Chasity Pitts (“Mother”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Caldwell County (“motion court”) modifying a prior judgment and parenting plan setting forth terms of custody of Mother’s daughter, R.Y. (“Daughter”). Mother claims that the motion court erred in denying her motion for disclosure of Department of Social Services (“DSS”) investigative records 1 pertaining to alleged abuse of Daughter by Mother’s husband, Steve Pitts. Mother offers two reasons for her claim of error: (1) that the statute dealing with confidentiality and release of DSS records, section 210.150,2 is unconstitutional as it violates due process; and (2) that the motion court’s finding that the DSS’s refusal to release the records to Mother was based upon concern for a person’s life or safety was not supported by any evidence in the record. Mother also claims that the motion court abused its discretion in establishing a seven-and-one-half-hour time limitation on the presentation of her case at the motion hearing. We affirm the judgment of the motion court and deny the *50pending motion to transfer this appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court. We also dismiss Father’s appeal of the award of attorney’s fees.3
Factual and Procedural Background4
On November 15, 2007, the circuit court entered a judgment of paternity, custody, visitation, and support. In the judgment, joint legal and joint physical custody of Daughter was granted to Mother and William Allen Young (“Father”), with Mother’s residence designated as residence for mailing and educational purposes. Father was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $450 per month. Per the original parenting plan, Father had Daughter every other week from Thursday evening until the following Tuesday evening, plus certain holidays and some summer vacation time, with Mother having Daughter the remainder of the time. After Daughter was to start Kindergarten, Father was to have Daughter on the first, second, and fourth weekends of each month, plus the holidays, with Mother to have Daughter at all other times.
In January 2008, someone made a hotline call to the DSS alleging that Mother and/or Pitts had abused Daughter sexually. After investigation, the allegations were found to have been unsubstantiated. In May of 2008, allegations of sexual abuse were made again. This time the allegations were found to have been substantiated as to Pitts.5 On July 24, 2008, after the second set of allegations of sexual abuse was made against Pitts,6 the visitation schedule was temporarily modified. The court granted Mother supervised visitation on Mondays from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., on Fridays from 3 p.m. to 9 p.m., and every other Sunday from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., with Pitts not to be present.
On June 4, 2008, Mother filed a motion to modify custody, alleging, among other *51things, that Father made repeated unsubstantiated calls claiming abuse of Daughter by Mother and Pitts. Mother requested that the motion court grant her sole legal custody with Father having supervised visitation. Father filed a counter-motion asking for sole legal custody and alleging that Pitts had sexually abused Daughter and that Mother had failed to protect Daughter from Pitts’s abuse.
During pre-trial discovery, Mother served the DSS with a subpoena seeking access to the records concerning the two investigations. The DSS moved to quash the subpoena and later moved the court to dismiss Mother’s resulting motions to compel discovery and for contempt against the DSS. The DSS asserted that it would not release the records pertaining to the abuse allegations against Mother and Pitts because some of the records were “law enforcement records which remain confidential during a criminal investigation.” The DSS continued that it “would not be providing records of [its] Children’s Division pursuant to [section] 210.150 without information from the prosecutor that charges have been filed or the investigation is concluded with no charges filed.”
After a hearing on September 30, 2008, the motion court denied Mother’s motions to compel discovery and for contempt against the DSS. The docket sheet states that the “[c]ourt does not require Children’s Division to release information requested by [Mother] as the Children’s Division believes release of such information may place life of juvenile in danger; therefore release of information will not be made pursuant to Section 210.150.4.”
At the final hearing on the respective motions to modify custody, the court reiterated that “since no criminal charges have been filed ... the reports are confidential and should not be turned over to either of the parties.”
On November 10, 2008, a hearing on temporary custody was held. The final hearing on the motions to modify custody was held on February 23, February 26, and April 30, 2009.7 At the final hearing, testimony began with Mother, who testified that Father’s house was “nasty” and “very cluttered” with seven people living in a very small house. She also testified that Daughter was not kept clean when she was in the custody of Father and his wife (“Stepmother”). Mother’s testimony then addressed the two allegations of sexual abuse made against her and Pitts. She testified that the first allegations against her and Pitts were found to be unsubstantiated and that the later allegations were found to be unsubstantiated as to her. After the second allegation, Pitts was ordered to have no contact with Daughter. Mother testified that she did not believe that “the substantiated [finding] was properly substantiated” and that she believed the allegations were made to deny her parenting time with Daughter. However, Mother acknowledged that Daughter had told a number of people, in Mother’s presence, that Pitts had touched her inappropriately.
