ORDER
On December 17, 1970, Percy Grubb borrowed $55.94 from the Dollar Loan Company. The disclosed annual percentage rate of interest on the loan was 65.46 percent. Although Grubb was obligated to repay Dollar Loan $55.94, he received cash in hand of only $17.27. Dollar Loan Company kept the balance in order to apply $22.73 to a prior unpaid loan, collect statutorily authorized interest charges of $5.59, and pay Grubb’s premiums of $10.07 on a credit accident and health insurance plan. Evidently this loan was insufficient to satisfy Grubb’s long range financial needs because on April 14, 1971, Grubb returned to Dollar Loan and negotiated another small loan for $55.94 out of which he received cash in *971hand of $35.27 after similar deductions were made by the Dollar Loan Company.
Grubb brought two lawsuits against the Dollar Loan Company for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act1 [“the Act”] in connection with each of these loans. The cases have been consolidated and are presently before the Court on Grubb’s motion for summary judgment. The question before the Court is whether Dollar Loan Company violated the Truth in Lending Act by using the words “loan fee” on its disclosure statements instead of the words “prepaid finance charge” as required by Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(d)(2) and (e) (1). The Court finds that Dollar Loan has violated the Act and plaintiff Grubb is entitled to the statutory penalty and attorney’s fees awarded by 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (Supp.1972).
The Georgia Industrial Loan Act authorizes Dollar Loan Company to charge two types of interest. First, Dollar Loan can charge eight percent (8%) interest per year on the face amount of the note.2 Second, and in addition to the first type of interest, Dollar Loan is authorized to charge a “fee” for making the loan: eight percent (8%) of the first $600 and four percent (4%) of the excess. This fee is collected at the time the loan is made and is not refunded to the borrower except insofar as it is required to be applied to any new loan which the borrower may negotiate with that lender within 15 days after prepaying the old loan (all of which must be within a six-month or two-year period, as applicable).3 ****In the instant case, Dollar Loan charged Percy Grubb interest of $1.11 and a “loan fee” of $4.48 on a note in the amount of $55.94. Percy Grubb contends that the $4.48 “loan fee” should have been referred to on Dollar Loan’s disclosure statement as a “prepaid finance charge” in order to comply with the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. Dollar Loan contends that the $4.48 “loan fee” is not *972a prepaid finance charge and is properly disclosed by the term “loan fee.”
The Truth in Lending Act and the regulations prescribed thereunder were designed to require creditors to make certain uniform disclosures in consumer credit transactions in order to “assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid.the uninformed use of credit.”4 Percy Grubb’s loan is covered by Regulation Z, 12 C. F.R. § 226.8, which specifies the disclosures creditors must make and uniform terminology they must use when extending loans and other nonsale credit. Section 226.8 provides in part:
“(d) Loans and other nonsale credit. In the case of a loan or extension of credit which is not a credit sale, in addition to the items required to be disclosed under paragraph (b) of this section, the following items, as applicable, shall be disclosed:
•X* * -X- -X- *
“(2) Any amount referred to in paragraph (e) of this section required to be excluded from the amount in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, using, as applicable, the terms “prepaid finance charge” and “required deposit balance,” and, if both are applicable, the total of such items using the term, “total prepaid finance charge and required deposit balance.”
* * * -X- -X- -X-
“(e) Finance charge payable separately or withheld; required deposit balances. The following amounts shall be disclosed and deducted in a credit sale in accordance with paragraph (c) (6) of this section, and in other extensions of credit shall be excluded from the amount disclosed under paragraph (d)(1) of this section, and shall be disclosed in accordance with paragraph (d)(2) of this section:
“(1) Any finance charge paid separately, in cash or otherwise, directly or indirectly to the creditor or with the creditor’s knowledge tó another person, or withheld by the creditor from the proceeds of the credit extended.12”
[12 C.F.R. 226.8(d) and (e) (emphasis added)]
The above-quoted sections of Regulation Z state, in essence, that a finance charge which is paid separately to the creditor or withheld by the creditor from the proceeds of the credit extended, must be disclosed using the words “prepaid finance charge.” The “fee” for making a loan which is authorized by the Georgia Industrial Loan Act is a finance charge which is paid separately to the creditor or withheld by the creditor from the proceeds of the credit extended and therefore must be labeled and disclosed as a “prepaid finance charge” as required by 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (d)(2) and (e)(1). To rule otherwise would frustrate the purposes of the Act and allow creditors to use varying terminology which would confuse the average person who attempts to compare his credit alternatives.
Moving to the issue of damages, the Court awards plaintiff $200 pursuant to Section 1640 of the Act which provides that the civil liability for violating the Act shall be “twice the amount of the finance charge” with a minimum award of $100 and a maximum award of $1,000.5 Since Dollar Loan violated the Act in connection with two loans, Mr. Grubb is entitled to the $100 minimum award for each loan which amounts to a total award of $200.
This order of summary judgment for the plaintiff was announced in open court and subsequent thereto evidence was taken on the issue of attorney’s fees which are also awarded pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) (Supp.1972). After due consideration of the evidence and *973argument presented by counsel for both parties, the Court awards the plaintiff’s attorney $1,750 in attorney’s fees for which the defendant is hereby liable.
In view of the above ruling, the Court need not reach the other issues presented by the parties in this case and also denies defendant’s motion for' a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.6 *8