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
DAUKSCH, COWART and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.