Mother testified that, after the first allegations, Pitts was no longer left alone with Daughter, except for two times when Pitts picked Daughter up from daycare and brought her to Mother’s workplace. Mother testified that, after the second alle*52gations, Daughter had not had any contact whatsoever with Pitts. Later, however, Mother testified that Pitts would sometimes enter their forty-acre property where Mother’s home was located during Mother’s visitation time with Daughter when Pitts knew that Mother and Daughter would not be there. Mother admitted that one time, when she and Daughter were returning home from an outing, Pitts was just leaving the property and the two cars met each other in the driveway. Mother also testified that shortly before the final hearing, she had made a hotline call to report that Daughter had been touched inappropriately by her five-year-old stepbrother while Daughter had been visiting Father’s home.
The Daughter’s guardian ad litem (“the GAL”) stated in closing that she was concerned that Pitts did not understand what “no contact” meant.8 There was evidence that Daughter reported seeing Pitts after the no contact order was in place. In response to these reports, the GAL went to Mother’s house for a home visit one evening during Mother’s visitation time with Daughter. Mother testified that on that visit, the GAL ran into Pitts sitting in his car on the property, two-tenths of a mile from the house. Subsequent to this visit, the motion court ordered Pitts not to be present on the forty acres on which Mother’s house was located during visitation.
Pitts also testified at the hearing. He stated that when Daughter was getting ready for bed at night, he would lie down by her and scratch her back and her belly until she was comfortable, which would take about five or ten minutes. Pitts did not see anything wrong with this nighttime routine, and it continued after the first allegation of abuse although, unlike before, Mother was present in the room when this occurred. Pitts stated that he never touched Daughter inappropriately, although he did, until the first allegations were made, bathe her and wipe her after she used the toilet. Pitts admitted that after the allegations of sexual abuse were made, Mother never asked Pitts whether he had touched Daughter inappropriately because “[s]he didn’t have to. She knew better.”
Father testified that Daughter had reported to him “several times” that she had seen Pitts, even after the court had ordered Pitts to have no contact with Daughter. Father testified that Daughter had reported to him on more than one occasion that Pitts had touched her inappropriately. Similarly, Stepmother testified that Daughter had told her on a number of occasions that Pitts had touched her inappropriately.
Noting that the Daughter stated repeatedly that Pitts had touched her inappropriately and that “we will not ever know” whether Daughter was abused, the GAL recommended that the court give legal and physical custody to Father. The GAL stated in closing argument that Mother “completely denied that there was even a possibility that anything occurred” and that
*53it’s very unfortunate that a parent hears from a child that something has happened to her and does not even ask— does not even take the time to ask her spouse.... [F]rankly, not to even take the time to ask and not to 'follow up on the things that should be done in order to make sure that the child is protected, I feel like that is the issue, for me, in this case ... and most of the reason why I have made the recommendation.
The motion court issued a judgment that referenced testimony from the final hearing and also summarized the testimony from therapeutic counselor Dr. Selina Sanchez, -forensic interviewer Heather Swy-meler, and evaluating psychologists Dr. Nancy Ansevics and Dr. Aileen Utley.9 The judgment noted that Dr. Sanchez reported that Daughter had disclosed, during play therapy when she was four years old, that she had been sexually abused. Daughter said that she felt seared and added, “That’s how I feel when [Pitts] touches my potty.” The judgment noted that Dr. Sanchez testified that there was nothing out of the ordinary regarding Daughter’s admissions that caused Dr. Sanchez to question Daughter’s truthfulness. Dr. Sanchez testified that Daughter told her that Pitts made her feel “yucky,” sad, and scared, and that Daughter’s play therapy was consistent with her allegations.
The judgment next summarized the testimony of forensic examiner Swymeler, relaying that Daughter had stated that Pitts had touched Daughter’s “potty- and butt” with his “potty and butt” on more than one occasion.
The judgment noted Dr. Ansevics’s testimony that Daughter was not shocked by male nudity in tests that Ansevics had administered to Daughter, which' was a matter of grave concern to Ansevics. An-sevics had also testified that usually the first report by a child was the most accurate and that there were several “red flags” regarding Pitts’s treatment of Daughter.10
The motion court’s judgment continued the arrangement of both parents having joint legal and joint physical custody of Daughter but essentially made permanent the temporary modification of visitation. Mother was given parenting time every other Monday and every other weekend until Daughter started Kindergarten, with Mother to have parenting time on the first, second, and fourth weekends of the month thereafter. Both Mother and Father were granted parenting time on holidays and during the summer months. Noting the allegations of sexual abuse against Pitts and finding that Mother had failed to take appropriate steps to protect Daughter from the alleged abuse, the judgment ordered that Pitts was not to be present on *54the forty acres on which Mother lived at any time during Mother’s parenting time. To the extent that Mother and Father disagreed as to medical, religious, and educational decisions, Father was to make the final decision after consulting with Mother. Father’s address was made Daughter’s residence for mailing and educational purposes. The judgment also required Mother to pay child support to Father in the amount of $344 per month and to repay Father for the child support she received when Father had temporary custody of Daughter. This appeal follows.
Standard of Review
We affirm the judgment of the motion court unless it is not supported by substantial evidence; it is against the weight of the evidence; or it misstates or misapplies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). When a judgment addresses a motion to modify child custody, we assume that the motion court was motivated by the best interests of the child. O’Connell v. Horton, 313 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Mo.App. W.D.2010). The motion court’s determination in a child custody matter is given more deference than in any other type of case. Id. Although the motion court here continued joint legal custody and joint physical custody, it altered the visitation time, and thus the same standard applies. Bather v. Bather, 170 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Mo.App. W.D.2005) (applying the above standard when a controlling custodial arrangement provided for joint physical custody and at least one parent was attempting to modify the time the child spent with the other parent).
Constitutionality of Section 210.150.2(4)
Mother’s first point on appeal is that section 210.150.2(4), which deals with the confidentiality of Children’s Division reports and records, is unconstitutional because it denies parents due process in that it gives the DSS a unilateral ability to determine whether investigative records are subject to disclosure, thereby depriving parents, who would otherwise have a right to such information, of notice and an opportunity to be heard. When an appellant makes a constitutional challenge, we first determine whether the constitutional issue was preserved for appeal and, if so, then determine whether jurisdiction lies with this court to decide the constitutional issue or whether the appeal must be transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court. State v. Newlon, 216 S.W.3d 180, 184-85 (Mo.App. E.D.2007). Father maintains that Mother failed to preserve her constitutional challenge to section 210.150 by raising it for the first time on appeal.
A constitutional issue must be raised “at the earliest possible moment consistent with good pleading and orderly procedure.” State v. Turner, 48 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Mo.App. W.D.2001). In addition, the constitutional provision claimed to have been violated by the challenged statute must be specifically referenced or quoted. Newlon, 216 S.W.3d at 184. The facts comprising the constitutional violation must be stated, and the constitutional challenge must be preserved throughout the lower court proceeding. Id.
Mother made numerous attempts before the motion court to obtain access to DSS records but points to nothing indicating any challenge to section 210.150’s constitutionality in any of the motions filed or hearings held in furtherance of her efforts. Mother’s motion to compel records from the division of child services and for contempt of court, filed September 26, 2008, requests that she be granted access to the investigative records pursuant to section 210.150 but does not challenge the statute’s constitutionality. Her request to re*55view DSS records held by the motion court in camera, filed February 13, 2009, similarly makes no reference to section 210.150’s constitutionality. Mother’s motion to revise the judgment, filed July 7, 2009, makes vague references to Mother having been denied “Due Process” but does not specifically reference the constitutionality of the statute, nor does the motion cite which constitutional provisions she feels that the statute violates. Mother does not provide transcripts to the hearing or hearings that the motion court held in its consideration of Mother’s attempts to gain access to the DSS records, so we cannot presume that Mother challenged section 210.150’s constitutionality in the course of those hearings. Because it appears that, as Father suggests, Mother first challenges the constitutionality of section 210.150 on appeal, the issue has not been preserved for appellate review. Accordingly, we are required neither to address Mother’s challenge to the statute nor transfer the matter to the Missouri Supreme Court. See Turner, 48 S.W.3d at 697. Mother’s motion for transfer is thus denied, as is her first point on appeal.
Motion Court’s Rationale for Refusing to Release DSS Records11
For her second point on appeal, Mother claims that the motion court erred in denying her request for access to the DSS investigative records because Mother is statutorily entitled to such access by virtue of section 210.150.2(4).
a. Statutory right to records
Section 210.150.2 provides:
2. Only the following persons shall have access to investigation records contained in the central registry:
(4) Any child named in the report as a victim ... or the parent, if not the alleged perpetrator ... but the names of reporters shall not be furnished to persons in this category. Prior to the release of any identifying information, the division shall determine if the release of such identifying information may place a person’s life or safety in danger. If the division makes the determination that a person’s life or safety may be in danger, the identifying information shall not be released....
Because Mother had been cleared of any wrongdoing by the time she requested the DSS investigative records, she claims that she was entitled to access the records as a parent of Daughter under this subsection and, therefore, served the DSS with two subpoenas requesting the records.12 The DSS refused to produce the investigative records, stating that “some of the Department’s records are law enforcement records which remain confidential during a *56criminal investigation.” Because at the time of Mother’s request a criminal investigation of Pitts was still reportedly underway, the DSS refused to produce the law-enforcement records and stated that it would only produce the non-law-enforcement records upon order of the motion court. When Mother asked the court to compel the DSS to release the investigative records, the court denied the request. The docket-entry order states, “Court does not require Children’s Division to release information requested by [Mother] as the Children’s Division believes release of such information may place life of juvenile in danger; therefore release of information will not be made pursuant to Section 210.150.2(4).”
Mother claims that there is absolutely no evidence in the record that would support a finding that any person’s life or safety would have been endangered by allowing Mother to have access to the investigative records. After reviewing all of the information that was provided to this court, we agree with Mother. Nowhere in the record before this court is there any indication that Pitts had a propensity for violence or that he or Mother had made any threats to anyone’s life or safety, even though it seems that everyone involved knew who had made the allegations of abuse and that the alleged victim was Daughter. And even if there had been a valid concern for a person’s life or safety, our reading of the statute is that a redacted version of the investigative records in DSS possession would still be accessible to Mother, with only the names of the reporters and any “identifying information” being redacted.
b. Prejudice as result of failure to provide access to the DSS report
However, even if Mother had the right to access the DSS investigative records in this proceeding, refusal to compel the DSS to release its records alone would not warrant reversal of the court’s judgment modifying child custody. In order to prevail, Mother must also demonstrate that she was prejudiced, as a result of the failure to provide her with access to the DSS investigative records. See Halford v. Halford, 292 S.W.3d 536, 543 n. 4 (Mo.App. S.D.2009) (“We should not reverse the trial court unless both error and prejudice are demonstrated.”). As noted above, Mother does not allege prejudice in her point relied on. We have elected to review this argument even though the point relied on is deficient. However, the argument itself alleges prejudice in only the most cursory way. Mother states simply that by denying her access to the DSS investigative records, the motion court “limited her counsel’s ability to cross-examine any DSS workers as to the contents ... or anything that is in the [DSS] record.”13 Also, Mother attempts to incorporate by reference into her appellate brief arguments that she made in pleadings before the motion court by stating that certain pleadings contained in the appendix and legal file “identify the prejudice she sustained with great particularity.” Arguments made in pleadings before the lower court may not be incorporated by reference in an appellate brief. Therefore, the only allegation *57of prejudice before this court is that the motion court’s failure to provide Mother with the DSS investigative records limited her ability to cross-examine any DSS workers about the contents of the records. Mother does not explain how cross-examining any DSS worker would have furthered her claims in this case. Mother’s bare allegation of prejudice is not supported by the record.14
In addition, Mother argues, without farther elaboration, that the DSS records to which she was denied access “were considered by” the motion court in its judgment. In her reply brief, Mother contends that the motion court’s reliance in its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on the fact that an allegation of sexual abuse against Pitts was substantiated by the DSS proves that the motion court relied upon the DSS investigative records, reviewed in camera by the motion court, in arriving at its decision and that the motion court erred in denying her review of the investigative records while relying on the same in its decision.
There is no indication that the motion court relied upon anything contained in the DSS investigative records in making its judgment. On the contrary, at the final hearing, the motion court expressly ruled that the DSS investigative records were not admissible. No DSS records were admitted into evidence at trial. In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, the motion court expressly cites to the transcript of the November 10, 2008, temporary custody hearing to support its finding that the allegation was substantiated by the DSS as to Pitts. 15 The motion court makes it clear that it was not relying on the records it reviewed in camera but on evidence presented by the parties. Even if the motion court had not expressly cited hearing evidence as the basis for its finding that the alleged abuse had been substantiated by the DSS, where evidence was presented during the modification hearings that a claim of abuse against Pitts was substantiated by the DSS, we will not presume that the court relied on information obtained during its in camera review of the investigative record.16
*58In light of the motion court’s pre-hear-ing ruling granting Mother’s motion in li-mine to prevent admission of the investigative records into evidence, we must assume that no evidence of the report of abuse or the resulting DSS investigation would have been presented at the final hearing had it not been for Mother’s decision to put the fact of the report and the investigation into evidence. Several people, including Mother, either stated or implied at the final hearing that the allegations against Pitts had been found to have been substantiated, and Mother’s attorney mentioned it in her closing argument. At the very least, Mother’s testimony at the final hearing regarding the second allegation against Pitts would reasonably lead to the inference that the second allegation had been substantiated.
Testimony was also offered, without objection, regarding the investigation of the allegations and that Pitts had been prohibited from having contact with Daughter. Mother did not seek to have this testimony admitted for the limited purpose of showing that it was Father who made the allegations of abuse. On appeal Mother does not challenge the validity of the motion court’s finding that the second allegations were substantiated; rather, she merely alleges that in light of that finding we should conclude that the motion court relied on the documents reviewed in camera and because the documents were relied upon, she should have been given access to those documents.17 Mother cannot elect, after the court had already ruled that the parents would not have access to the investigative records, to put into evidence the fact that an allegation of abuse was substantiated and then attempt to use the motion court’s reliance on that fact as the basis to claim that she was prejudiced by being denied access to the documents.
Further, even if Mother had been given access to the records so that she could challenge the validity of the DSS’s substantiation of abuse, there is no reason to believe that the judgment of the motion court would have been different. The motion court modified physical custody of Daughter because the court found that, when confronted with evidence of possible sexual abuse of Daughter, Mother took inadequate steps to protect Daughter from the possible abuse. The evidence that Mother was on notice of the possible abuse included not only the finding by the DSS that an allegation of abuse had been substantiated but also uncontroverted evidence that Daughter had repeatedly reported the abuse to Mother or to others in Mother’s presence and that at a hearing on November 10, 2008, a number of health care professionals testified to comments made by Daughter and conduct consistent with abuse. Both Mother and Pitts acknowledged that Mother did not question Pitts about the allegations of abuse. Moreover, after the second allegations, when Pitts had been ordered not to have *59any contact with Daughter, Daughter reported that she still saw Pitts when she went to Mother’s house for visitation, which prompted the GAL to conclude that Pitts might not understand what “no contact” means and led her to visit Mother’s home unannounced. During that visit, the GAL encountered Pitts on the property. All of this evidence supports the motion court’s finding that Mother failed to take steps to protect Daughter from possible sexual abuse.
Contrary to Mother’s argument, the motion court’s findings do not evidence that it relied on anything in the DSS investigative records as evidence that Pitts had in fact abused Daughter. Rather, the motion court found it relevant that Mother took no steps to protect Daughter after she had been made aware of serious allegations of sexual abuse. The motion court noted that Mother rejected the allegation of abuse out of hand and that she instead relied exclusively on her husband’s denials without taking “necessary and required steps to protect the child.” Thus, to the extent the motion court “relied” on the fact that the second allegation was “substantiated,” it did so, not as evidence that abuse had in fact occurred, but as evidence that Mother had been made aware of serious allegations and had failed to act on them. The fact that the motion court relied, for this limited purpose, on evidence that the second report of abuse was substantiated is also evidenced by the fact that the motion court did not make a finding that Pitts had abused Daughter.18 Suffice it to say that it was not an abuse of discretion to fault Mother for all but ignoring allegations that her child was being sexually abused.
The motion court’s conclusion that Mother did not take adequate steps to protect Daughter is also supported by its findings of fact regarding evidence of the allegations of abuse. The judgment cited the testimony of the various treating and evaluating professionals and the forensic examiner that relayed Daughter’s reports of abuse and behavior consistent with such allegations. This testimony was apparently presented at the November 2008 hearing, yet by the time of the final hearing in the spring of 2009, Mother still had not expressly asked Pitts about the veracity of the allegations.19
Because the record does not support the conclusion that the motion court relied upon the DSS investigative records in arriving at its decision and there is substantial evidence in the record provided to this court to support the judgment, Mother fails to show that she was prejudiced by the motion court’s refusal to allow her access to the records, even though such *60refusal was improper. Her second point on appeal is also, therefore, denied.
Time Limitations for Presentation of Evidence
Mother’s final point on appeal is that the motion court abused its discretion in limiting the parties to seven and one-half hours each to put on their cases at the final hearing because Mother was unable to sufficiently present her case within the bounds of such time constraints. As acknowledged by Mother’s point on appeal, time limitations placed on presentation of evidence are matters within the motion court’s discretion and will only be reversed for an abuse of that discretion. L.J.B. v. L.W.B., 921 S.W.2d 23, 27 (Mo.App. E.D. 1996). As long as the court notifies counsel in advance of any time limitations, they are usually upheld on appeal. See, e.g., McAllister v. McAllister, 101 S.W.3d 287, 291-93 (Mo.App. E.D.2003); Brady v. Brady, 39 S.W.3d 557, 560-61 (Mo.App. E.D.2001); L.J.B., 921 S.W.2d at 27. However, time limitations are not generally favored and “should be imposed carefully and only after consultation with counsel. If the evidence on essential points cannot be fully developed within the allotted time the court must show some flexibility.” B.J.D. v. L.A.D., 23 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Mo.App. E.D.2000). In all cases, an offer of proof must be made, either before the close of evidence or, if time does not permit, in a post-hearing written motion, stating what evidence would have been produced had additional time been allowed and how the party seeking to introduce that evidence was prejudiced by its being excluded. See, e.g., Brady, 39 S.W.3d at 560-61; L.J.B., 921 S.W.2d at 27.
In this case, the parties clearly knew about the time limitations in advance of the final hearing.
THE COURT: Now, I believe, for the record, the court is going to — has also advised the parties in chambers that each party has a total of seven and a half hours of direct or cross-examination. The clerk of this court will be keeping track of the time, and after conclusion of each direct or cross-examination, you’ll be advised of how much time was used so everybody is well aware of how much time has expired and how much time remains for each party. The guardian ad litem is excluded from the limitation other than for reasonableness, which I’m sure she will be.
Mother’s counsel objected to the time limitations stating that she had “multiple witnesses and some hundred or so exhibits” that Mother wanted to present to the court. After the court overruled Mother’s objection, the parties proceeded to put on their evidence. Mother herself testified and then called her mother-in-law, Daughter’s former and current daycare providers, an employee of the school district in which Mother resided, one of Daughter’s health care providers, and a child psychologist who had examined Daughter. Mother also cross-examined witnesses called by the other parties, including an employee of the Children’s Division.20
Mother’s offer of proof that she submitted with her motion stated that Mother wished to examine, inter alia: (1) several witnesses “regarding the Division of Family Services allegations and investigation of January, 2008, and May, 2008, including what was done, and more importantly what was not done, as well as the significant delays in their investigation”; (2) *61some ten people that she claims would have testified that Pitts was not .around Daughter and that they had not been contacted by the GAL; (3) over 100 character witnesses (one of whom was Pitts himself) to testify as to her and Pitts’s good characters; (4) the Carroll County Prosecutor to testify that Pitts had not been charged criminally for abusing Daughter; and (5) Stefanie Kissick, to testify as to an allegation that one of Father’s stepsons had touched Daughter inappropriately.
Mother provided no affidavits from any of the would-be witnesses to indicate that they would have testified in any manner that would have helped Mother’s case. In fact, Kissick did testify at the hearing and stated that she found the allegations of inappropriate touching by the stepbrother to have been completely incredible and that Daughter had been coached to make the false allegations by Mother. Moreover, since the crux of Mother’s case was that Pitts had been falsely accused, the best evidence had already been produced at the hearing. Pitts himself testified as to how and when he had touched Daughter. Mother also testified as to Pitts’s relationship with Daughter, and Father and Stepmother testified as to what Daughter had reported to them about Pitts. The GAL had found Pitts on the property during Mother’s parenting time with Daughter after Pitts had been ordered to have no contact with Daughter. Testimony was also elicited to establish that Pitts had not been charged criminally for abusing Daughter. Much of the testimony Mother sought to introduce was, therefore, duplicative or irrelevant. As such, Mother has failed to show that she was prejudiced by the time limitations imposed by the motion court. Testimony has to end sometime. Mother requested to examine over one hundred additional witnesses at the hearing. This is simply not reasonable. The motion court did not abuse its broad discretion, and Mother’s third point is denied.
Conclusion
For all of the abovestated reasons, the judgment of the motion court modifying custody and support is hereby affirmed.
JAMES EDWARD WELSH, Presiding Judge, concurs.
MARK D. PFEIFFER, Judge, dissents in separate opinion.